

THE CONCORD REVIEW

I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it.
K'ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects

New Netherland The Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey	Remko Wang Kuijs
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NEW NETHERLAND AND ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACTS ON EARLY AMERICA

Remko Wang Kuijs

I. Introduction

The national myth of origin of the United States is the tale of the Pilgrims landing at Plymouth.¹ New Englanders had been singing praises of their Pilgrim forebears for generations, when the Mayflower Compact was enshrined as the precursor to America's republican constitutions.² The common narrative is that America's social, political, and economic systems were by and large influenced by the British system. Moreover, scholars like David Fischer emphasize that American culture was shaped by four British folkways, diminishing other cultural influences.³ This Anglocentric viewpoint downplays the influence of ideas and institutions imported and developed under the Dutch in the colony of New Netherland, which later became New York.

There are several reasons why the Dutch influence is underappreciated. The colony of New Netherland lasted only fifty years, from 1614 to 1664. After that, there was no concerted effort by the Dutch Republic to grow their communities in North

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America. Also, the New Netherland Dutch did not publish a history of their own, and most documents in Dutch were not made available in English until recently. As a result, Dutch influence has been neglected or left at the fringe.⁴ In contrast, New Englanders had a definitive advantage in pushing their story onto the national stage, having been victorious in the American Civil War and aided by a deep historical awareness.⁵

In 1973, Charles Gehring began to translate a set of 12,000 17th-century Dutch documents stored in Albany's New York State Library. Throughout the following quarter of a century, Gehring, together with the New Netherland Institute he founded, published volume after volume of translated letters, court records, council minutes, government files, and company records. This newly available information sparked a new generation of historical research on New Netherland, providing insights on the long overlooked Dutch impact and challenging the Anglocentric narrative of American history.

These translated materials and the research that they have spurred demonstrated the deep cultural, social, and political influences of the Dutch on early American history. The 1993 *Encyclopedia of North America Colonies* contained 40 essays on various aspects of Dutch colonial history, revealing a new and more complete picture of early American history "with the Dutch put in."⁶ Jaap Jacobs and Firth Fabend both demonstrated that the transfer of culture, religious conventions and governmental institutions from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland was substantial, and that some of the influence was present and discernible well into the 19th century.⁷ Others produced work showing that the location and commercial importance of New Netherland and its capital New Amsterdam allowed it to play a critical role in shaping social patterns and ways of thinking in America.⁸

Too often, mainstream discussion of the Dutch colony's legacy has focused on the names it left behind. New Yorkers may have heard that Harlem came from *Haarlem*, or that Brooklyn came from *Breukelen*. Others have identified the colony's continuation in the great American families—the Roosevelts, Vanderbilts, and Van Burens—whose ancestries trace back to New Netherland.

The more meaningful legacies of New Netherland are easier to miss. The Dutch brought with them key ideas and institutions: an emphasis on commerce, a pragmatic policy of religious tolerance, and a tradition of defending community privileges and entitlements. These ideas would continue to shape the character of the region long after New Amsterdam became New York. The legacies of these ideas—New York’s commercial character, its reputation as the great American melting pot—are universally known, but their New Netherland origins are not. Out of these ideas emerged an unparalleled diversity of economic, religious, and regional interest groups. As they competed for advantage, they colored the unique political culture of New York with factional contention.

This paper shows how Dutch social and political ideas and institutions imported into New Netherland impacted early American politics and society. To achieve this, I explore the translated materials of the New Netherland Project and Holland Society as well as recent English and Dutch language research on the Dutch colonial presence and its impact. Secondly, the paper describes the historical context of the founding of the colony of New Netherland as well as the key ideas and institutions the settlers imported into the colony. The third section discusses the impact of Dutch ideas and institutions on early American politics and society, with an emphasis on commerce, ethnic diversity, religious tolerance, and the factious nature of New York politics. Section 4 concludes.

II. Historical overview and context

The Dutch Republic

To understand what the Dutch brought to its North American colony, it is important to acknowledge the special characteristics that distinguished the Dutch Republic from other European countries. Officially known as the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, the Dutch Republic formed in 1579 under the Union of Utrecht, uniting in revolt against Spanish rule and declaring independence from Spain in 1581. Dutch qualms against Spanish rule included Spanish efforts to extract greater taxes, efforts to centralize governmental structures across the provinces, and the persecution of Protestants. The Dutch revolt, known as

the Eighty Years' War, ended in 1648 when Spain recognized the independence of the Dutch Republic.

During the 17th century, the Dutch Republic was one of the world's most prominent maritime and trade powers. In the 1640s, 2,500 Dutch ships accounted for around half of Europe's total.⁹ Despite the turbulent backdrop of the Eighty Years' War, the Dutch Republic emerged as a center of commerce, science, and art, attracting merchants, intellectuals, and religious refugees. The port of Amsterdam saw the flow of goods from across Europe, as well as from European colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Amsterdam also served as Europe's information hub. Through its expansive trade network, newspapers, maps, and treatises published they "were certain to make an impact across the Continent."¹⁰

Amsterdam emerged as Europe's financial center as well, hosting the world's first stock exchange (established in 1611) and the first joint-stock company, set up to raise capital for the Dutch East India Company. Dutch success in trade and finance ran in parallel to a cultural proclivity toward commerce. Historian Simon Schama wrote that the Dutch had "a respect for commerce rather than nobility."¹¹ Reflecting the economic importance of trade and commerce, urban merchant classes were more prominent in Dutch social and political life than in other European countries. Since the late Middle Ages, Dutch cities had been run by rich merchant families, de facto "patricians" that formed the ruling regent class.

The emphasis on commerce also brought about a pragmatic cultural prioritization of profit over creed, which allowed the Netherlands to become an international center of commerce and tolerance.¹² Individuals from different backgrounds, beliefs and origin could obtain credit and exchange in Amsterdam with little trouble.¹³ While the Dutch Reformed Church was the official state church and other denominations were not permitted to worship publicly, the freedom of conscience was upheld.¹⁴ Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht explicitly stated that "each person shall remain free in his religion and that no one shall be investigated or persecuted because of his religion."¹⁵ This state policy of tolerance stood out starkly from contemporaneous Western Europe, where "virtually all political leaders" accepted that religious di-

versity was dangerous to political stability.¹⁶ Against the backdrop of the brutal religious wars of the early 17th century, Amsterdam became a place where different groups of people participated in the early modern Atlantic trade without fear of persecution and forced conversion.¹⁷

One notable feature of the Dutch Republic was the absence of a strong central government. Traditionally, Dutch fiefdoms enjoyed a large degree of autonomy from Burgundian and Habsburg rulers. These historical arrangements made the Dutch wary of centralized authority and protective of local autonomy. The Republic was a confederacy of seven provinces that initially united only to combat Spanish rule—each province operated as an independent entity, only ceding those powers to the States General (*Staten Generaal*) that were necessary for the maintenance of the collective peace and security. In turn, the regions were governed by their own ‘Staten,’ with cities enjoying a large degree of autonomy. The Dutch had a cultural disdain for overly concentrated power—as the 17th century painter Romeyn De Hooghe put it, a “strenuous spirit of opposition to a sovereign concentrated in one head.”¹⁸

In the absence of a strong central government, many political decisions were made by urban authorities, whether in townhalls, by clergymen, or by directors of the East or West India Companies.¹⁹ The political independence exercised by the provinces was reflected in the attitudes of the population, as observed by English diplomat William Aglioby, who wrote in 1669 that the people of Holland “all love their Liberties, even those that have made but a few years stay in that *Province*.”²⁰ Indeed, the comparatively tolerant Dutch Republic provided an environment of relatively free expression.²¹ English visitor John Ray noted in 1663 that in the Netherlands “the people say and print what they please, and call it liberty.”²² Those who sought refuge in the Netherlands included Descartes, Spinoza, John Locke, and the Pilgrims—the latter group lived in Leiden for twelve years before a number set sail for New England.

The Founding of New Netherland

By the time the Dutch and Spanish entered a truce in 1609, the Dutch Republic had begun to establish trade settlements

and colonies in Asia and Africa. In 1609, English sailor Henry Hudson sailed up the Hudson River (named after him in 1664) on behalf of the Dutch East India Company. His exploration of the modern-day New York region laid the foundation for Dutch colonization. In 1614, several Dutch merchants established the New Netherland Company to profit from the fur trade with Native Americans. Soon after, the company built Fort Nassau in the area of modern Albany, and in 1621, the Dutch government chartered the West India Company (WIC) to organize and expand commercial activity in the New World and challenge Spanish influence.²³

The first permanent settlement of the new colony was established at Fort Orange (now Albany) in 1624, and the construction of Fort Amsterdam at the southern tip of Manhattan Island, intended as a trading post, began in 1625. With a firm grip on the Hudson River, the Dutch controlled the only route from the coast to the Mohawk River Valley and the Great Lakes. The port city of New Amsterdam, chosen as the capital of New Netherland, soon became a major hub for trade between North America, the Caribbean, and Europe. By 1664, when the English seized control over the Dutch colony, it was home to 9,000 settlers, and covered the current New York and New Jersey areas and along the Hudson River valley up to Albany, parts of Connecticut and Delaware, and small outposts in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.²⁴

Ideas and institutions introduced into New Netherland

The makeup of settlers of New Netherland reflected the diversity of their home country. New Netherland settlers came not only from the Dutch Republic, but also from other parts of Europe. Analysis of ship passenger lists suggests that around 30% of the immigrants to New Netherland came from outside of the Republic, mostly from Germany, France (primarily Huguenots), and the Spanish Netherlands (current Belgium).²⁵ Nevertheless, the settlers of New Netherland largely shared the Protestant faith and West or Northern European origin. Most agreed, at least tacitly, to share “the same social system with the same norms and values” as promulgated by the Dutch West India Company.²⁶ With Dutch spoken as the common language of the colony, Russell Shorto argues that it was a “seventeenth-century Dutch sensibil-

ity”—keen business sense and a pragmatic willingness to put up with differences—that formed the social glue.²⁷

In the Dutch colony and New Amsterdam in particular, a remarkable level of mixing took place that Shorto calls “unprecedented elsewhere in the colonies.”²⁸ The marriage records of the Dutch Reformed Church show that a quarter of all marriages performed in New Amsterdam were culturally mixed.²⁹

The Dutch also brought to New Netherland a connection to the greater Atlantic world. The new settlements were built on Native land, where Manhatesen remained for decades, and the lucrative trade for furs connected European settlers of the colony to other Native American groups upriver.³⁰ New Netherland became home to enslaved people of African descent as well as the region’s first free black community.³¹ Under the West India Company, Manhattan became an Atlantic trade hub. Observing the varied cultures and ethnicities of people settled in the Dutch colony, a Jesuit priest who visited New Amsterdam in 1644 wrote that 18 languages were reported to be spoken in the colony.³²

As the first Europeans to settle in the area, the Dutch transferred their culture, religious arrangements and government institutions to New Netherland. The cultural and institutional transfer was enhanced after 1640, when the WIC lost its trade monopoly over New Netherland. This led to a significant influx of traders, businessmen and other settlers seeking to take advantage of the free port. As the colony transformed from a trade outpost into a settlement, the WIC started to serve as its government administration.

The autocratic nature of the WIC’s governance over the colony under Director-Generals such as Willem Kieft and Pieter Stuyvesant increasingly dissatisfied the population of New Amsterdam and especially its leaders, who expected a more participative government. Leaders such as lawyer Adrien van der Donck organized in opposition to the WIC officers, petitioning the Dutch States General for the blanket of Dutch rights to be applied to the colonists, including a system of quasi-representative government similar to that of the municipalities in the Netherlands. According to historian Jaap Jacobs, the resistance against the Governors

showed that New Amsterdam developed itself into a society that required competent governance in line with the wishes of the population and that aligned itself with what they were used to in the Republic.³³

In 1650, after years of opposition by obstinate WIC leaders, the States General introduced a new “Council” in the colony, operating in conjunction with the governor and composed of settlers and members of the WIC. Two years later, New Amsterdam received a city charter and thus a civil government (*burgerlijk bestuur*) with two mayors, five aldermen and a *schout* (prosecutor or sheriff, the predecessor of the District Attorney). Differences of opinion between leaders and inhabitants could thus be discussed in a recognizable Dutch model.³⁴

Among all the ideas and institutions brought into New Netherland, three that stand out are an emphasis on trade and commerce, diversity and religious tolerance, and the importance of traditional community rights.

Commerce was at the very heart of the colony. “Everyone here is a trader,” remarked a resident in 1650.³⁵ The opening of trade after 1640 had led to the growth of an intensely active merchant class that placed trade as a top priority and pressed the WIC for local institutions that would facilitate commerce and the growth of the local economy.³⁶ In fact, the campaign initiatives by New Amsterdam leaders for a city charter stemmed primarily from their desire to boost trade.³⁷ Leaders believed that their ability to control the institutions of local government would help urban economic development. In 1653 the mayors and aldermen of New Amsterdam successfully petitioned for the establishment of a *waag* or weighhouse, patterned after those in Dutch municipalities, understanding that successful business conduct rested on rigorous standards of measurement.³⁸ Soon thereafter, the people of New Amsterdam petitioned for and were granted the Burgher right, a form of citizenship that, among other things, restricted the right to trade to people with a stake in the community. In doing so, the merchants of New Amsterdam wished to protect their emerging prosperity against what they saw as the chaos of itinerant traders

taking advantage of New Amsterdam's ports without paying the taxes that inhabitants had to pay.³⁹

By 1650, public offices in most Western Dutch cities were controlled by regent families of mercantile origins that directed civic activities. The Dutch brought this urban culture to the colony. The influx of commercial activity during the Dutch colonial period spurred the emergence of a *burgerlijke* urban patrician middle-class. As in the home country, merchants' social and political standing rose as they acquired wealth through trade. The elevated status of merchants was reflected in their prominence as church officers and in magisterial appointments.⁴⁰ The merchant class and the mercantile culture they promoted continued to flourish after the English takeover. As the social structure in English New York matured, it continued to follow this Dutch pattern.

The Dutch transplanted their religious institutions to New Netherland. By the 1640s, the Dutch Reformed religion was practiced in the colony in similar ways as in the Dutch Republic.⁴¹ Colonial congregations organized in the same fashion as the homeland churches, clergymen were sent over from the Netherlands, and worship was performed in Dutch.⁴² Almost two decades before the founding of Rhode Island—regarded as the first English colony with religious tolerance—there was New Netherland. Although the Reformed church alone enjoyed the privilege of a public church, people of different religious beliefs were generally allowed to settle in New Netherland and worship in private. This practical policy of tolerance was in sharp contrast with the Puritans in the Plymouth Bay and Massachusetts colonies, who strictly imposed their religious laws and banished dissenters like Roger Williams. The Virginia colony was similarly intolerant, adopting religious tolerance only late in the 18th century.⁴³

Mirroring practice in the homeland, directors of the WIC generally upheld practical tolerance of non-Calvinists as they were more concerned about immigrants' potential economic contribution than their own "religious predilections."⁴⁴ When Pieter Stuyvesant urged the removal of Jews, Quakers, and Lutherans, the WIC commanded him to "not force people's consciences, but allow everyone to have his own belief, as long as he behaves

quietly and legally.”⁴⁵ This policy of toleration was not based on any enlightened philosophy—it came from the need to populate the colony and facilitate commerce. The WIC directors noted that this policy had led to a “considerable influx of people” in old Amsterdam, and that New Amsterdam “would be benefited by” it.⁴⁶

By the time an English fleet seized the colony in 1664, it was likely the most religiously diverse colony in the New World.⁴⁷ Expulsion or forced conversion to the Church of England would have been impossible, and thus the Duke of York accepted an unusually tolerant policy on religion.⁴⁸ The Dutch negotiated in the 1664 Articles of Capitulation that existing settlers under future English jurisdiction “shall keep and enjoy the liberty of their consciences.”⁴⁹ Indeed, the visiting Virginian William Byrd commented in 1682 that New Amsterdam had “as many Sects of religion there as at Amsterdam.”⁵⁰

Another aspect of traditional Dutch society brought to New Netherland was the importance of traditional privileges and liberties obtained by interest groups and communities as “corporate rights.” Since the early medieval ages, merchant burghers in the Netherlands would pay overlords for town charters that included commercial and political privileges, often including the right to self-governance and monopolies in the production or distribution of a commodity.⁵¹ Dutch communities in New Netherland drew on this tradition—the merchants of New Amsterdam and Beverwijck (Albany) campaigned for and received city governments and the Burger right, for instance.⁵²

III. The impact of Dutch ideas and institutions on early American society and politics

This section shows that legacies of the Dutch colony, including an emphasis on trade and commerce, many ethnicities and religions, and the guarding of communal privileges, were important in shaping the social-political character of New York. The state’s factious politics, in part a result of the Dutch legacy, laid the foundation for party politics in the 18th century and beyond.

After the English took over New Netherland in 1664, the colony faced challenges in maintaining Dutch cultural and

institutional continuity as immigrants from New England and of non-Dutch origin poured in. Settlers from Britain and New England immigrated to the colony, as well as French Huguenots, Germans, and smaller contingents of Scots, Irish, Swedes, and Portuguese Jews.⁵³ New York City saw the bulk of non-Dutch immigration, and by 1698 the Dutch made up slightly less than half of the city's white population, compared to majorities in upriver areas and an overwhelming 93% in Albany County.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, in the decades after the English conquest, everyday life changed little. The Duke's Laws of 1665, written by the Duke of York's first governor Richard Nicolls, drew English, Dutch, and New England precedents together and incorporated Dutch legal liberties into the judicial system. The newly "conquered" Dutch retained their customary rights and traditions, including Dutch customs in inheritance, property rights and family matters.⁵⁵ The "Anglicization" model that long dominated the historiography of New York holds that cultural change was unidirectional and steady.⁵⁶ The reality was more nuanced. Dutch settlers persisted in their customary ways despite greater exposure to British culture. In the decades following the English takeover, although the Dutch became an ethnic minority, close kinship and commercial ties with the Dutch Republic meant that New York culture continued to reflect that of the Dutch Republic.⁵⁷

Dutch political divisions resonated in New York as well. In the 17th century, Dutch politics split into two factions. The *Oranjegezinden* (Orangists) supported the executive power known as the *stadhouder*, while the *Staatengezinden* (States Faction) supported the *raadpensionaris*, who represented the regents. The factions aligned with opposing sides of a theological dispute between followers of Gisbertus Voetius and Johannes Cocceius.⁵⁸ As a Voetian-inspired Pietist movement spread into New York's Reformed churches, New York's merchant elite began to fracture into opposing lines that echoed the divisions in the Republic.⁵⁹

Jacob Leisler, son of a Reformed minister, rallied the colony's artisans and small traders with Orangism against King James II's centralizing policies and the Anglicizing Dutch elite.⁶⁰ In 1689, Leisler seized control of the colony for two years before

royal authority was restored and he was beheaded. “Rancor and reprisal” remained long after the short-lived uprising, and New York divided into Leislerian and Anti-Leislerian factions that remained in bitter contention until the arrival of Governor Robert Hunter in 1710.⁶¹

Over time, Leislerians began to associate with the English Whigs and Anti-Leislerians with the Tories.⁶² But it is clear that New Yorkers, at least in part, saw their political strife in terms of that of the Dutch Republic. When Leislerians called their opponents “grandees” and “Cocceians,” and when Robert Livingston called Leislerians “butter boxes and boors,” they were using relevant Dutch political labels.⁶³

Importance of Trade and the Merchant Class

Under the Dutch, Manhattan developed into a regional trade hub. The Dutch settlers negotiated for the continuation of their trade networks in the Articles of Capitulation, securing language assuring that “Dutch vessels may freely come hither.”⁶⁴ The new English governors quickly recognized that they were in the unique position of being at the heart of world trade with both Dutch and English trade networks, and made a point of naming prominent Dutch merchants to economic councils to retain these strong ties.⁶⁵ Commerce remained at the heart of the colony—a regional comparison shows that exports per capita in 1768-1772 were 25% higher in the Middle Colonies than in New England.⁶⁶ In the 19th century, exports from New York continued to grow rapidly, even as shipments from Boston stagnated.⁶⁷

The Dutch merchant patrician class retained their position in the urban social structure, as evidenced by occupational and wealth profiles of the Dutch in NYC and Albany in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. They often retained political dominance as well. A handful of interrelated merchant families increasingly dominated urban and provincial offices.⁶⁸ Between 1686 and 1776, two-fifths of officials elected to the Albany Common Council came from eleven wealthy Dutch merchant families. Over the course of 90 years of colonial charter government, these patrician families led the rest by far, both in terms of number of members and terms served.⁶⁹

Trade between New York and the Dutch colonial world, both legal and illegal, continued to flourish long after 1664 despite later English attempts to restrict it with various Navigation Acts. Merchants in New York relied on their strong ties in Amsterdam to secure goods and credit for imports from continental Europe, and went to Amsterdam brokers for the best maritime insurance.⁷⁰ Evidence suggests that Dutch commercial networks persisted right up to the American Revolution. Even as traders' imports of Dutch manufactured goods declined throughout the 18th century, as late as 1756 a British act curbing the flow of smuggled goods on Dutch ships into America created a crisis among the merchants of New York.⁷¹

Dutch traders played an important role in the leadup to the American Revolution: they supplied goods, including tea, for the colonies while the colonists boycotted British imports. During the boycotts, the colonists echoed old Dutch arguments about the harms of overtaxation and the overregulation of trade.⁷²

The Guarding of Community Privileges

The Dutch tradition of defending communal privileges did not disappear after the English takeover. Communities retained their existing privileges and continued seeking to acquire new ones.⁷³ In the 1680s, leading Dutch merchants in Albany sought to firm their grip on the fur trade amidst competition from New York City and Schenectady. In Dutch fashion, they paid Governor Dongan £300 for monopoly privileges over the Indian trade to be included in the 1686 Dongan charter, which incorporated Albany as an English town.⁷⁴

Throughout the 18th century, New York communities jealously guarded the entitlements granted to them in their charters and patents. Facing challenges from other communities, Albany traders fought for the right to enforce their monopoly in the Assembly, until finally a Schenectady trader successfully challenged it in the courts in 1726.⁷⁵ Competition between communities and interest groups over entitlements would prove a common theme in colonial New York politics—New York City would compete with upriver communities over an export-trade monopoly and a flour-bolting monopoly.⁷⁶

The Dutch-style city government charters and privileges granted to New Amsterdam (New York City) and Beverwijck (Albany), as well as New Netherland's 16 separate villages, would lay the foundations for the web of overlapping jurisdictions which distinguish New York, as well as the "intercommunal bickering" among New York regions that persists to this day.⁷⁷

Religious Tolerance and the Melting Pot

Dutch ideas of tolerance and acceptance of different peoples and ideas persisted in New York after 1664. Freedom of conscience was guaranteed under the English rule as a result of the negotiations of the Dutch surrender in 1664. Indeed, little changed in the tolerant climate of former New Netherland. In 1686, Governor Thomas Dongan observed that in addition to Dutch Calvinists, Anglicans, French Calvinists, Dutch Lutherans, and "ordinary" Quakers, the city also contained "Singing Quakers, Ranting Quakers, Sabbatarians; Antisabbatarians; Some anabaptists some Independant; some Jews."⁷⁸ Ships from the Dutch Republic, with mixed loads of European immigrants, continued arriving in the New York harbor, sometimes to the dismay of new English leaders. Future Governor Charles Lodwick remarked in 1692 that New York had "too great a mixture of nations and English the least part," echoing the sentiments of some contemporaries and future commentators that ethnic diversity threatened the social order.⁷⁹

When Stuyvesant surrendered control of the colony to an English fleet in 1664, America's national myth of origin was already emerging. Beginning in the 1660s, a group of New England clergymen began extolling their pilgrim forebears. A century later, John Adams proclaimed his reverence of the Pilgrims and announced them as the fathers of America, whose traits of being practical, plain-spoken, and businesslike ought to be emulated.⁸⁰ But the Pilgrims were also intolerant zealots. Freedom of worship, according to a prominent New England minister who later became president of Harvard College, was the "first born of all abominations."⁸¹ The state policy of intolerance pursued often cruel punishments for those who practiced another sect.

John Brodhead, a New York historian who spent four years in Europe gathering documents in Dutch and English archives

pertaining to the origin of New York, pointed to a reason for the differences in toleration in an 1864 lecture: unlike the English, the Dutch colonists were not persecuted at home. “They left its shores, not as refugees. But as volunteers—not to seek freedom to worship God for themselves and deny it to others; not to establish an inquisitorial dogmatism, but to live and let others live in comfort.”⁸² Brodhead, along with his contemporary E. B. O’Callaghan, recognized the Dutch colony’s overlooked significance while America was “in throes of a nostalgia for its Puritan beginnings.” Indeed, a newspaper correspondent responded to one of Brodhead’s lectures by vehemently disputing that America could have followed “the example of the policy of the petty cheese-paring of the Batavian provinces.”⁸³

The Middle Colonies have long been considered the birthplace of the American melting pot. In one of the earliest descriptions of American society, French-born American writer J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur had this region in mind when he wrote that “here individuals of all nations [and religions] are melted into a new race.”⁸⁴ Beneath the label of the Middle Colonies lies the Dutch colony, as well as Pennsylvania, known for its religious toleration. But the former Dutch colony can claim unique importance among the other colonies of the region named as the progenitor of the ‘melting pot,’ in that it is the colony in which a multi-ethnic society first formed.⁸⁵

The Dutch colony set Manhattan on a course as a place of openness and toleration alien to New England and Virginia. Between 1624 and 1750, New York had the greatest religious diversity of all North American colonies.⁸⁶ Considering the religious diversity already existing in the former New Netherland, the English had no choice but to maintain the freedom of conscience.⁸⁷

In practice, upholding the freedom of conscience principle varied by governor. Governors Benjamin Fletcher and Edward Cornbury both embarked on campaigns to establish religious conformity in the colony, and the notoriously detested Cornbury attempted to prosecute Presbyterian ministers in 1707.⁸⁸ The governors’ attempts to force the Church of England on a non-Anglican population only intensified New Yorkers’ attachment

to the freedom of conscience. After Cornbury's departure, the English seemed to "discover what the leaders of the Dutch WIC had known"—that religious diversity and tolerance facilitates "economic success" far better than "orthodoxy and repression."⁸⁹

New York's religious denominations did not always exist in harmony. But the sheer variety of ethnicities and denominations was a result of the Dutch colony's official policy of tolerance. So was the social mixing, economic interdependence, and intermarriage that blurred religious and ethnic lines, and reduced their importance.⁹⁰ Given this background, it is no surprise that the New York Constitution of 1777 guaranteed religious freedom. Indeed, the degree and reach of the religious freedoms included in it created "the most tolerant constitutional order in the new nation."⁹¹

Unique among the state constitutions of the Revolutionary era, New York's 1777 constitution not only disestablished the Anglican church but also prohibited the future establishment of any church, cleanly separating the church and the state.⁹² "Clearly," wrote historian Patricia Bonomi, "no church establishments could be imposed on such a mixed population."⁹³ Instead, the voluntary church, supported by free choice rather than obligatory taxes and the law, emerged and flourished.

This positive experience with pluralism and voluntary churches was manifest in the minds of revolutionary generation Americans as they thought about church and state in their new Constitution. Some leaders worried that in the absence of specific language favoring Protestants, "Papists...deists...or Mahometans" may gain office.⁹⁴ But most sought to create language acceptable to an ever-diverse people. Thomas Jefferson wrote that "Pennsylvania and New York...have long subsisted without any establishment... They flourish infinitely. Religion is well supported." James Madison agreed, writing that the Middle Colonies that "rejected religious establishments altogether, proved that all Sects might be safely & advantageously put on a footing of equal & entire freedom."⁹⁵

Particularly factious politics

One aspect of the Dutch legacy in New York was the breadth of material for contention it left behind. Wealthy and comparatively influential merchant and landholding classes, as

well as artisans and tenant farmers, vied for economic advantage. The unparalleled range of ethnicities and religious denominations coexisted, sometimes competing, sometimes interlinking. Communities fiercely guarded traditional privileges and monopolies. The sheer variety of interest groups was wider than in any other place of comparable size.⁹⁶

Unlike a number of other colonies where interests were less diverse, ever-present polarities in New York created what Bonomi argues was a particularly factious body politic. Historians like Philip L. White and Gary B. Nash have pointedly observed that the premise that New York was exceedingly factious cannot be proven without a comparative study of colonial politics.⁹⁷ However, the ubiquity of constant bitter competition between interest groups and contemporary accounts of factionalism certainly provide evidence for it. Historians of colonial New York and contemporary commentators alike persistently emphasize the factiousness and “viciousness” of their politics.⁹⁸ When Governor Fletcher arrived in 1692 he lamented that New Yorkers were “divided” and “contentious.”⁹⁹ Robert Livingston attributed factionalism to ethnic differences: “a mixture of English, Dutch, and French...they are not unanimous, & doe not stick to one another.”¹⁰⁰ Some 70 years later, the colony’s Lieutenant Governor Cadwallar Colden wrote that so long as New Yorkers had “different political and religious principles,” factionalism would continue to run rampant.¹⁰¹ Historian Milton Klein summarized that the “political history of colonial New York is the story of party rivalries.”¹⁰²

The early 18th-century political and economic rivalry in New York between the “landed” or “country” interests and “merchant interests” offers an example of the constant political competition between varied factions for group or personal advantage. With deep roots in commercial activity and the distribution of huge tracts of land in Dutch “patroons,” mercantile and landed interests both became very wealthy and politically influential. This dual prominence differed from the politics of the South, where planter interests generally dominated, and that of New England, where the township pattern of land distribution prevented the rise of a class of wealthy landowners.¹⁰³

In the 1710s, as the old Leislerian and Anti-Leislerian tensions subsided, new battle lines were drawn between the “merchant interest” and the “country interest” as they vied for political control. Over the next two decades, the two factions bitterly contended for official favor in a struggle to determine the direction of fiscal policy and future development. The most contentious issue was how to raise the colony’s revenue. At the time, the New York government obtained most of its budget through duties on trade and internal excise taxes, and a small share came from a tax on property “as needed.”¹⁰⁴

The merchant faction was resistant to the idea that duties should provide the main source of the colony’s income and pushed for a land tax. This became the dominant political issue in the first part of the 18th century as the two interest groups fought for control over political bodies and the favor of the governors.¹⁰⁵ When one faction gained the upper hand, they pushed out opponents in important positions and implemented policy in line with their own group interests at the expense of the other. Governor William Burnet replaced merchant interest leaders from the Executive Council with country faction allies shortly after his arrival in 1721, for instance. With the merchant opposition temporarily neutralized, Burnet succeeded in passing a law banning the sale of Indian goods to the French “notwithstanding many difficulties put in the way by merchants.”¹⁰⁶

The factional divisions shifted with time as New York’s economy became more complex and new issues rose to the fore in the 1730s. The “country” faction led by landowner Lewis Morris initially incorporated the interest of artisans, farmers, and “toleration for dissenters and for Dutch descendants,”¹⁰⁷ but later adopted more conservative stances. The factions were led by elites who sought to “manipulate the lower segments of society for partisan advantage,” capable of “appearing either liberal or conservative as it suited their purposes.”¹⁰⁸

It is difficult to trace a pattern of development in colonial New York political factions based on ideology, in part because of the fluid nature of factional divisions. One might find political allies in the 1720s on opposing sides of new factional lines a decade

later, as new issues, religious and constitutional, emerged and personal or group interests changed. Philip Livingston remarked on the fluid nature of factional divisions, observing that “we Change Sides as Serves our Interest best not the Countries.”¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, both Klein and Bonomi observed a traceable development in New York politics. The colony’s political evolution exhibited a “steadily rising intensity of competition among concerted factions.”¹¹⁰ As one conflict followed another, New Yorkers refined their skills as partisans, polishing their skills in political organization, developing over time “much of the paraphernalia of the modern political process”—canvassing votes, pamphleteering, creating slogans, running slates of candidates, and appealing to minority groups.¹¹¹

Historians broadly agree that Martin Van Buren was the architect of the modern two-party system, and that his Albany Regency was the prototype of the modern political party.¹¹² Bonomi argues that the regency possessed a stability and cohesiveness that was more than a stroke of luck or genius—rather, that it came from a long thread of political experience of Van Buren’s New York predecessors. “One thinks of Burrrites” and “Clintonians,” she writes, “of the Whigs and Tories” of the Revolution, “and thence back to colonial factions led by Morrisises, DeLanceys, Philippses, and Livingstons.”¹¹³ Though the level of party development and organization fades with each step back, it remains noticeable especially when compared to party development in other areas at corresponding times.¹¹⁴


In other words, New York’s unparalleled variety of ethnic, religious, and economic interests led to a constant state of factionous contention. The factions of each new division drew on the political, electoral, and organizational experience or innovation of the previous, over time creating a political culture rich with partisan experience. This political culture ultimately aided in the development of an essentially modern party system—Richard Hofstadter wrote that it was this political culture “from which Van Buren had emerged.”¹¹⁵

IV. Conclusion

Too often, this short-lived and non-English colony has been ignored in the story of America's origins, relegated to footnotes in English histories of New York. But the Dutch didn't vanish in 1664, neither did their culture, customs, and social structures.

The Dutch colonists imported Dutch ideas and institutions into their 17th century colony, key among them an emphasis on trade and commerce, and a politically powerful merchant class that pursued privileges and advantages for their communities. They also brought to New Netherland a diverse immigrant group and a practical policy of toleration. These ideas, institutions and power structures persisted long after the formal Dutch rule ended and helped shape the social and political character of New York, and through it, the nation.

Building on the foundation laid by the Dutch, New York's trade and commerce continued to expand rapidly. The tolerance of different religions and peoples, a legacy of the Dutch colony, was key in making New York the birthplace of the American melting pot. New York's religious arrangements also influenced the thinking of the revolutionary generation on church and state in their new Constitution. Meanwhile, New York's factious politics, shaped by high diversity in terms of groups of people and interests, and the practice of fighting for communal privileges, developed further in the 18th century and contributed to the evolution of modern party politics.



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RATIONAL OR IRRATIONAL: KAMIKAZE
ATTACKS IN WORLD WAR II

Kyle Zhang

Introduction

Despite Japan's impressive advances early in World War II, particularly its rapid expansion in China and colonization of Singapore and the Philippines, the tide of war began to turn after 1942. A huge carrier defeat at Midway and substantial airpower losses in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, called the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot by the Americans, sent Japanese forces reeling. One result of these military defeats was Japan's decision to send more than three thousand kamikaze pilots flying towards American fleets intending to directly crash into them.¹

These suicide tactics not only inspired "sensational headlines and articles in [contemporary] newspapers and magazines," but also attracted analysis by military historians.² Examined in the context of the war economy and Japan's unique culture and history, adopting the seemingly irrational kamikaze tactics was in fact a rational decision of the Japanese government, complied

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with by their soldiers. The main driving forces of these unprecedented mass suicide attacks were the possible economic benefit of achieving a truce rather than unconditional surrender, and the blind loyalty from Japanese pilots and citizens despite the ever-prominent fear of death.

The Emergence of Kamikazes

Suicidal tactics first emerged in New Guinea from late 1943 to early 1944, where Japanese pilots employed them to halt air raids by American planes, but these actions were taken individually by the pilots as a last resort.³ After Lieutenant Colonel Koji Tanaka returned to Japan from New Guinea, he recommended that the Japanese government create kamikaze attack units.⁴ Soon afterwards, when Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi arrived at Luzon in the Philippines on October 17, 1944, he found that he had fewer than 100 operable planes, no match for the incoming American carrier fleet. To neutralize the American forces, he proposed the use of suicide attacks. Within an hour, twenty-seven pilots of the 201st Air Group volunteered for the mission, marking the first organized kamikaze unit in World War II.⁵ Their success made kamikaze tactics seem a viable option for the Japanese government.

By 1944, the Japanese had exhausted their military reserves, including pilots, planes, and aviation gasoline. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese had a group of well-trained pilots with 500 to 650 hours of flight time each, often combined with combat experience in the Second Sino-Japanese War.⁶ Such training and experience contributed to Japan's early military successes against the Americans. But over time, the pilots suffered great casualties because their planes had less protective armament. The replacement pilots had much less training time—typically less than 100 hours—generally resulting from a shortage of aviation gasoline due to the Allied economic blockade.⁷ In addition to the lack of experienced pilots, fewer planes could be used as fighters because of the heavy loss of planes in the earlier stages of the war along with decreasing manufacturing capabilities due to the blockade.

Kiichi Kawano, a kamikaze pilot who was originally scheduled to take off the day after Japan surrendered, recalled, “On July 25, 1945, the top military leaders decided to convert my unit of 116 pilots to a Special Attack Force (kamikaze), because our planes were unfit for combat.”⁸ Their planes, no longer suitable for traditional aerial warfare, were put to use as kamikaze planes in order to inflict some damage on enemy targets. Yukihiisa Suzuki, another kamikaze pilot, described the special attack planes as being in such poor condition that they would have a difficult time even completing their kamikaze missions. He referred to the obsolete and poorly maintained Kate he was assigned to as a “miserable coffin.”⁹ Overwhelmed by the shortage of well-trained pilots, well-equipped planes, and aviation gasoline, the Japanese were not capable of relying on conventional air attacks to effectively deter the American advance. Kamikazes emerged when Japan had exhausted its air force capabilities. They were the final choices that used dilapidated aircraft and inexperienced pilots to deter powerful American fleets.

The Japanese Government’s Two Choices

Military power required economic strength and resources, and Japan and the United States were far from equally matched in this respect. While the United States had a GDP of \$800.3 billion in 1938 and a land area of 3.5 million square miles, Japan had a GDP of \$169.4 billion and a land area of 0.14 million square miles.¹⁰ The United States’ GDP was about five times as large as Japan’s, and it had more than twenty times as much land. Japan’s significantly inferior economic capacity made it unlikely to support a long war against an enemy as strong as the United States. The disparity in steel output, essential for the production of aircraft, ships, and weapons, was even larger: while the *New York Times* boasted in its business section that “1944 Steel Output Setting Records, 7,188,482 net tons produced in February,” Japan, including all its occupied territories, produced only 5.9 million tons in the whole of 1944.¹¹

Given these discrepancies in economic capacity and military power, Japan's probability of winning World War II outright was close to zero. This effectively left it with two choices. The first choice was unconditional surrender, which would require the Japanese to return all territories they had occupied since World War I. The phrase "unconditional surrender" was first publicly brought up by President Roosevelt during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, a year before the first official kamikaze attack was organized.¹² On December 1, 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the Allies. It further specified,

It is [the Allies'] purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.¹³

Under the Cairo Declaration, Japan would retain only its home islands, which had an area of 0.14 million square miles, half of which was suitable for growing crops, to support seventy million people.¹⁴ To support that much population on such little farmable land, Japan already used phosphate, potash, and fish fertilizer to a great extent in its agriculture, creating the highest rice yield per acre in the world.¹⁵ Even with such efforts, at the start of the war, fifty percent of the population was engaged in feeding the nation and twenty percent of the rice consumed still had to be imported.¹⁶ Japan's agriculture industry on the eve of World War II demonstrates how its food security was vulnerable and its labor force was already strained to provide sustenance for the population.

Using agriculture as a window into its economic situation, it is evident why Japan had a strong desire to expand into China and Southeast Asia: to obtain resources that the home islands did not have in abundance. The imperial Japanese state of Manchuria, located in northeastern China and occupied by Japan from 1931 to 1945, had over half a million square miles of land with

thirty million people.¹⁷ As Japan secured its hold on Manchuria, the production of coal and iron ore in Manchuria and other occupied territories in China rose considerably, eventually supplying 49 percent of Japan's iron.¹⁸ Manchuria's soybeans and salt also became an essential part of Japan's food intake.¹⁹ In Southeast Asia, Japan controlled 1.7 million square miles of land, 140 million residents, and many valuable resources, including crude oil, rubber, copper, tin, and nickel.²⁰ There is no publicly available data in English on the goods that Japan took from Southeast Asia during World War II, but the available trade data is suggestive. For instance, the Dutch East Indies, which were occupied by Japan for three and a half years, exported 11.2 million tons of goods in 1940 alone before Japan's occupation, making it evident how extra land could benefit Japan economically.²¹

Indeed, Japan longed for vast areas of land and valuable resources for its growing population and economy, which was one of the main reasons it started the war and refused to surrender. Giving up all of their occupied territories after an unconditional surrender meant that it would have nothing after paying the enormous cost of a prolonged war. In contrast, in the event of a truce, Japan's other diplomatic option, it would conceivably be allowed to retain some of their occupied territories. Indeed, an intercepted cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to his ambassador in Moscow, sent on July 13, 1945, stated that "[u]nconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace."²²

In this light, the choice to implement kamikaze attacks was not made to win the war, but to impose a high cost on the Americans so Japan could reach a favorable treaty. At the outset of the Pacific war, Japan was fully aware that its chances of victory were slim, because in a war of attrition, the United States' industrial capabilities would decide the ultimate outcome of the war. Japan's original plan for the Pacific War was thus to strike a paralyzing blow, wage a short defense, and then negotiate a peace in which it would give up some of its farthest territories but not the most important ones.²³ Kamikazes were later incorporated into the Japanese homeland defense operation *Ketsu-Go* to inflict heavy

losses on the invading Americans.²⁴ The Japanese hoped that by doing so, there would be too many casualties for American society to withstand. The Americans would be compelled to make an agreement which left Japan with some of its occupied territories or allowed it to preserve much-needed resources. Hichiro Maemura, a former instructor for kamikaze pilots, said, "I did not believe we could win the war against the overwhelming enemy, no matter how well we fought. [...] Our special kamikaze tactics could delay the enemy's advance towards our homeland and inflict severe damage upon him. By delaying his encroachment we hoped that the enemy would agree to negotiate a truce."²⁵

Kamikazes were about as effective as the Japanese had hoped. In World War II, 60 U.S. ships were sunk, another 347 were damaged, 6,805 servicemen were killed, and 9,923 servicemen were wounded by kamikaze strikes.²⁶ These attacks were estimated to be four to five times more effective than conventional air attacks and had approximately a twenty percent success rate overall.²⁷ Japanese planners themselves viewed kamikaze tactics as more likely to be successful than conventional attack methods, judging that "[t]he chances of scoring a hit would be much greater than by conventional bombing. It would probably take several days to repair the damage to the flight deck [of the carrier]."²⁸ The Americans also realized that a conventional invasion of Japan would be opposed ferociously by thousands of kamikaze aircraft and other suicide crafts, with over one million predicted casualties.²⁹ Considering that the atomic bomb had been under construction until the first nuclear detonation, the Trinity test, on July 16, 1945, it was not unreasonable for Japan to view kamikazes as a way to increase its bargaining power and achieve some strategic goals.³⁰

Societal Roots of Kamikazes

Kamikaze tactics seemed promising, but the cost of implementing them was enormous. Although kamikaze planes were typically obsolete and therefore considered worthless, giving up thousands of valuable pilots' lives was unimaginable to many. There

are several reasons, however, why Japanese soldiers and citizens displayed little resistance to such inhumane actions.

First, the Japanese political and cultural systems stressed loyalty to the emperor, the sacred center of the nation. Japan has the oldest continuous lineage of emperors in the world, starting at least 1500 years ago, with mythical accounts dating back to 660 BCE.³¹ Although there were periods when Japanese emperors lost power to other political forces to varying degrees, they remained the symbol of sovereignty. The *de facto* rulers, such as shoguns, still had to be officially appointed by the emperors, who were believed to be the direct descendants of the sun goddess.³² The Japanese faith in their divine emperor had been passed down from generation to generation. Even decades after Emperor Hirohito proclaimed in 1946 that he was “not a living god and that the concept of the Emperor’s divinity is not true” in an imperial rescript called *Ningen-sengen*, the emperor still holds a special place in modern Japan.³³ When Emperor Naruhito was crowned in 2019, Yorio Fujimoto, a professor of Shinto studies, commented, “the Japanese people have a very special understanding of what is Japan. It is not just a nation in terms of geography...Rather, we must also take into account the special existence of the emperor, who rules in a spiritual and cultural sense.”³⁴

Parallel to this loyalty to the state and emperor, filial piety, a Confucian concept adopted from China in the seventh century, required people to respect and obey their parents. Confucianism held that those who respect their parents were more willing to obey superiors. As its ethics stressed social order and promoted authority, “Japanese rulers awarded citation and material benefits to citizens for exemplary filial behavior.”³⁵ Furthermore, filial piety practices were cultivated through formal education as well as through tales, prints, and even embroidery on clothes.³⁶ For example, Japan developed many versions of *Twenty-four Instances of Filial Piety* based on China’s classic. An illustrated version, collected by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, vividly exemplified via twenty-four short stories how to put filial piety principles into

practice.³⁷ Eventually, filial piety became an important way of life, one deeply rooted in Japanese culture.

Second, Japanese religions were purposefully shaped and controlled by the Japanese government during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) in order to foster nationalism and loyalty. Forced by Western countries to open its borders and threatened by a series of unequal treaties in the 1850s and 1860s, the Japanese were anxious to create a powerful government and army to defend against foreign encroachment.³⁸ Adopting the slogan “enrich the country, strengthen the army” (*Fukoku kyohei*), the Meiji Restoration was characterized by rapid modernization, the centralization of power in the emperor, and the rising influence of the military.³⁹ Parallel to the political and economic transformation, religious belief was exploited to help instill loyalty among Japanese citizens, particularly soldiers. In contrast to Buddhism, which was introduced to Japan in the sixth century BCE, the native religion Shinto had a natural connection with nationalism. In addition, it worshipped the emperor, along with nature and the deceased, which accompanied the spirit of nationalism during the Meiji Restoration. Shinto became the official religion of Japan in 1868.⁴⁰

Shinto shrines were typically controlled and maintained by local, prefectural, or national governments.⁴¹ However, Yasukuni Shrine, one of the most important Shinto shrines, was controlled by the military from its creation.⁴² It was established in 1869 to commemorate those who gave their lives to the nation. Army officials refused to have a regular high priest officiate at ceremonies, instead appointing army officers to priestly roles.⁴³ The prayers at the shrine repeatedly emphasized loyalty to the emperor and praised the people who died for him.⁴⁴

By controlling Yasukuni Shrine, the military intentionally converted the memorial of the war dead into a commendation of their sacrifice, which was not a custom of traditional shrines, but a political rite by choice. In this way, they were able to link religious and patriotic sentiments, forming a receptive atmosphere for the creation of kamikazes.

During World War II, shrines took on increasing importance. For example, ceremonies and morning prayers were held regularly at Yasukuni, and kamikazes looked to it as a meeting place after death.⁴⁵ The shrines' spiritual power and symbolic importance helped promote and reinforce the idea of sacrifice for the greater good, and was a part of a broader cultural and spiritual context that shaped the attitudes and beliefs of Japanese soldiers.

Third, the Japanese government indoctrinated children through education, taking advantage of the fact that children are generally susceptible and compliant. As early as the 1890s, the government began to standardize emperor worship in schools, connecting worship of the emperor to a desire to protect the country:

Students, teachers, and the principals bow deeply facing the image of the emperor and empress and pray for the long life of both. [...] The principal and teachers work to cultivate in the students the resolution to love one's country and be loyal to one's lord by respectfully elucidating the sacred intent underlying the Imperial Rescript on Education.⁴⁶

These ceremonial practices made the students more inclined to sacrifice their lives for the greater good of the nation from a young age.

Elements of the military also appeared in Japanese education leading up to World War II. Elementary and middle school students worked on sword techniques during physical education classes, and college students learned how to use rifles on their visits to military headquarters.⁴⁷ Military training became an integral part of Japanese schools in the 1930s. At the same time, schoolchildren were encouraged to send letters and dolls to departing pilots.⁴⁸ Such practices put children in direct contact with designated role models who valued the state above individuality. Japan soon became a society with militaristic ideals for the general populace.

Fourth, an economic downturn in the 1930s further pushed Japan into military dictatorship, which expounded propaganda regarding sacrifice and led to the population's mindset that victory trumped individual loss. The Showa Depression (1930-1931), partially triggered by the Great Depression (1929-1933) in the

United States, was the most devastating economic crisis in modern Japanese history.⁴⁹ Deflation hit the economy hard. Japan's GNP (Gross National Product) fell by 10.3% on average every year.⁵⁰ The Depression prompted criticism against the government and free market economy. In total despair, even people who normally opposed militarism were so disappointed with the performance of the government that they began to sympathize with the military and nationalists. The military took advantage of the Depression, and their power grew.

Before long, Japan found itself in conflict for territory with Western nations and ramped up its media campaign to stoke hatred towards the West. The young officers movement, known as *genkokujū*, played a significant role in this process.⁵¹ The militaristic cast of society was reflected towards the end of the war, where millions of civilians, from old men to children, were trained to attack Americans suicidally in order to defend the homeland.

In summary, the factors that fostered kamikazes include the value system embedded in Japanese culture and religion, as well as the belief instilled by nationalism and militarism that sacrifice would prevent further harm to the country. Takushima Norimitsu, a kamikaze pilot, stated, "I am happy to consider myself to be fighting to achieve the harmony of this universe."⁵² He perceived the war as a sacred fight to make amends for the harm inflicted on the Japanese people, so he willingly accepted his patriotic duty.

Individual Rationales of Kamikazes

Regardless of all propaganda, inner doubts could not be denied. Privately, many pilots expressed doubts and concerns, even though outwardly they displayed eagerness by stepping forward or raising their hands when called to volunteer for kamikaze attacks. Common methods of "volunteering" allowed the pilots to see the actions of their compatriots and provided peer pressure, which eliminated the chance to decline. A complete and coherent explanation, given by 1st Class Petty Officer Takao Musashi, was that:

No [Japanese] pilot would volunteer for such a mission of his own free will, yet if volunteers were called for, practically all pilots would

volunteer, [as no Japanese] would question an order. [He] signified that the matter would be put to them in such a way that no one would dare to do other than put his hand up. Apart from this, if a pilot did not volunteer, his life would be made unbearable by other pilots.⁵³

If a pilot did not volunteer, his family at home would also be disgraced, further intensifying the forces compelling him to volunteer. Admittedly, in many cases, in the stratified hierarchy of the military, there was no choice but to obey superiors, who may have compelled pilots to execute the missions regardless of their individual willingness.

Hayashi Tadao wrote in his diary prior to going on his kamikaze mission, “To be honest, I cannot say that the wish to die for the emperor is genuine, coming from my heart. However, it is decided for me that I die for the emperor...”⁵⁴ The phrasing “it is decided for me” suggests a lack of agency in his decision to go on a kamikaze mission, and that external pressure, either from his superiors or his peers, had effectively made the decision for him. According to Superior Private Guy Toko, the volunteers for kamikaze missions were mostly those who had attended military schools or who had very little education.⁵⁵ The former had additional lessons in discipline and patriotism, so that they could have been more likely to see themselves as part of a larger cause and more willing to sacrifice themselves for their country. The latter volunteered for kamikaze missions, perhaps because their lack of education made them less capable of making informed decisions and therefore more susceptible to indoctrination and more inclined to emulate role models. Overall, the motivations of kamikaze pilots were complex and multifaceted, involving a range of factors such as patriotism, obedience, fear of punishment, and social stigmas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Japanese government rationally decided to use kamikaze tactics towards the end of World War II in order to deter the American invasion and potentially achieve a favorable truce. The great potential benefit of keeping some of the

occupied territories via a truce and a comparatively small social pushback for doing so led to these extreme actions. The uniqueness of kamikaze attacks shows how culture, religion, indoctrination, and nationalistic propaganda—interwoven with economic motives—led kamikaze pilots to make the ultimate sacrifice, a seemingly irrational behavior.



Endnotes

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⁴ Rielly, *Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A Complete History of Japanese Suicide Strikes on American Ships, by Aircraft and Other Means*, 45.

⁵ Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, and Roger Pineau, *The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 6-7.

⁶ Rielly, *Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A Complete History of Japanese Suicide Strikes on American Ships, by Aircraft and Other Means*, 50.

⁷ Rielly, *Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A Complete History of Japanese Suicide Strikes on American Ships, by Aircraft and Other Means*, 324.

⁸ Edgar A. Porter and Ran Ying Porter, *Japanese Reflections on World War II and the American Occupation* (n.p.: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 121, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1pk3jj7>.

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ROADS ACROSS AMERICA:
GOOD ROADS, RESISTANCE, AND THE
IMPACT OF THE INTERSTATES TODAY

Allan Wang

Introduction

One of the classic symbols of the United States is its Interstate highway system. Officially named the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways, the Interstates comprise over 40,000 miles of highway stretching across all 50 states. The largest infrastructure project in American history, the likes of which had never been attempted before, the construction of the Interstates required collaboration and coordination among federal, state and local governments on an unprecedented scale.

Such scale meant that the Interstates affected every part of American life. While they connected far flung areas of the country—allowing goods and people to flow from east to west and north to south—they also caused disruption in the wake of their construction. Though most Americans were initially willing to stomach the consequences for promises of progress and revi-

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talization, as they began living with the Interstates, their impressions quickly soured. In cities, Interstates were often built through minority neighborhoods, displacing thousands while giving others the opportunity and incentive to move out. Meanwhile, those living close to the highways had to deal with the endless noise and increased pollution.

It is no surprise then that in the later parts of the 20th century, resistance movements, led primarily by citizen activists on environmental and social grounds, cropped up throughout the country. Though not successful in stopping all Interstate construction, these movements did result in substantial change to how infrastructure projects were constructed, most notably by ending the almost-free reign engineers had on route choice through the establishment of environmental reviews and public comment, frequently plaguing contemporary projects with years of delays. However, with the passage of major federal infrastructure legislation and the need for new infrastructure to address climate change and facilitate the shift to renewable energy, it has become increasingly important to expedite modern infrastructure construction. Thus, this essay will provide an overview of the movements leading to the creation of the Interstate System in the U.S. and explore how the various economic and social aspects of the system have affected the completion of infrastructure projects today.

Background

Federal involvement in the construction of roads in the U.S. began with the signing of the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916, which allotted the newly created Bureau of Public Roads \$75 million over the next five years for road improvement projects throughout the country.¹ For the first time, states would only be responsible for half of road improvement costs, with the federal government covering the rest. By that point, it was clear that road improvement was sorely needed. Of the three million miles of road in the U.S. at the time, only 350,000 were “surfaced.”²

The Act was largely a product of the Good Roads movement, an effort spearheaded by the League of American Wheel-

men. The League, which originally began in the late 1800s as an organization of cyclists campaigning for “smooth-surfaced roads,”³ was soon joined by farmers who wished to use roads to address rural isolation through efforts like free rural delivery, by which post offices would deliver parcels free of charge.⁴ Additionally, as farmers increasingly looked to circumvent the high rates of railroad companies, road quality became a serious impediment. One study, for instance, found that shipping a bushel of peaches 20 miles by road cost more than shipping the same bushel across the country by rail.⁵

Following the conclusion of World War I and the appointment of Thomas MacDonald as the head of the Bureau of Public Roads, road improvement projects across the U.S. began in earnest. MacDonald, who previously headed Iowa’s highway commission, was a ruthlessly efficient technocrat. In Iowa, he had utilized modern road-building techniques, exposed local corruption, and, in the span of just ten years, improved roads to the point that Iowans owned the most automobiles per capita in the nation.⁶ Along with the help of numerous pro-highway organizations such as the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) and the aforementioned League of American Wheelmen, MacDonald successfully lobbied Congress to continue supporting highway legislation. Thus, as the Wilson Administration rolled into the Harding Administration, and then the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations, the Bureau of Public Roads quietly continued to expand its scope, receiving ever-increasing amounts of funding each year. When the Federal-Aid Highway Act was renewed in 1921, Congress allotted \$75 million annually,⁷ rather than over the course of five years as it previously had. With this new funding, the federal aid highway system grew, reaching 169,000 miles by 1925 and 226,000 miles by 1935.⁸ Furthermore, during the Great Depression, roads were seen by President Roosevelt as an important job creator and a potential political tool to win over voters. Billions were pumped into new highway projects across the nation, with New Deal programs alone providing \$1.8 billion for road construction between 1933 and 1940.⁹

As the Bureau of Public Roads began to steadily improve roads across the U.S. and manufacturing innovations (such as the assembly line) dramatically lowered prices, Americans began buying more cars than ever. By 1929, there were 26.5 million cars in the U.S., one for every four people.¹⁰ Booming car sales meant more auto workers, more steel production, more oil refineries and gas stations. As interest groups representing these industries realized the benefits improved roads would have on their business, they quickly came to support road-building efforts.¹¹ Culturally, Americans began to see cars as a necessity, not only for work, but also for leisure. Tourist attractions like Saratoga Springs in New York boomed due to new automobile traffic. In New York, Robert Moses, president of the Long Island Park Commission and seen as an epic visionary who would modernize the city, constructed a series of Long Island Parkways and highways throughout New York City which gave car-owning New Yorkers unprecedented access to Long Island and Upstate New York. Cars came to symbolize freedom—the idea that Americans should be able to go wherever they wanted, whenever they wanted. To most Americans at the time, highways gave a glimpse of a future where urban congestion would be a problem of the past.

After World War II, the GI Bill gave thousands of veterans access to low-interest housing loans, often with no down payment.¹² To address the severe housing shortage the Bill caused, the Federal Housing Act of 1949 offered incentives for the construction of large developments, which usually took the form of single-family suburban homes,¹³ causing a large exodus to the suburbs as many became first-time homeowners. Life in suburbia was heavily automobile dependent. Residents relied on cars to get to work, school, and to shop. Subsequently, suburban roads became heavily congested, leading to increased demand for more roads.

As the Cold War escalated, roads also began to be seen as important defense measures. MacDonald, for instance, advocated for the Pennsylvania Turnpike's value as a "strategic military route" and argued that its extension to Philadelphia was "imperative."¹⁴ Major General Frank A. Helleman, then Army Chief of Trans-

portation, wrote in 1952 that highways would allow for the “fast movement of military units and equipment to every strategic area in the United States.”¹⁵ While a general fighting in Europe during World War II, future-president Eisenhower (who would later initiate the interstate highway system), saw firsthand how Germany’s autobahn helped its war effort. In addition, fears of nuclear attack meant that many city planners felt the need for easily evacuable cities.¹⁶ One way to do this, they reasoned, was through major highways which ran through city-centers.

Thus, when Eisenhower was elected president in 1952, roads were at the top of his mind. Though the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 had authorized the construction of a new 40,000 mile system of Interstate Highways, it didn’t dedicate specific funding to implementing such a system.¹⁷ Eager to rid Republicans of the blame they had accrued for the Great Depression, Eisenhower believed that “fiscally sound” social spending could help stimulate the economy.¹⁸ As a result, he pushed for increased federal involvement in highway construction. Though there were initial qualms from Congress over funding methods and complaints from lobbying organizations regarding the tax increases needed to pay for the program, any objection quickly disappeared when members of Congress saw highway plans showing how the Interstates would benefit their constituencies,¹⁹ and lobbies saw the massive economic benefits to their respective industries.²⁰ Eisenhower’s efforts culminated in the Federal-Aid Highway Acts of 1954 and 1956 and the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, with construction of the Interstate System beginning in August of 1956 near Topeka, Kansas.²¹

Funding

Decades before the Interstates were proposed, ballooning highway budgets under the Bureau of Public Roads meant that states were already finding the need for new methods to fund road construction. Up to the early 1920s, most states funded roads with a combination of bonds and property taxes, both of which were becoming increasingly strained.²² As a result, they turned

to the gas tax, which provided numerous benefits over existing funding methods. Since the tax was applied to the handful of oil wholesalers across the country rather than individual consumers, administrative costs were low, which provided more revenue.²³ Because the tax was billed as a quasi-toll (which charged drivers in proportion to their road usage), and since declining oil prices throughout the 1920s due to increased oil production meant that most wouldn't substantially feel its effects, the gas tax was supported by most motorists.²⁴

The tax was also a way of securing highway funding for years to come. Automobile and road-building lobbies such as the National Highway Users Conference successfully advocated for "linkage," a policy in which gas tax revenues are reserved exclusively for road projects. In the midst of the Great Depression, when many states were diverting gas tax funds away from road expenses, Congress passed the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934, which penalized states that redirected gas tax revenues by reducing their share of federal aid, effectively separating road-building costs from general funds and ensuring money would always be available for road projects.²⁵ "Linkage" would continue to be adopted by individual states, with twenty-five states implementing constitutional amendments reserving gas tax revenues for highway projects between 1934 and 1956.²⁶

Similarly, the Interstate System also required new funding methods to be devised. Starting in April of 1954, Eisenhower instructed various members of his administration to create a "dramatic plan to get 50 billion dollars worth of self liquidating highways under construction."²⁷ However, divisions quickly arose about how the new system would be implemented. One proposal involved the creation of a "National Highway Authority" which would give the federal government complete control over the financing and construction of the system.²⁸ Another proposal called for the continuation of the existing federal-state split in funding contributions, while yet another called for a completely state-funded system.²⁹

By August of 1954, seeing the impasse at hand, Eisenhower appointed a new President's Advisory Committee, headed by Lucius Clay, who had served as Eisenhower's deputy during the occupation of Germany at the end of World War II, and an Interagency Committee led by Francis du Pont, then head of the Bureau of Public Roads.³⁰ Together, the two committees finally released plans for how a system was to be constructed and funded, with the federal government responsible for ninety percent of the cost, and states responsible for the rest. Bonds would be sold to finance the construction, with income from the gas tax eventually paying off the bonds.³¹

However, Eisenhower's plan was stalled in Congress by the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. A staunch fiscal conservative who refused to allow the issuance of billions in bonds over concern for the national debt, Byrd preferred a "pay-as-you-go" approach, whereby federal gas tax revenues were saved until there was enough to pay for the entire program.³² Compromise was reached with Representative George Hyde Fallon of Maryland's highway bill, in which the interstate system would be funded by a highway trust fund created from gas tax revenues. In order for the trust fund alone to support the new highways, the gasoline tax would rise from two to three cents, while the diesel tax would rise from two to four cents, in addition to increased taxes on trucks, buses, and tires.³³ Incidentally, the trust fund also served as the ultimate implementation of "linkage," ensuring that the project would always be funded, even as costs ballooned and "antihighway sentiment" began to build in its later years.³⁴

Effects of the Interstates

Economically, researchers have found evidence that the Interstate system has provided benefits for the U.S., primarily through increasing mobility, leading to improved access to markets for producers, wider choices for suppliers, and increased employment opportunities for workers. These effects can be seen in a 1994 study conducted by Nadiri and Mamuneas, which found

that public infrastructure investment helped to reduce costs and increase productivity in a variety of industries across all sectors of the economy.³⁵

On a local level, a 1989 study conducted by Duffy-Deno and Eberts found that increased public capital, which included roadways in addition to other resources like sewerage, hospitals, and airports, was correlated with increased personal income.³⁶ In addition, the study concluded that within metropolitan areas, a ten percent increase in public investment was associated with a 1.13 percent increase in personal income.³⁷ A 2007 study conducted by Lynch found that Appalachian counties served by interstates experienced faster growth in per capita income and the service sector than counties which were not served by Interstates.³⁸ Statewide, a ten percent increase in the value of highway and road capital was found by Munnell and Cook to be associated with a 0.6 percent increase in gross state output.³⁹ Within each state, intrastate highway stocks have been found to cause large reductions in manufacturing costs. Between 1970 and 1987, each \$1 million invested into public capital (which includes highways) has led to between \$160,000 and \$180,000 in annual cost savings.⁴⁰ Nationally, the Interstate highway system caused a boom in the trucking industry, with a fifteen-fold increase between 1956 and 2006.⁴¹ Had highway improvements due to Interstate construction not been implemented, trucking costs in 1973 would have been nineteen percent higher, with the value of total savings from trucking alone being equal to between 33 and 44 percent of the cost of the federal-aid highway system.⁴²

These benefits, however, have largely decreased with time. Interstate investments after 1966, for instance, did not have the same cost-saving effects on the trucking industry as those before.⁴³ A 2006 study, again by Nadiri and Mamuneas, found that the net rate of return on highway capital was highest in the decade between 1949 and 1959, eventually dropping close to the long term interest rate by the late 1990s.⁴⁴ Another study by Fernald in 1999 concluded that although roads contributed to approximately 1.4

percent of U.S. growth before 1973, they only contributed to 0.4 percent after 1973.⁴⁵

In addition, there is contention regarding whether the Interstate system has net positive effects on the economy, or whether it simply relocates economic prosperity elsewhere. One study conducted by Cohen and Morrison Paul in 2004 found that the Interstates had approximately zero net regional effects,⁴⁶ supporting claims that the system simply redirects economic resources rather than increasing them. There is also significant disagreement about the spillover effects on neighboring states (where a positive spillover indicates that adjacent states benefit from highway investment, while a negative spillover shows that adjacent states are negatively affected).⁴⁷ While Berechman, Ozmen, and Ozbay (2006) found that a ten percent increase in the value of highway and road capital in neighboring states was associated with a 0.21 percent increase in gross state product,⁴⁸ Jiwattanakupaisarn et al. (2008) and Sloboda and Yao (2008) found that lane-mile additions of Interstate highways have caused negative employment spillovers in neighboring states and that out-of-state highway spending tended to depress in-state output, respectively.⁴⁹ Another study by Chandra and Thompson in 2000 found that between 1969 and 1993, while nonmetropolitan counties with interstates experienced earnings growths of between six and eight percent, similar counties without interstates experienced earnings losses of between one and three percent.⁵⁰ These studies temper the overall benefits the Interstate system has had on the U.S., especially if other factors that are not merely economic are also considered.

Highway engineers, however, generally did not look at these other factors. They usually had little understanding of the socioeconomic considerations of highway routes and almost always chose the cheapest route to construct, particularly in urban areas. Officials in cities such as Philadelphia saw reducing congestion and encouraging traffic flow as the primary consideration driving the city's highway development, rather than the effects on the communities which would be displaced. In fact, "belief in the utility of expressways was so great and so widespread in the 1950s

that it hardly warranted further amplification,” with “savings to motorists in time and money” being sufficient justification for any highway construction.⁵¹

As a result, the Interstates were devastating for cities. First, since the Interstate highway system provided the infrastructure needed to facilitate longer commutes into city centers, it contributed significantly to the rise in suburbanization throughout the 20th century, causing city populations to decrease substantially.⁵² By 1970, suburbs had passed metropolitan and rural areas in population size.⁵³ By 1980, suburb-to-suburb commutes became the most prevalent form of travel to work, with 33 million jobs located in suburban areas, up from 14 million in 1960.⁵⁴ By 1990, nearly half of all Americans lived in suburban communities.⁵⁵ In line with the aforementioned economic effects of the Interstate system, the largest population shift from cities to suburbs also coincided with the 1950s and 1960s, when the suburban population increased from 35 to 84 million residents.⁵⁶

This suburban shift largely favored white Americans, who were wealthier and had access to greater opportunities in the suburbs. Following World War II, while the GI Bill technically made VA home loans available to all veterans, in practice, as the program was administered by the all-white Department of Veterans Affairs and individual states and localities (many of which practiced racially discriminatory policies, especially in the South), African Americans faced significant difficulties accessing such loans.⁵⁷ Many suburban communities had racial covenants, with African American residents in initial suburban communities such as Levittown facing often-violent backlash upon attempting to move in.⁵⁸

Urban interstates were also usually constructed in impoverished and minority neighborhoods due to cheaper costs in acquiring the land through eminent domain and unfounded beliefs by famous road officials like Robert Moses and Thomas MacDonald that highway construction could foster urban renewal through the destruction of blighted neighborhoods.⁵⁹ Additionally, in places where African American communities had little political lever-

age, “building a freeway...was not only the most common choice but the choice that generally had the support of the dominant white community.”⁶⁰ Thus, these highways “create[d] havoc for poor urban residents,”⁶¹ exacerbating the problems caused by suburbanization, as another significant factor in the declining tax base of cities was the liquidation of properties absorbed by such major projects.

Because of the large-scale flight to the suburbs and the construction of highways through downtown neighborhoods, cities were left with increasingly impoverished populations, poorer tax bases, and dwindling job opportunities, leading to high crime rates, unemployment, and strained funding for welfare programs when they were most needed.⁶² New York City, for instance, faced major budget problems as many companies and manufacturing jobs moved to the suburbs throughout the 1960s and 1970s, eventually resulting in the city’s finances being taken over by an Emergency Financial Control Board, which drastically cut social programs and fired over 20,000 municipal workers.⁶³

Similar effects can be seen in numerous cities across the country. After World War II, the Syracuse-Onondaga County Post-War Planning Council (of Syracuse, New York), following much of the consensus on urban highways at the time, laid out plans for an extensive network of urban freeways through the city, including various north-south and east-west thruways, and a beltway to allow trucks to pass the city without going through the city center.⁶⁴ As Syracuse was within a three-hundred mile radius of various major cities—such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh—the Council saw that a robust network of highways could allow the city to serve as a “central location in an overall transportation network.”⁶⁵ Thus, the Council, and many in Syracuse at the time, believed that “the economic future of the city was linked to highway construction,” and that street capacity was the limiting factor in the city’s growth.⁶⁶ At the same time, a “very strong interest” to clear the Fifteenth Ward of the city, seen as a slum,⁶⁷ meant that the city was looking for government funding to acquire and redevelop the land of the neighborhood.

The Interstate highway program presented a best-of-both-worlds solution to this issue: highways could be constructed through the city which would run through the “slums,” allowing for urban redevelopment, while federal support of the program meant that the city would only have to contribute a fraction of the final cost.⁶⁸ As a result, Interstate 81 was constructed, splitting the city into two, displacing much of the city’s African American population.⁶⁹ As African Americans moved to other neighborhoods in the city, white residents, aided by the new highway, escalated their movements into the suburbs,⁷⁰ hurting Syracuse’s finances and perpetuating its cycle of urban decline.

Likewise, in Miami in the early 1960s, the newly formed Dade County metropolitan government, which had broad power over the entire Miami metro area, was eager to embrace the new Interstate program, hoping it would deliver economic revitalization of Miami’s central business district and, like in other cities across the country, be a way to “redevelop...valuable inner-city land.”⁷¹ The then-mayor of Miami Beach, for instance, advocated for “anything necessary” to prevent traffic congestion.⁷² Interstate proposals in Miami called for two highways: Interstate 95, which would run north-to-south through the city, and Interstate 395, which would branch off from Interstate 95 and connect Miami Beach to downtown Miami and the Miami International Airport.⁷³ The initial plan for Interstate 95, as proposed by federal and local legislators, was routed following an abandoned rail corridor through “low-value” warehouse neighborhoods.⁷⁴ However, the land was owned by influential businessman Ed Ball of the Du Pont Corporation, who, along with the Miami Chamber of Commerce, lobbied the Florida State Road Department to reroute the highway directly through Overtown,⁷⁵ the city’s large black residential district. The new Overtown route, which was farther west than the original proposal, was also seen to provide “ample room for the future expansion of the central business district.”⁷⁶

At the time, despite Overtown’s many thriving businesses and vibrant economy, the community was seen as “utterly expendable” by the city government.⁷⁷ Not only did the all-white

government officials look down upon the neighborhood's African American communities, but also, due to a law prohibiting taxes from being levied on properties worth less than \$5,000 (which most Overtown homes were),⁷⁸ the neighborhood contributed very little to Miami's tax base. As one city planner put it, the ultimate goal was "a complete slum clearance effectively removing every Negro family from the present city limits."⁷⁹

There was little room for objection to the highway plans. Thanks to the secrecy of the municipal government, many were unaware of the true scope of the project.⁸⁰ Because of the preoccupation of most African American activists with integration, and consensus at the time among city dwellers that any urban highway projects were largely beneficial and that any displacement was simply a side effect of progress, land usage of Interstate 95 was seen as a relatively minor concern.⁸¹ A series of Florida Supreme Court decisions which greatly expanded eminent domain allowed the State Department of Roads to condemn all lands necessary for "existing, proposed, or anticipated" road projects.⁸² The Dade County metropolitan government also had the power to overrule any lower municipal governments in cases of multi-city projects, allowing land in Overtown to be easily acquired. Finally, many Overtown residents, unaware that they had the right to refuse to sell their property and believing letters sent from the city were eviction notices, simply left without protest.⁸³ This also meant that, by and large, those relocated were not offered the full value of their homes.

Interstates 95 and 395, which were both ultimately constructed, destroyed thousands of homes, with the downtown interchange between the two highways alone taking up 20 blocks and displacing approximately 10,000 people.⁸⁴ This destruction, which threw thousands "into a crowded housing market with virtually no new low- or moderate-income housing vacancies," forced many Overtown families to move to "existing ghettos" farther from downtown such as Liberty City, leading to them becoming "incredibl[y] overcrowd[ed]."⁸⁵ The highways also caused the decline of Overtown, with the population of Overtown dropping

by nearly half from around 30,000 to close to 15,000 between 1950 and 1970.⁸⁶

In addition to the destruction of housing, Interstate construction negatively affected the environment as well. For those living close to urban interstates, the constant vehicle noise was unbearable. Noise levels in one home off of Interstate 93 near Boston averaged around 68 decibels, or the volume of a vacuum cleaner.⁸⁷ Noise spikes above this average would also frequently occur, which were found to cause “chronic physiological disturbances,” including stress and high blood pressure.⁸⁸ This noise and light from highway traffic disrupted surrounding ecosystems as well. The densities of a variety of species, for instance, including birds and large mammals like deer, were found to be lower in the areas immediately surrounding a highway.⁸⁹ Since animals do not frequently cross highways, they were found to serve as a barrier within ecosystems, resulting in habitat fragmentation and loss of biodiversity.⁹⁰ As the suburbs crept closer to the wilderness (in part thanks to the Interstates), a rise in human-wildlife encounters and water and air pollution further threatened the health of wildlife populations.⁹¹

Interstates and highway construction also discharged pollutants into the environment—including dust containing toxins such as lead and rubber, hydrocarbons, and gasses such as carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide—elevating the risk of lung and heart disease. In New York City, for instance, there are an estimated 320 premature deaths annually caused by vehicle air pollution.⁹² As a result of Interstate construction in minority neighborhoods specifically, exposure to PM 2.5 (particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter) from vehicles have disproportionately affected minority residents, with concentrations being 42 percent higher for Latino residents, 40 percent higher for Asian American residents, and 31 percent higher for African American residents when compared to average levels.⁹³

Overall, concern over the devastation the highway system had on cities and the environment and growing distrust of the federal government caused by U.S. involvement in scandals like

Vietnam and Watergate challenged the faith that Americans had placed in government planners to oversee highway construction. Evidence of this distrust can be seen in the crumbling of Robert Moses' reputation, whose parkways and urban improvement projects were once broadly supported by New York City residents. As the 627 miles of expressways he had built across the New York City area failed to reduce the city's traffic problems, and as the 1964 New York World Fair (organized by Moses) drew protests from African Americans who had been sidelined from his urban renewal projects, the *New York Post* wrote in an editorial reflecting growing public sentiment that it was now "safe to question Robert Moses."⁹⁴ These developments have in turn caused significant increases in organized resistance to highway construction in the decades since.

Resistance to the Interstates

By the 1960s, movements to stop the construction of Interstates had sprung up in numerous cities across the country. In 1946 in New Orleans, Robert Moses (still at the height of his popularity) was hired to address the city's traffic problem. He proposed a series of expressways, one of which would run along the Mississippi River in the French Quarter of the city. Though the project had stalled by the mid-1950s, it was revived by the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce's newly created Central Area Committee. The Committee, which was tasked with preventing suburban migration, funded studies which showed that a river-front expressway was "imperative for the future of New Orleans" insofar as diverting automobile traffic away from the Central Business District, which the Committee believed was making the area unattractive to businesses.⁹⁵ In 1964, with the Interstate highway system already beginning construction, the committee knew it would easily be able to convince the Bureau of Public Roads to designate the expressway as an Interstate highway,⁹⁶ allowing for federal funds to contribute towards its construction.

However, highway officials underestimated the power of local pushback. Seeing how Interstate 10 unleashed crime and instability by destroying Claiborne Avenue, a once-thriving black

district of the city, many residents would not support the construction of another highway. Residents of the French Quarter began holding rallies and protests against the highway. Protestors spread their cause through the press, resulting in numerous editorials in local newspapers criticizing the expressway. In addition, they sent press releases to influential magazines and newspapers across the country, effectively making construction of the expressway a national issue. During the annual televised Mardi Gras parade, protestors unfurled anti-expressway banners, further spreading the movement across the country.⁹⁷ Their efforts were successful. When John Volpe was appointed Secretary of Transportation in 1969, he canceled plans for the expressway.

Resistance to highway construction was also seen in Arlington, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, DC. Original plans for the Interstate system in the District of Columbia included a route designated Interstate 66, which would run west from Washington, DC through Arlington County, the City of Falls Church, and Fairfax County, eventually connecting with Interstate 81 in the Shenandoah Valley.⁹⁸ After World War II, Northern Virginia experienced explosive population growth, with the population of Fairfax County nearly tripling and the population of Arlington County doubling through the 1950s.⁹⁹ As such, local governments saw the need for better roads as a pressing issue, one which Interstate 66 would hopefully address.

Though the highway was eventually completed in 1982, it was not without one of the “longest running battles ever fought over a stretch of asphalt during the history of the Federal Highway Administration.”¹⁰⁰ Much like in New Orleans, the resistance movement was spurred largely by citizen activists. Starting in the late 1950s, concerned citizens showed up to various county board hearings across Arlington and Fairfax Counties, voicing their concerns over issues regarding proposed route choices and the impact it would have on property taxes.¹⁰¹

In June of 1958, the Bureau of Public Roads approved the final route. However, a variety of factors—including difficulty acquiring the property where the highway was to be built, an in-

ability to finalize the design for the highway due to the proposed creation of a Metro line running through its median, and disputes over whether a new bridge could be constructed across the Potomac—caused delays in construction.¹⁰² By 1970, a group of I-66 opponents formed the Arlington Coalition on Transportation (ACT), which lobbied for reopened hearings on the highway itself. Often at these hearings, hundreds of local residents shared their “overwhelming sentiment[s]... against building the road.”¹⁰³

In the meantime, legislation limiting the almost-unlimited control highway engineers had over highway projects was being passed, helping the ACT’s cause. The 1966 Department of Transportation Act stated that “special effort should be made to preserve the environment,” including “parks, recreational areas, wildlife... refuges, and...historic sites” and that after 1968, the Secretary of Transportation would not be able to approve “any...project that required the use of publicly owned lands” unless there was no other feasible option.¹⁰⁴ The 1970 Uniform Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act required citizens forced to relocate because of highway projects be “fair[ly] and reasonabl[y]” compensated, and that “adequate relocation housing” be available.¹⁰⁵ The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which required environmental impact statements to be developed for all highway projects receiving federal funds, allowed the ACT to successfully sue to block construction of the highway from beginning with the rationale that the Virginia Department of Highways had not filed a comprehensive enough environmental impact statement.¹⁰⁶

The project reached a low point in 1975, when following the EPA’s analysis of the highway’s environmental impact statement as “environmentally unsatisfactory,” the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, Arlington County Board, the City of Alexandria, the City of Falls Church, and the District of Columbia all voted to oppose the road, which represented reversals of prior policy for some of the jurisdictions.¹⁰⁷ However, numerous developments soon caused a decline in the strength of the resistance. Desires for access to Metro funds frozen in the Interstate 66 impasse led Secretary of Transportation William Coleman to suggest a

“compromise highway-subway combination for the [Interstate] 66 corridor,” and the election of a Republican majority in the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, which was friendlier to infrastructure developments, meant that plans for the highway were revived.¹⁰⁸ Though once again the ACT attempted to sue to block construction from beginning, they were unsuccessful.¹⁰⁹ Even as the movement to stop Interstate 66 ultimately failed, it still embodies many efforts to block highways today.

Infrastructure Projects Today

After the 1970s—due in part to the increased resistance to highway projects—planners, engineers, and politicians began being forced to consider an infrastructure project’s environmental, social, and economic effects before beginning construction. The average Environmental Impact Statement for federal infrastructure projects is now typically over 600 pages, taking upwards of four to five years to complete.¹¹⁰ Lawsuits from citizens also often substantially delay projects. For instance, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), one of the strictest of its kind throughout the country, requires all projects receiving state or local permits (in essence all infrastructure and construction projects) to be environmentally reviewed. CEQA has frequently been used by citizens as justification to block any potentially unwanted developments, including those which actually help the environment.¹¹¹ One study estimated that only thirteen percent of CEQA suits were from groups with a prior history of environmental advocacy.¹¹²

Additionally, as the Interstates were nearing completion, a shift towards neoliberal economic policies in response to the stagflation of the 1970s contributed to reductions in government spending (during the Reagan Administration, for instance, the federal non-defense budget decreased from 23% of gross national product to 19.9%), meaning less funding was made available for future infrastructure projects.¹¹³ Increased partisan gridlock on the federal level has also meant that federal infrastructure funding in general, not just new spending on the scale of the Interstate program, has largely been absent as well. In the 1990s, national

infrastructure legislation passed by Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—including the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, the 1998 Transportation Equity Act, and the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act—resulted in only “modest highway construction,” with “a lot of noise” and “not a lot...accomplished.”¹¹⁴


As a result, very rarely are major infrastructure projects on the level of the Interstate highway system completed in modern times, and the ones that are attempted are often plagued with delays. In 2008, California voters first approved a \$33 billion bond issue for 500 miles of high speed rail connecting the San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento with Los Angeles and San Diego, initially meant to be completed by 2020.¹¹⁵ As of 2023, however, the project has been delayed significantly, with a new goal of opening only the 171-mile section between Merced and Bakersfield by 2030 at a new estimated cost of \$113 billion.¹¹⁶ One major cause of the delay has been getting the project environmentally cleared, which has added \$1.3 billion to overall costs so far.¹¹⁷ Though the project has been ongoing for over fifteen years, only 422 of the 500 miles of proposed track have been environmentally cleared, with the rest still ongoing.¹¹⁸

Similarly, around a year after passage of California’s high speed rail proposal, the Obama Administration announced plans for a sweeping 12,000 mile nation-wide high speed rail system, which would stimulate the economy as it recovered from the Great Recession, starting with \$8 billion being allocated for high speed rail in the 2009 American Rescue and Recovery Act.¹¹⁹ In his 2011 State of the Union Address, Obama went further, declaring his Administration’s goal to “give 80% of Americans access to high speed rail” within 25 years.¹²⁰ Details of this plan, which Vice President Biden revealed the following month at an event in Philadelphia, included spending \$53 billion over the next six years to construct a vast “national high-speed and intercity passenger rail network.”¹²¹ However, Congressional Republicans, who had gained control of the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterms, refused to fund the program, and Republican governors in Wisconsin

and Florida rejected already appropriated federal funds for such projects in their states, effectively killing the plan.¹²²

Thus, in recent years, the U.S. has faced an estimated \$2.5 trillion infrastructure shortfall.¹²³ U.S. infrastructure spending has only “hovered around 2.5% of GDP over the last few decades,” approximately half the level of when the Interstate system was being constructed, and less than the 5% spent in Europe and 8% spent in China.¹²⁴ The American Society of Civil Engineers has given American infrastructure a C-.¹²⁵ On the funding front, the recently passed Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act have served as a start in addressing this shortfall. These Acts have already gone toward many important projects, including a floodwall in Norfolk, Virginia, and plans to “reconnect Detroit around I[nterstate] 375.”¹²⁶ Yet, more needs to be done, especially as the U.S. aims to address the “existential threat posed by climate change.”¹²⁷

However, if these projects are to beneficially transform the U.S. in a timely enough manner to substantially reduce the effects of climate change, a balance must be struck between the interests of individual citizens and the public good. Existing environmental laws need to be reformed to expedite the environmental review process and prevent individuals from holding up construction for years. At the same time, government officials and engineers must regain the trust of citizens. No longer can they solely focus on cost and convenience without consideration for the people, animals, or landmarks which will be displaced. Therefore, in any future infrastructure endeavors, the U.S. would do good to pay keen attention to the successes and failures of the Interstates.



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“THE SENATOR WITH A CONSCIENCE”: CHARLES
SUMNER, THE FREE SOILERS OF MASSACHUSETTS,
AND THE COALITION OF 1850-1851

Maielle Merriam

Oh! if but one man could arise with a Genius capable of comprehending, a heart capable of supporting and an utterance capable of communicating those eternal truths that belong to this question, to lay bare in all its nakedness that outrage upon the goodness of God, human Slavery, now is the time, and this is the occasion upon which such a man would perform the duties of an Angel upon Earth.

— John Quincy Adams, Diary, 1820.¹

Introduction

On the 7th of March 1850, during debate preceding the Compromise of that year, Daniel Webster of Massachusetts rose in the United States Senate to deliver a much-anticipated speech on the situation of the country. Stating that he had “nothing to propose” on the subject of slavery, supporting a new law for the reclamation of fugitives from slavery, and scolding the abolitionists, Webster abandoned the anti-slavery cause and shunned an anti-

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slavery stance.² His speech and his subsequent conduct reflected the policy of the Whig Party, dominant in his state. Little more than a year later, however, the Massachusetts Legislature elected a successor to Webster who would—stating that he abhorred slavery with his whole soul, in a speech urging the repeal of the new fugitive slave law—dedicate himself to the anti-slavery cause, in all that he was or could be.³ Charles Sumner, the third Free Soil Senator, was elected in April 1851, after four months of contentious balloting, by a controversial coalition of Free Soilers and Democrats.

Contemplating this profound shift in leadership—achieved by a third party not three years old, in service of an unpopular cause whose unpopularity had just been renewed, and during a particularly dismal stage of the anti-slavery struggle—it is reasonable to wonder that it was achieved at all. Indeed, Sumner's election was an unlikely, narrow victory. In 1851, it was a much-needed triumph for anti-slavery. His presence in the Senate was a powerful, potential protest against the Compromise and the argument of finality which was soon built up around it. It was likewise a consequential step in the ascendancy of political and constitutional abolitionism and it greatly benefited anti-slavery forces in Washington—forces so small that one man, even one less committed than Sumner, still had deep significance. Sumner himself served in the Senate until his death nearly twenty-three years later, advocating faithfully not only for abolition but also for equality.

However, this unlikely victory emerged from a struggle rife with questions of personal and political morality. That struggle itself arose from deepened animosities between anti-slavery advocates and their former allies, the Whigs, rested upon an alliance with Democrats that crumbled as soon as it was formed, and divided the Free Soilers of Massachusetts amongst themselves. In order to uphold their principles and advance their cause, the Free Soilers had to set aside the prejudice, the advantage, and, some feared, the sovereignty of their young party; but in trusting to a coalition to place a friend of freedom in Webster's seat, they appeared to their enemies—and some of their friends—to have sacrificed

those principles. In order to protest the Compromise, they had to compromise themselves; yet, in so doing, they succeeded in sending an uncompromising man to the Senate, as unfettered by party as he could conceivably have been.

This paper recounts the story of how the Free Soilers, through their coalition, replaced Daniel Webster with Charles Sumner, changing the course of Massachusetts statesmanship and anti-slavery advocacy in the Senate. It aims to shed light on the aftermath of the Compromise of 1850 and the dawn of the tumultuous decade which followed. The account, of course, cannot be complete; and the story is told with particular attention to Sumner, without whom it would be exceedingly different. The paper begins with events in September 1846, which illuminate the originating tensions of the struggle between Webster, the Whigs, and the anti-slavery forces and, from March 1850, continues through April 1851, when Sumner was at last elected.

The paper sets out to show that Sumner's election was intended not merely as a contribution to the anti-slavery political forces, but directly as a response to Webster's apostasy, as some called it, and as a correction to the course which Webster and the Whigs had adopted by 1850. Likewise, the paper aims to show how the Free Soilers found it necessary to persuade a man of conscience to become a politician just when the political world seemed particularly bleak, base, and spineless, and how, having chosen their candidate, who was deeply reluctant to hold or seek political office, they forced him into politics, aided in this compulsion by the enormities of the Fugitive Slave Act and the dictates of Sumner's own sense of duty. In the process, it will become evident that the effort to send Sumner to Washington involved and depended upon a large number of interconnected individuals. This paper will explore how Sumner's circle of friends sustained and challenged him, although at times he stood alone.

I. "Do not shrink from the task."

On the 23rd of September 1846, seven hundred delegates and three hundred spectators assembled at Faneuil Hall in Boston for the annual Whig State Convention of Massachusetts.⁴ Among the crowd were the leaders and members of two factions, at odds on the subject of slavery: the Cotton Whigs and the Conscience Whigs.⁵ The convention followed months of hostility in the press and ostracism in the streets and two years of developing tensions, sparked by the annexation and admission of slave-holding Texas and the resulting war with the Republic of Mexico.⁶ The Cotton Whigs, with supremacy in the cities and dominance in the state, had found it increasingly difficult to silence the anti-slavery voices in the party ranks; those anti-slavery Whigs, rebuked and ridiculed, had increasingly struggled to reconcile their fidelity to conscience with their membership in a party which too often placed prudence over principle. The convention of 1846 was to reveal the depths of the conflict, and evince the weakness and the strength of both factions.⁷

When the Whigs convened in the storied hall, the conservatives tried to believe that no one would venture a serious threat to the unity of the party, and the Conscience Whigs hoped they could successfully influence the party's principles.⁸ Signs of their mutual disappointment were nearly immediate: the Conscience men were startled to find the gubernatorial candidates nominated by acclamation, after the State Committee had assured them this would be done by ballot; the Cotton leaders were dismayed to perceive that their gestures of good-will, in appointing two Conscience delegates as vice-presidents, were not going to keep their opponents quiet.⁹ The Committee on Resolutions retired to prepare its reports, carrying with it the fuel for conflict to come and, with the crowd calling for an orator, the strife shifted to the question of whom to invite to the platform.¹⁰

The conservatives intended to have a speech by Robert C. Winthrop,¹¹ Boston's loyal representative in Congress, but the Conscience men called decisively upon one of their foremost ora-

tors, Boston attorney Charles Sumner,¹² a delegate at the convention. That summer, Winthrop and Sumner had been involved in a heated debate in the newspapers and in private correspondence, prompted by Winthrop's vote in May in favor of the bill to supply the unpopular war with Mexico.¹³ The general feeling in the hall prevailed in Sumner's favor, and he stepped to the platform. His speech, as a concise and early articulation of his and the Conscience Whigs' vision for anti-slavery political action, deserves examination.

Sumner titled the speech, "The Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party"; and he informed his listeners of his intention to speak of those duties.¹⁴ He proceeded to ask the question, "[Who are the Whigs?]"¹⁵ Suggesting that matters of policy like the tariff, internal improvements, the National Bank, and restriction of the veto power, while long part of the Whig program, were of secondary importance, he described the principles of the party, as he urged they ought to be.¹⁶ He stated that the Whigs ought to be "the party of Freedom." He emphasized their reverence for the Declaration of Independence, and the truth contained therein, "that all men are created equal"; reverence for the Constitution, as the safeguard of freedom; and recognition of conscience and benevolence as the "animating ideas" of the association. "Such is, as I trust," he said, "or *certainly should be*, the Whig party of Massachusetts." It was clear to Sumner that, during the present tumultuous time, this party should act in accordance with its principles: "It must utter them with distinctness, and act upon them with energy."

With this, Sumner introduced his principal subject: "The time, I believe, has gone by, when the question is asked, *What has the North to do with Slavery?*" One could reply that, "politically, it had little to do with anything else...Slavery is everywhere." He summarized the numerous ways in which the institution stamped upon the country the character "of that monstrous anomaly and mockery, a *slaveholding republic*, with the living truths of freedom on its lips, and the dark mark of slavery printed on its brow."¹⁷ He acknowledged that Massachusetts had done, "to a certain extent," what she ought regarding slavery, but he asked, "shall

this Commonwealth continue in any way to sustain an institution which its laws declare to be contrary to natural right, to justice, to humanity and sound policy?" Should the Whigs support what was contrary to the principles of their party? Sumner urged that they should not. The duty of the Whigs, he argued, was to strive for the abolition of slavery under the Constitution and the laws of the federal government.¹⁸

He stressed how anti-slavery action could no longer be opposed on constitutional grounds: "I wish to say, distinctly, that there is no compromise on the subject of slavery, of a character not to be reached *legally and constitutionally*, which is the only way in which I propose to reach it."¹⁹ Congress could, constitutionally, abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and in the Territories, end the slave trade between the states by sea, and refuse admission of new states sanctioning slavery. Further, he pointed out, the Constitution provided for its amendment, allowing additional action on slavery.²⁰ The founders of the nation and authors of the Constitution, he reminded his audience, did not intend slavery to be perpetual; rather, Franklin, Jefferson, and Washington bequeathed the next generations the task of abolishing the system of inhumanity which preyed upon the republic.²¹

He thus urged that it was the duty of the Whigs to declare themselves "openly, distinctly and solemnly against slavery"; and, elucidating the crucial difference between the two Whig factions assembled, "not only against its further extension, but against its longer continuance under the Constitution and laws of the Union." He acknowledged that this task should be undertaken with moderation, but he urged that emancipation be presented consistently as the "cardinal object" of Whig national policy.²² He added that it would not be enough to pass resolutions to oppose slavery. Rather, "we must choose *men*," he entreated, "who will devote themselves earnestly, heartily, to the work; who will enter upon it with awakened conscience, and with that valiant faith, before which all obstacles disappear." These "must not be Northern men with Southern principles," and not even "Northern

men under Southern influences.” Rather, they should be ready to claim the name Abolitionist. “They must be courageous and,” he emphasized, “willing on all occasions to stand alone, provided Right is with them.”²³

In closing, Sumner repeated that the time had arrived for the Whigs of Massachusetts—owing it to principle, character, and conscience—to place themselves firmly on an active anti-slavery ground. “Ours is a noble cause,” he counseled:

Nobler even than that of our fathers, inasmuch as it is more exalted to struggle for the freedom of *others*, than for our *own*. The love of Right, which is the animating impulse of our movement, is higher even than the love of Freedom. But Right, Freedom and Humanity all concur in demanding the abolition of slavery.²⁴

With this, he concluded.

One passage of Sumner’s speech was particularly striking and applauded: a direct appeal which he made to Daniel Webster,²⁵ the revered Whig statesman, then serving as Senator from Massachusetts in Washington, and an orator of such ability and presence that listeners—especially New England listeners—almost worshipped him.²⁶ Addressing the absent Webster, who had been expected at the convention, Sumner invoked Webster’s titles, “*Defender of the Constitution*” and “*Defender of the Peace*.” He elaborated:

There are yet other duties, claiming your care, whose performance will be the crown to a life of high public service. Let me ask you, when again at your post in the Senate, not to forget them. Dedicate, Sir, the golden years of experience happily in store for you, to the grand endeavor, in the name of Freedom, to remove from your country its greatest evil. In this cause you shall find inspirations to eloquence, higher than any you have yet confessed...²⁷

“Do not shrink from the task,” Sumner urged. If Webster assumed “these unperformed duties,” he would be awarded another title, which would never be forgotten “on earth or in heaven”—“*Defender of Humanity*.”

The *Boston Daily Advertiser*, organ of the Cotton Whigs, conceded that Sumner made “a very eloquent speech,” and reported that it was received “with sympathy...and applause.”

As the orator stepped from the platform, Nathan Appleton,²⁸ manufacturer, politician, and conservative leader, remarked to him: “A good speech for Virginia, but out of place here.”²⁹ In other words: we need not, and should not, speak of slavery here. “If good for Virginia,” Sumner replied, “it is good for Boston, as we have our responsibilities for Slavery.” There were some who would insist on speaking of it.

Winthrop followed him, addressing the crowd in a more conventional vein, speaking of the tariff, internal improvements, the disastrous overreaches of President Polk, the evils of the Democratic Party, and the war with Mexico which the Democrats began.³⁰ His peroration was a fine example of protest against slavery’s “further extension”—and *only* that; but Winthrop’s purpose was overtly, as Edward L. Pierce observed, to dwell on the measures on which Northern and Southern Whigs agreed.³¹ He made several allusions to the agitators of Conscience: “If anybody has come here,” he said near his conclusion, “either by direct expression or by covert allusion, to cast imputations, to provoke collisions, or to stir up strife, I pass him by with whatever respect other people may think him entitled to.”³² The two speeches, met with varied responses, “indicated clearly two divisions no longer bound together by any tie of sympathy,” in the words of Pierce.³³

The Cotton-Conscience division was likewise demonstrated, and the conflict brought to fever pitch, by the resolutions which were next presented for consideration. The State Committee had invited the Conscience men, to their surprise, to offer resolutions of their own, but their set, having been composed without knowledge of the contents of the regular resolutions, bore an unfortunate resemblance to that of the conservatives, though it contained important differences of degree and equivocation. This similarity was made the ground for its rejection, while the Conscience delegates fought for the differences. Debate ensued and quickly became personal.³⁴ They were in the minority, but the anti-slavery men, wrote Henry Wilson,³⁵ one of the ablest among them, “were strong in character, capacity, confidence, as well as in the justice

of their cause”; so formidable was their show of resistance that the conservatives “trembled for its effect on the integrity of the party.”³⁶ So concerned did the Cotton Whigs become, sensing the tide turning against them, that they resorted to their most powerful weapon: Daniel Webster himself.³⁷

In a scene that was to be memorable, Webster’s entrance was arranged.³⁸ Webster’s son was seen in “hasty conference among the gray-haired conservatives,” then departing the hall, then returning, and exiting again with Abbott Lawrence,³⁹ another Cotton Whig leader. Lawrence and Webster had a lengthy history of rivalry and grievance, but, on that September afternoon, they entered Faneuil Hall arm-in-arm.⁴⁰ Instantly, once Webster’s appearance was perceived, “debate was suspended, the disorder ceased, and all eyes turned to him.”⁴¹ Thunderous applause accompanied Webster’s walk to the platform, where he sat, “grand, gloomy, impressive,” brooding over the close of the day.⁴²

In this changed atmosphere, the Conscience Whigs lost all chance of influencing the resolutions. Their own set was soon disposed of, after which Webster rose to speak, briefly and gloomily. His words, like his entrance, would be remembered long afterward.⁴³ He closed thus:

Others rely on other foundations and other hopes for the welfare of the country; but for my part, in the dark and troubled night that is upon us, I see no star above the horizon promising light to guide us but the intelligent, patriotic, united Whig party of the United States.⁴⁴

And so, as the delegates departed the hall, they were left with what these words implied: party was to be the guiding light to Massachusetts. The anti-slavery men sensed the approaching breach ever more clearly; for, to them, the light was, and could only be, conscience. Henry Wilson reflected, decades later, on Webster’s short speech, in which the silence, expressing more than the words, revealed “the policy of the hour”—that policy was, Wilson wrote, “the statesmanship of submission and surrender.”⁴⁵ It was dismaying to find that, despite “the depths of his capacious mind and large experience,” Webster’s only watchword “for that dark

hour of strife” was Union. It was “his only talisman to heal the diseases of his country, his only charm to conjure with.”

Daniel Webster, however, was too towering a figure to abandon in haste, and political abolitionism was too young to ignore the possibility of his momentous aid. Only two years earlier, he had done much to spark opposition to the Texas annexation; in 1845, he had aided the anti-slavery Whigs with an anti-Texas convention, co-authoring a report, and forfeiting thereby some power among his fellow conservatives.⁴⁶ His famed eloquence contained much with which the Conscience men agreed; it might be, considering the approaching presidential contest of 1848, self-interest would lead him to seek further alliance with the anti-slavery Whigs, even if conscience would not.

Therefore, two days after the convention, Sumner wrote Webster an explanatory note, clarifying his respectful intentions and briefly reiterating his appeal.⁴⁷ Webster’s reply is a paragon of evasion, the substance bookended by assurances of his personal regard for his correspondent:

In political affairs we happen to entertain, at the present moment, a difference of opinion respecting the relative importance of some of the political questions of the time, and take a different view of the line of duty most fit to be pursued in endeavors to obtain all the good which can be obtained in connection with certain important subjects.⁴⁸

With this answer, Sumner could be sure of Mr. Webster’s “continued good wishes.” It was quite as evident that the Senator was not intent on the title “*Defender of Humanity*.”

When the Quaker abolitionist poet John Greenleaf Whittier⁴⁹ read of the convention’s proceedings, he swiftly penned some impassioned verses and enclosed them in a letter to his friend Sumner, suggesting they might be printed.⁵⁰ Whittier deplored the conduct of the Cotton leaders, and feared that Webster was, on the subject of slavery, “no better...than ‘a colossal coward,’” but he sent thanks to Sumner and the other Conscience delegates for their words. Grateful for the poet’s encouragement, Sumner

assured him, “We do not despair.”⁵¹ What had been set in motion could not be stopped.

Whittier’s poem, “The Pine-Tree,” soon published in the *Conscience* newspaper, closed:

Where’s the man for Massachusetts?—
 Where’s the voice to speak her free?—
 Where’s the hand to light up bonfires
 from her mountains to the sea?
 Beats her Pilgrim pulse no longer?—
 Sits she dumb in her despair?—
 Has she none to break the silence?—
 Has she none to do and dare?—
 O my God! for one right worthy to lift
 up her rusted shield,
 And to plant again the Pine-Tree in her
 banner’s tattered field!⁵²

There was, however, one Massachusetts man in Congress who was working to speak his state free, and who Sumner praised in his speech as one who was dedicating “the closing energies of a long and illustrious life” to the cause of freedom.⁵³ John Quincy Adams,⁵⁴ former president, now, at age seventy-nine, was serving as representative of the state’s 8th District, and father of *Conscience* Whig leader, Charles Francis Adams.⁵⁵ To the elder Adams, the Whig convention made clear that there were two divisions in his party, one, as he matter-of-factly phrased it, guided by “public principle” and the other by “manufacturing and commercial interest.”⁵⁶ The day after the convention, Adams made his way to Faneuil Hall for a meeting to protest the recent kidnapping in Boston of an escaped slave from New Orleans. Despite ill health, Adams was pleased to accept the invitation to preside at the meeting which Charles Sumner and Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe⁵⁷ had urged upon him.⁵⁸ His illness rendered Adams’s voice feeble, but, in the words of a biographer, “his presence was enough, his look testimony to the antislavery cause.”⁵⁹

Adams was a mentor to the Conscience Whigs and, in 1846, he was particularly interested in the future of Charles Sumner, by whom he had long been admired.⁶⁰ In August, Adams listened with pleasure to one of Sumner's best orations: "The Scholar, the Jurist, the Artist, the Philanthropist," which memorialized two other mentors who helped to make Sumner the man he was. Joseph Story⁶¹ (the Jurist), Supreme Court Justice and professor at Harvard Law School, had taught Sumner both the science and the spirit of the law, and instilled foundational ideals of republican leadership; William Ellery Channing⁶² (the Philanthropist), the Apostle of Unitarianism, was to Sumner an inspiring example of ethical integrity and humanitarian faith, who had provided a reminder of the preeminence, even over intellectual achievement, of the conscience and love which Channing exemplified.⁶³ Through his subjects, Sumner found occasion to uphold the causes nearest his heart: peace, and the abolition of slavery. John Quincy Adams, like many in the audience, was enchanted.⁶⁴

In a note of thanks for Adams's kind words following the address, Sumner recollected a scene of twenty years before, when, graduating with a blue-ribboned Franklin medal from the Boston Latin School, he heard Adams speak in Faneuil Hall.⁶⁵ He wrote, "you were then President of the United States—it little occurred to me that I could ever receive praise from those lips on whose accents I hung with such interest." A few weeks before that occasion, the fifteen-year-old Sumner heard another orator from the same platform: Daniel Webster, delivering his eulogy on John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who had both died on the Fourth of July, the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.⁶⁶ It was then far from Sumner's thoughts that he could ever challenge Webster.

In his diary, a few days after the August 1846 address, Adams recorded his hope that Sumner would "contribute largely to redeem the Spirit of the free people of this Union from the dastardly Servility to the slave mongrel oligarchy into which they have insensibly and almost unconsciously fallen."⁶⁷ He wrote to

Sumner of “the vista of the future” which the address had opened to his view.⁶⁸ Adams cast his glance back to the 4th of July 1845, when Sumner, Boston’s chosen orator, “set all the vipers of Alecto a-hissing,” as Adams wrote, by addressing the patriotic and martial audience with an appeal for the end of war.⁶⁹ When Adams looked forward—“perhaps not much further, but beyond my own allotted time”—he could see that Sumner had “a mission to perform.” He wrote: “I look from Pisgah to the Promised Land; you must enter upon it. To the motto on my seal [*Alteri saeculi*] add *Delenda est servitus*.”⁷⁰

* * *

Literature has been the charm of my life, and could I have carved out my fortunes, to Literature would my whole life have been devoted. I have been a lawyer for bread, and a Statesman at the call of my Country.

—John Quincy Adams, Diary, 1820.⁷¹

While Sumner had followed his conscience wholeheartedly into reform, and felt something of the fascination of the public controversies into which he had been drawn, his involvement with the anti-slavery cause increasingly led him toward a realm from which he instinctively shrank: politics. Indeed, his father, who had bequeathed him an abhorrence of injustice, had, at the same time, taught him an aversion to politics.⁷² The elder Sumner was disillusioned with the political sphere after his own involvement, and he was sure to discourage his son’s interest when it manifested in the Anti-Masonic movement of the early 1830s.⁷³ Though it upheld an ideal of service to one’s community, the moral and educational culture of Charles Sumner’s childhood also advanced a certain disdain for political activity. Thus, the younger Sumner, while keeping himself well informed on affairs of state, both American and European, found ample and increasing sources of aversion as the years passed. Even as he urged the importance of political action to the anti-slavery effort, and even as he described the conscientious representatives Massachusetts ought to elect, he did not see himself as one to hold office.⁷⁴

In 1846, appreciation of his talents and his stature among the Conscience forces first challenged his personal wishes regarding political office. Sumner was lecturing in Maine when an Independent Whig committee nominated him as their candidate for representative of the 1st Congressional District to contest Robert C. Winthrop's reelection.⁷⁵ Though he was the leader of the movement against Winthrop, as soon as he could, Sumner withdrew his name, insisting that he was no politician.⁷⁶ "If it should be my lot to exert any influence," he wrote, endeavoring to convince Nathan Hale of the *Advertiser*, and stating he knew well how little that influence must be, "I wish it may be always as a private citizen."⁷⁷

Now, as for years afterward, he found it necessary to repeat that public and official life were discordant with his disposition; he loved literature, and had never sought glory in a legislature, controversy was alien to his nature, and he entered it only in obedience to duty.⁷⁸ He valued his independence and dreaded the allegations and misinterpretations which, should he seek office, would join those he faced constantly in the Cotton Whig papers and from former friends. While we might attribute some of Sumner's statements to the aforementioned anti-political culture, their abundance, nature, and consistency—along with the independent observations of others, his responses once in office, and his later admissions of political ambition—stand as testimony to their sincerity.

The Independent Whigs were disappointed at his refusal.⁷⁹ Samuel Gridley Howe admonished him for his hesitation and, with almost equal reluctance, consented to take Sumner's place, feeling as though he had "swallowed a peppercorn" when he thought of how no-one dared "to be made a martyr of in the cause of humanity."⁸⁰ The attacks in the newspapers came anyway.⁸¹

By 1848, as the Conscience men left the Whigs to form with other disaffected partisans the anti-slavery Free Soil Party, Sumner saw with increasing clarity, though no less dread, that he was becoming more and more entangled in politics. His closest friend, the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,⁸² at whose Cambridge

home Sumner found refuge every Sunday, observed the changes mournfully.⁸³ “Sumner passed the afternoon with us,” Longfellow wrote in September. “He looks somewhat worn. Nothing but politics now. Oh, where are those genial days when literature was the theme of our conversation?”⁸⁴ He attended one of Sumner’s Free Soil speeches in Cambridge and exclaimed, “Ah, me! in such an assembly! It was like one of Beethoven’s symphonies played in a saw-mill!” Sumner spoke well, but “the shouts and hisses and the vulgar interruptions grated on” Longfellow’s ears, and he was glad to get away.⁸⁵

Sumner would have been glad likewise. “Take from me the pleasures of friendship,” he wrote to Longfellow’s wife, Fanny,⁸⁶ in the spring, and he had “small satisfaction left except in the performance of...duty.”⁸⁷ The controversies of the past four years had already cost him much, of friendship and of good name. But he felt himself “at just the most critical point of his life.”⁸⁸ Longfellow wrote in October: “Shall he plunge irrevocably into politics, or not?—that is the question.” The poet thought it was a question already answered. “He inevitably will do so,” and “[w]hen he has once burned his ships there will be no retreat.” He already held in his hand “the lighted torch.” To duty, Sumner wrote to Fanny, “God willing! I will hold fast.”⁸⁹

When he was nominated again for Winthrop’s seat in the House, this time by the Free Soilers, Sumner felt it his irresistible duty to accept. He wrote to the Free Soil committee: “You now bid me renounce the cherished idea of my life, early formed, and strengthened by each day’s experience”—an idea to “labor in such fields of usefulness as are open to every private citizen, without the honors, the emoluments, or the constraint of office.”⁹⁰ He realized, however, that a crisis had arrived, which required every citizen’s best efforts.⁹¹ That citizen “should shrink from no labor, and no exposure.” The cause was everything, Sumner wrote, “Let me offer to it, not my vows only, but my best efforts wherever they can be most effectual.”

And so he was “submerged in politics,” as Longfellow reported.⁹² But not so; for, in Boston, the 1st District, Sumner hardly stood a chance against the conservatives’ faithful representative, Winthrop. He lost resoundingly, as Dr. Howe had two years before and, though he accepted the position of chairman of the Massachusetts Free Soil Party for 1849, looking always to the success of the cause, Sumner privately hoped that he would not again be called as a candidate.⁹³ He even began preparations on a two-volume edition of his orations and speeches, to close this tumultuous chapter of his career and leave politics behind him, as far as he could. He dreamt of writing a book.

* * *

In the winter of 1846, John Quincy Adams’s health was beginning to fail. On November 20th, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, from which he recovered, able by February to return to his duties in Washington.⁹⁴ During the months of recuperation, he spent time conversing with Sumner, from whom he hoped so much.⁹⁵ Perhaps Adams made his prophecy regarding Sumner so clearly because he perceived that Sumner was needed to perform a task which others would not, or could not, undertake. On the 21st of February 1848, Adams suffered another hemorrhage, at the post of duty in the House, having just voted against the decoration of generals in the Mexican War and, two days later, he died.⁹⁶

Years afterward, when circumstances made the words painfully significant, Sumner remembered something Adams told him in 1846.⁹⁷ Having expressed his desire to make one final Congressional speech on slavery, Adams added that he wished particularly “to expose the great fallacy of Mr. Daniel Webster, who is perpetually talking about the Constitution, while he is indifferent to freedom and those great interests which the Constitution was established to preserve.”⁹⁸ “Alas! that speech was never made,” Sumner mourned. “But the work ought to be done.”

II. "Put not your faith in politicians."

In 1820, as Speaker of the House, Whig leader Henry Clay⁹⁹ of Kentucky managed to pass the measures which resolved the Missouri crisis; and the questions at its heart were "winked away by a compromise," in the words of John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State.¹⁰⁰ While Clay maneuvered in the House, John C. Calhoun¹⁰¹ of South Carolina headed the War Department, grimly foreshadowing secession, and Daniel Webster cultivated his glittering legal career, Adams watched the course of debate over Missouri with pain and prophecy. "Never since human sentiments and human conduct were influenced by human speech, was there a theme for eloquence, like the free side of this question now before the Congress of this Union," Adams wrote.¹⁰² The "ardent Spirits" and "most eloquent Orators," however, seemed confined to "the side of Oppression;" Adams longed for such a man as could, with a capable "Genius," "heart," and "utterance," communicate the "eternal truths" of the question and expose the "outrage" that was human slavery.¹⁰³ That man, at such a time, he mused, "would perform the duties of an Angel upon Earth."

Now, in 1850, such moment had arisen. A similar sectional controversy raged, with the same problems and hostilities intensified by three intervening decades of division. The fate of vast territories was at stake and, under the pressure of secessionist threats, it seemed that the Union was also. Henry Clay, with his prudence and his politics, trusted again to compromise, proposing "an amicable arrangement" to settle "all questions in controversy between the free and slave States, growing out of the subject of slavery."¹⁰⁴ Debate over the "amicable arrangement" did not proceed amicably. Calhoun, the charismatic though dying spokesman of slavery, warned again of disunion, denounced the proposed compromise, detailed Southern "discontent," and arraigned Northern "hostility."¹⁰⁵ A new fugitive slave law was already being drafted.¹⁰⁶

And now, from the Senate floor, on the 7th of March, Daniel Webster—who certainly had the "Genius" and the voice, and

who had sometimes shown the heart—addressed an attentive and overflowing crowd.¹⁰⁷ When it was over, Horace Mann,¹⁰⁸ Adams’s successor as representative from the 8th District, was moved to compare the senator to an angel—to “Lucifer descending from heaven.”¹⁰⁹ He was not the only one to make the comparison. Charles Sumner employed it years earlier, in 1842, when Webster’s *Creole* letter demonstrated the statesman’s inconsistency on slavery; now he employed it again, in a list which included Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot.¹¹⁰ John Greenleaf Whittier penned the mournful, scathing poem “Ichabod.”¹¹¹

O, dumb be passion’s stormy rage,
 When he who might
 Have lighted up and led his age,
 Falls back in night.
 [...]
 All else is gone; from those great eyes
 The soul has fled;
 When faith is lost, when honor dies,
 The man is dead!¹¹²

To many in Massachusetts, he was.

What had Webster done to warrant such outrage? He began his 7th of March speech, as it came to be called, by stating that he wished to speak “not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American”; he intended to speak “for the preservation of the Union.”¹¹³ To that end, he reviewed the controversy between and assessed the “grievances” of the free and the slaveholding states.¹¹⁴ Those of the latter he treated sensitively, generously—“in a way,” wrote one historian, “that won the liveliest recognition from the most fiery partisans of slavery.”¹¹⁵ Of those of the former, he said, “I need not go over them particularly.”¹¹⁶ He declared he would vote against the Wilmot Proviso, which was proposed as a prohibition on slavery in the territories; for, he claimed, slavery was excluded from them by “the law of nature,

of physical geography”; and he “would not take pains uselessly to reaffirm an ordinance of nature, nor to reenact the will of God.”¹¹⁷

Webster had much eloquence in favor of patriotism, reason, brotherhood, and the Union, and much outrage for those who spoke of secession. But he reserved some of his harshest words for the abolitionists of the North.¹¹⁸ He declared that every effort of “this agitating people” had been, in effect, “not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave population of the South.”¹¹⁹ He announced his full support of a more stringent fugitive slave law, vowing to “speak to the whole North” on the subject of this Southern “right.”¹²⁰ He gave assurance of his cooperation in any scheme, of Southern origin, “for the transportation of free colored people to any colony or any place in the world.”¹²¹ He had himself, he announced, “nothing to propose” on the subject of slavery; he closed with an acute irony, rejoicing that his country, “in all its history,” had “trodden down no man’s liberty.”¹²²

At first, it seemed to Sumner, Mann, and their friends that most Whigs in the North, and especially in Massachusetts, were shocked at Webster’s speech.¹²³ For a time, the outrage was general, but by April, they had increasing reason to moderate their assessment of anti-Webster sentiment. A letter appeared in Boston’s major Whig papers, the *Advertiser* and the *Courier*, thanking Webster for his speech, “which pointed out to a whole people the path of duty,” and expressing its signatories’ “entire concurrence in the sentiments” contained therein.¹²⁴ Sumner looked on the bright side, as he often did, and noticed the names that were absent among the undersigned.¹²⁵ Many prominent gentlemen remained willing to express their disapprobation “in private.” Still, there had been over nine hundred signers.¹²⁶ In Washington, Mann judged that Webster had “changed the course of things,” for the Southerners pushed their “schemes with renewed energy” and their usual skill.¹²⁷ He began to fear that the anti-slavery cause would be lost as political aspirants scrambled to imitate and outdo Webster. When Webster visited Boston in March, he spoke allur-

ingly of the tariff; his hint had its effect.¹²⁸ Sumner looked over the disheartening conduct of politicians like Clay and Webster, and asked, “What shall we do?”¹²⁹ Rousing himself to hope, he wrote, “But I have unbounded faith in God and in the future. I know we shall succeed.” Yet he added, “But what shall we do?”

Henry Wilson had an idea. In the Massachusetts Legislature, he had been a leader in the passage of anti-slavery resolutions that winter.¹³⁰ Instructions to Webster to vote according to those resolutions had been proposed in an amendment, but rejected.¹³¹ In vain, Wilson endeavored to bring the amendment up for reconsideration, as petitions to the same effect reached the legislature.¹³² He argued that the people of Massachusetts would never sustain the stance which Webster had adopted, nor countenance those who followed and defended the apostate senator. He declared to the Whig majority before him, “I will...go out from this hall, and unite with any party or body of men to drive you from power, rebuke Daniel Webster, and place in his seat a Senator true to the principles and sentiments of the Commonwealth.”¹³³ Based on this pledge, Wilson proposed a “coalition” between the Free Soilers and the Democrats of Massachusetts—the state’s two subordinate parties.¹³⁴ The Democrats of the state had shown sympathy for anti-slavery; and such a coalition, in which both parties were “to retain [their] distinctive organization, principles, and policy,” would not involve the compromise of principle.¹³⁵ It would do much for the cause. Accordingly, over the summer, Wilson explored the possibility.¹³⁶ By August, Sumner could note that there was “a strong disposition in many of our friends” in favor of the proposed union.¹³⁷ With the cascade of Whig betrayals and the impending success of the Compromise, it seemed to Wilson—and to many in the Free Soil ranks—that the coalition, and its goal of an anti-slavery Senator for Massachusetts, constituted “a necessity” and “a duty.”¹³⁸

Meanwhile, a controversy raged between Horace Mann and Daniel Webster, from May through the summer. In a series of scathing letters, begun by Mann, the two attacked one another in the press, descending to personalities, begun by Webster, and

even a dispute over one of Webster's Latin references, in which professors were consulted, only to take opposite sides themselves.¹³⁹ Existing animosities were strengthened, while lingering friendships withered and died. Sumner, actively assisting Mann with sources, notes, suggestions, and proofreading, was pained, though unsurprised, by the intensity of the conflict.¹⁴⁰

Events in Washington increased the turmoil in Massachusetts. In July, as debates over the Compromise measures dragged on, President Taylor died suddenly, leaving the pro-Compromise Millard Fillmore¹⁴¹ to undertake the precarious task of governance.¹⁴² The new President chose to assemble a new cabinet and, as many expected, he invited Webster to be Secretary of State.¹⁴³ After some hesitation, due to age and health, Webster accepted the post, anxious to recover his damaged prestige.¹⁴⁴ His term in the Senate was to end anyway on March 4th, 1851;¹⁴⁵ yet until the Massachusetts Legislature elected a new Senator, his replacement would serve by the appointment of the Whig Governor, George N. Briggs.¹⁴⁶ The Free Soilers hoped that Briggs, often sympathetic to anti-slavery and among the outraged following Webster's speech in March, would select someone fit to correct Webster's course.¹⁴⁷ The Governor, however, under pressure from Webster and Fillmore, chose Robert C. Winthrop, Webster's natural successor.¹⁴⁸

Sumner was disheartened, regretting that Briggs had not chosen Horace Mann.¹⁴⁹ He wrote to Mann, trying to give him some perspective amid the bitterness: "You must expect the coldness & vituperation of *politicians*."¹⁵⁰ They worked in a trade, after all, which compelled them "to be faithless to principles." The governor's missed opportunity was yet "another illustration, that a *politician* in the service of a *party* cannot be trusted." It was a group which he eschewed and detested, Sumner wrote. To Howe he observed, "Put not your faith in *politicians*. They may talk fairly; but they will *act always* as politicians. At last I understand them."¹⁵¹

As Winthrop settled into Webster's seat in the Senate, Boston held a special election to fill Winthrop's seat in the House. The Whigs put forward Samuel A. Eliot,¹⁵² whom Sumner thought

would have been, in another time and place, an Inquisitor.¹⁵³ For the third time, the Free Soilers chose Sumner; for the second time, he reluctantly accepted, feeling it his duty, and was resoundingly defeated.¹⁵⁴ Sumner and the Longfellows learned of the result from Nahant—a rocky near-island, popular among summering Bostonians, branching off from Lynn with a view of the capital over the encircling ocean.¹⁵⁵ “As we sat at breakfast in the hall,” wrote the poet, “with open doors looking upon the street, a handsome equipage drove by, with two white horses. It was the successful candidate, on his way already, rolling by triumphant; while the beaten candidate sat in the little way-side cottage, waiting for the public coach to take him to town. We had a good laugh at the theatrical scene....”¹⁵⁶

Webster was elated at the news. “From the commencement of the government,” he wrote, rather improbably, “no such consequences have attended any single election, as those that flowed from Mr. Eliot’s election.”¹⁵⁷ It proved, to him, that Webster “was not a dead man...”¹⁵⁸ The victorious Eliot was “the personation of Boston: ever intelligent, ever patriotic, ever glorious Boston.” Southerners responded with “hopes in which they had never before indulged”—hopes that Northerners were not, indeed, abolitionists one and all. Their prejudices “against our good city,” Webster thought, also improbably, were “all sunk and lost forever in their admiration of her nationality of spirit,” as evinced by the triumph of Eliot over Sumner. Rumor had it, Webster reported, that Eliot had declared, “Now we have trodden Satan under our feet.”¹⁵⁹

Sometime in August, Sumner and Whittier visited Dr. Gamaliel Bailey,¹⁶⁰ editor of a Washington anti-slavery paper, who was staying for a few weeks near Phillips Beach, across the water from Nahant.¹⁶¹ Perhaps it was then that Whittier drew Sumner aside, wishing to speak with him; and then that the two approached “the summer sea, white in the moon,” and

saw the long waves fall

Baffled and broken from the rocky wall,

That, to the menace of the brawling flood,

Opposed alone its massive quietude,

Calm as a fate....¹⁶²

The poet wished to persuade his friend to accept, if Henry Wilson's coalition were enacted and successful, the nomination for Webster's place in the Senate.¹⁶³ He listened to Sumner's well-practiced yet heartfelt objections and he "told him that he would be Senator."¹⁶⁴ "It would not be so," Sumner insisted; "others were better fitted."¹⁶⁵ Whittier remembered that Sumner "greatly doubted his natural fitness for political life."¹⁶⁶ He seemed resolved; but Whittier persisted, and perhaps the recollection of this conference gave strength to later and different resolutions.¹⁶⁷ In years to come, Whittier would "sometimes think this night-scene by the sea prophetic,—"

(For Nature speaks in symbols and in signs,

And through her pictures human fate divines),—

That rock, wherefrom we saw the billows sink

In murmuring rout, uprising clear and tall

In the white light of heaven, the type of one

Who, momentarily by Error's host assailed,

Stands strong as Truth, in greaves of granite mailed;

And, tranquil-fronted, listening over all

The tumult, hears the angels say, Well done!¹⁶⁸

* * *

Henry Wilson's coalition, however, of which he and the Free Soil ranks had, over the summer, begun to form a favorable judgment, was strongly opposed by the party leaders.¹⁶⁹ The strategy of coalition was familiar in anti-slavery circles. Coalitions with Democrats in New Hampshire and Ohio had recently sent two Free Soilers to the Senate; and local alliances were formed for Massachusetts elections in 1849, with varying success.¹⁷⁰ But to the leaders—to five of the most distinguished Free Soilers: Charles Francis Adams, Richard H. Dana Jr.,¹⁷¹ Samuel Hoar,¹⁷²

John Gorham Palfrey,¹⁷³ and Stephen C. Phillips¹⁷⁴—such a scheme was dangerous and tainted. Their feelings were made clear at a meeting hosted by Wilson on September 10th. They feared that cooperation with the Democrats would dissolve the Free Soil Party; the tactics of coalition and office-trading were sure to appear, if they were not actually, disreputable. Palfrey contended that “the value of electing a United States Senator had been exaggerated,” the others agreeing that it was not worth the cost, and that it might be accomplished in five or six years without such alliances.¹⁷⁵ They disapproved of the direction in which this shoemaker from Natick, Henry Wilson, was taking their movement; being former Whigs, they had a “repugnance to Democrats” which cemented their resistance.¹⁷⁶ Wilson, however, was determined, if he could, not to wait five or six years to rebuke Daniel Webster and set a friend of freedom in his place. The meeting closed with the decision to permit each Free Soiler to make his own choice regarding the coalition.

Sumner did not share the others’ “repugnance to Democrats,” nor was he so averse to practical plans such as Wilson’s as his reputation has suggested.¹⁷⁷ Thinking of the importance of the senatorship to the cause, he confessed “the strength of the temptation,” but he doubted the coalition could be accomplished.¹⁷⁸ He wrote Wilson, urging, first, their principles, and, second, harmony among themselves. It seemed to him, he wrote, “a step of questionable propriety” for an organization of Free Soilers to bargain with Democrats for the disposition of offices.¹⁷⁹ Possibly, he suggested, the local and county unions already in operation could produce sufficient change in state politics—without the dubious coalition. For now, he could not give Wilson his support.

Salmon P. Chase of Ohio disagreed with this hesitation.¹⁸⁰ Writing from Washington, where he labored as one of the two Free Soilers among sixty-two Senators, and where he knew well “the value of electing a United States Senator,” he exhorted his friend Sumner: “Rouse up in Massachusetts and quit you like men.”¹⁸¹ In June, he had emphasized that the conduct of Massachusetts,

“the heart of the cause,” was felt across the whole country.¹⁸² A senatorial voice of freedom from this freedom-loving state was sorely missed. Now, in September, Chase wrote: “Would that it might be so ordered that you could be placed in the Senate!...If the Democrats would place you there, they might have the Governor and welcome—doubly welcome.”¹⁸³

III. “Because I place Freedom above all else.”

Then, on September 12th, the House passed the Fugitive Slave Bill—the Senate having done so in August.¹⁸⁴ Alone of the Massachusetts delegation, Eliot voted “yea.” Three others abstained. Horace Mann wrote from the floor as the votes were called: 109 to 76—“an enormous majority,” for it was an enormity.¹⁸⁵

Amending and supplementing the Act of 1793, the Act of 1850 authorized and required commissioners, appointed by Circuit Courts in the states and Superior Courts in the territories, to execute its provisions; and required the courts to enlarge, from time to time, the number of commissioners, “with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor.”¹⁸⁶ A claimant was authorized to “pursue and reclaim such fugitive person,” either on a warrant or, “where the same can be done without process,” and to bring the alleged fugitive before a “court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner.”¹⁸⁷ The commissioner was, upon satisfactory proof, to grant certificates, authorizing claimants to remove alleged fugitives to the state or territory from which they escaped.¹⁸⁸ Satisfactory proof was to consist of a deposition or affidavit obtained from some legal officer in the state from which the fugitive escaped, the seal of which was to be “sufficient to establish the competency of the proof.”¹⁸⁹ The claimant was to be granted the use of “such reasonable force and restraint” as was necessary to remove the fugitive to the state from which he or she escaped. No testimony of the alleged fugitive was to be admitted as evidence; and the certificate granted to the claimant was to “prevent all molestation of such person or persons by any

process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.”¹⁹⁰

Commissioners would receive ten dollars when they issued a certificate, and five when they did not.¹⁹¹ A marshal or deputy marshal was to be fined one thousand dollars if he refused to execute the act; if a fugitive should escape while in his custody, he could be prosecuted for “the full value of the service or labor of said fugitive.”¹⁹² Commissioners were authorized to appoint persons to assist them, and “to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or *posse comitatus* of the proper county, when necessary to ensure...faithful observance.” Closing the act’s fifth section was a commandment to “all good citizens...to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law, whenever their services may be required.” If the claimant was apprehensive that the fugitive would be rescued, force was required to be used to transport him or her to the claimant’s state.¹⁹³ Compensation for officers and assistants was to be taken from the Treasury of the United States. Any person who knowingly hindered those authorized to arrest the fugitive, attempted to rescue, or aided or harbored them, was to be “subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months.”¹⁹⁴ Thus, escaping from enslavement, or, indeed, falsely claimed, a person was to be denied the right to a trial by jury, often to a trial by judge, to *habeas corpus*, to testimony, and to the aid of sympathetic citizens. Those citizens were to be denied the right to offer that aid, or, indeed, to stand aloof from the return of a fellow being to slavery. Under this act, they were forced to aid not the enslaved but the enslaver.

Mann predicted that it would “make abolitionists by battalions and regiments.”¹⁹⁵ But he dreaded that the Whigs might acquiesce all too heartily in the measure, as the other pieces of the Compromise were passed and celebrated; and he waited anxiously for a response from the North.¹⁹⁶ “Are they all dead in Massachusetts?” he asked Free Soiler Samuel Downer.¹⁹⁷ Longfellow seemed to think that, in Boston, they were. Eliot’s vote for the Fugitive Slave Act was “a dark disgrace” to the city he represented;

but the people of Boston, who would abhor such an action in the pages of history, would not see it in themselves.¹⁹⁸ “They will uphold it,” Longfellow mourned. The “theatrical scene” of Eliot’s victory could not be so amusing now. “If the friends of freedom do not rally on” the Fugitive Slave Act, Mann warned, “they are dead for half a century.”¹⁹⁹

They were soon tested. “The slave-hunters are in Boston,” Longfellow wrote on October 26th.²⁰⁰ Two agents, hired by a Georgia slaveholder, had arrived in search of William and Ellen Craft,²⁰¹ fugitives who had escaped two years earlier, the light-skinned Ellen dressing as a white man traveling with his slave (her husband, William).²⁰² Samuel J. May,²⁰³ a founding member of the American Anti-Slavery Society, noted that “a cool determination not to allow this young couple to be taken from Boston into slavery, was aroused, and pervaded the city.”²⁰⁴ The Boston Vigilance Committee, organized by Black and white abolitionists, succeeded in concealing the Crafts and scaring off the agents, using various weapons, from lawsuits to threats of gunpowder.²⁰⁵ Finally, the agents gave up; but the Georgia claimant appealed to President Fillmore, who granted the use of military force. By that time, the Crafts were on their way to Nova Scotia, and from there to England. May lamented, “A brave young man and a virtuous young woman must fly the American shores, and seek, under the shadow of the British throne, the enjoyment of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”²⁰⁶

At the Free Soil State Convention of October 3rd, and again at a Free Soil meeting in Faneuil Hall in early November, Sumner delivered a speech on “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties.”²⁰⁷ “[W]ell may the question be asked, ‘What of the night?’” he said. “For things have occurred, and measures have passed into laws, which, to my mind, fill the day itself with blackness.”²⁰⁸ He acknowledged the “unwonted dawn” signaled by the admission of California as a free state, the victories achieved in the suppression of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and the abolition of flogging in the navy.²⁰⁹ “Thus two props and stays of Slavery...have been

weakened and undermined by Congressional legislation. Without the *slave-trade* and the *lash*, Slavery must fall to the earth."²¹⁰ If he seemed to exaggerate the importance of these measures, he said, it was in part to be referred to his desire of finding something good in a Congress which had been so deeply disappointing. The remaining Compromise measures admitted of no such hopeful interpretation.

With this, Sumner turned to the Fugitive Slave Bill, on which he dwelt at length.²¹¹ Congress had passed "a most cruel, unchristian, devilish law," which, added to its inhumanity, in denying the trial by jury, was "three times unconstitutional."²¹² He trusted that the people of Massachusetts would not add their support to the atrocity. "Surely the love of Freedom cannot have so far cooled among us, the descendants of those who opposed the Stamp Act," he said, "that we are insensible to the Fugitive Slave Bill."²¹³ The former act could not be executed in Massachusetts. Sumner asked, "Can the Fugitive Slave Bill?"

"We have seen what Congress has done," Sumner continued, in a particularly striking passage—an early rebuke to the argument of finality which was beginning to enshrine the Compromise as a "final settlement" of the slavery question.

And yet, in the face of these enormities of legislation,—of Territories organized without the prohibition of Slavery, of a large province surrendered to Texas and to Slavery, and of this execrable Fugitive Slave Bill,—in the face also of Slavery still sanctioned in the District of Columbia, of the Slave-Trade between domestic ports under the flag of the Union, and of the Slave Power still dominant over the National Government, we are told that the Slavery Question is settled. Yes, *settled*,—*settled*,—that is the word. *Nothing, Sir, can be settled which is not right.* Nothing can be settled which is against Freedom. Nothing can be settled which is contrary to the Divine Law. God, Nature, and all the holy sentiments of the heart repudiate any such false seeming settlement.²¹⁴

"Amidst the shifts and changes of party our DUTIES remain, pointing the way to action," he continued; and duty pointed back to the issue at the heart of it all:

Slavery is wrong. It is the source of unnumbered woes; not the least of which is its influence on the Slave-holder himself, in rendering him insensible to its outrage...Language toils in vain to picture the wretchedness and wickedness, which it sanctions and perpetuates. Reason revolts at the impious assumption, that man can hold property in man. As it is our perpetual duty to oppose wrong, so must we oppose Slavery.... *Especially must we oppose it, wherever we are responsible for its existence, or are in any way parties to it.*²¹⁵

And whatever the influence of morals and religion, employed tirelessly by the abolitionists, Sumner urged that slavery also be opposed “directly by every instrument of Political Power.”²¹⁶

As it is sustained by law, it can be overthrown only by law; and the legislature, in which is lodged the jurisdiction over it, must be moved to undertake the work. I am sorry to confess that this can be done, only through the machinery of politics. The politician, then, must be summoned. The moralist, the philanthropist must become for this purpose a politician; not forgetting his morals or his philanthropy, but seeking to apply them practically in the laws of the land.

In accordance with this sentiment, Sumner, in the speech of November 6th, a few days before the elections, at last gave his support to the coalition: “[I]t is because I place Freedom above all else that I cordially concur in the different unions or combinations throughout the Commonwealth...”²¹⁷ By securing control in the Legislature, the cooperation between Free Soilers and Democrats would enable the friends of freedom to contribute more powerfully than otherwise possible to the cause which had drawn them together.

* * *

“I think Daniel Webster has broken up the Whig party in Massachusetts,” was Longfellow’s verdict on the November elections.²¹⁸ The coalition, as hoped, secured a majority in the legislature—in the Senate of twelve, and in the House of about fifty.²¹⁹ The governor and several other state officers had not received decisive votes, and in January were chosen by the legislature, according to coalition negotiations. But the coalition remained

controversial, within the Free Soil ranks and without. In January, as the legislature assembled, Palfrey wrote a circular urging Free Soilers not to vote with the coalition.²²⁰ Charles Francis Adams wrote a letter of his own, moderating Palfrey's. The *Transcript* reported Adams's confidence in the purity of his party.²²¹ Looking at the party's present object, "securing to their cause the aid of one of their ablest and most inflexible advocates" as a Senator, Adams felt "almost as strongly as any of them, the temptation to overlook the difficulties in the way of accomplishing it." The prospect, he emphasized, was particularly compelling as a rebuke to Daniel Webster.

From Amesbury, Whittier confessed to Henry Wilson that the senatorship was his "single object" in voting for the coalition ticket.²²² He was willing to consider several Free Soilers as a candidate; but the "popular feeling" was in Sumner's favor. Some had voted the coalition ticket "solely" for Sumner's sake, he noted. Charles Francis Adams felt that Sumner's presence in the Senate was the only adequate compensation for the risk of the coalition.²²³ "If anything can be done in that iron and marble body," he wrote, pessimistic, "you may do it." The choice was clear. Many were confident that Sumner would be Senator; many told him that he could not refuse.²²⁴ Sumner himself continued to express his unwillingness, urging that there were others in the Free Soil Party, his "seniors and betters," to whom he deferred—Adams included.²²⁵ Such avowals were not unusual; to an extent they were standard practice; but Sumner's hesitation ran deeper. "I have searched my heart," he wrote to his brother; and he had its response: "I do not desire to be Senator."²²⁶ He had not been able to bring himself "even to be willing to take" the office.²²⁷

But the tide was against him—or, rather, *for* him. On January 7th, the Free Soilers of the legislature met to nominate their candidate for the Senate term of six years. Edward L. Keyes²²⁸ wrote Sumner of the result: "[Y]ou are the man. For Charles Sumner, 82; others 0. We have sworn to stand by you; to sink or swim with

you, at all hazards. If you shall fail us in any respect, may God forgive you! we never shall."²²⁹

The Democratic caucus at one meeting consented, 65 to 6, to the Free Soilers' unanimous choice; but one faction, the twenty-five or thirty absent from the meeting, and led by Caleb Cushing,²³⁰ arrayed themselves in opposition.²³¹ They were not willing to upset the country's peace by sending "a firebrand into the councils of the nation," as one wrote.²³² On the first vote in the Senate, Sumner received twenty-three votes to Winthrop's fourteen, and was elected by the body.²³³ But in the House, he fell short a few votes from the number required for an election. "The recusant Democrats" had not fulfilled, and were not about to fulfill, their side of the coalition's agreement.²³⁴ Longfellow wrote Sumner, "I never had any great faith in your perfidious allies."²³⁵ The poet thought his friend was "too good, too noble, too free, too independent for the purposes of politicians."²³⁶ Fanny Longfellow wrote similarly, as the voting dragged on: "He is far too good and pure and noble for a politician, and though he has an energy and eloquence which, as well as the times, seem to claim him for such work, I shall half regret it."²³⁷

After the failure of the first votes, Whittier counseled Sumner that it might be best to resign the nomination and to withdraw altogether from the coalition.²³⁸ There were suggestions also of selecting another candidate, one less likely to be labeled, as Sumner was by Caleb Cushing, "a one-ideal, abolition agitator."²³⁹ Sumner wrote Wilson: "Abandon me...whenever you think best, without notice or apology. The cause is everything; I am nothing."²⁴⁰ But Wilson and the Free Soil masses disagreed. They did not consider Sumner to be "nothing," and would hear of no withdrawal or substitution; in their view, the election of anyone else would be "half a defeat."²⁴¹ They insisted on perseverance. And so the struggle dragged on for four months and twenty-six ballots, Sumner consistently receiving a few votes too few, the required number changing with the number of members present in the House, and the vote for Sumner ranging inconsistently from 179

to 194.²⁴² Howe complained that even the Free Soilers were not sufficiently resolute, though “the pressure upon the waverers” was “enormous.”²⁴³ While the Whigs exhausted their catalogue of epithets in the press, the Democrats sought promises from Sumner that he would as senator refrain from agitating the slavery question. They received no such thing; Sumner would not compromise.²⁴⁴ If he was to retain the qualities for which he had been chosen—if he was to be the sort of senator the Free Soilers were determined to elect, “the office must seek me, and not I the office,” as he wrote, “and...it must find me an absolutely independent man.”²⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Boston was shaken by two fugitive slave cases. In the first, in February, Shadrach Minkins²⁴⁶ was successfully rescued by a group of Black Bostonians.²⁴⁷ Compromisers reacted in a frenzy, Fillmore again threatened belated military force, while Southern sectionalists cited the rescue as proof of the North’s inability to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.²⁴⁸ In early April, when Thomas Sims²⁴⁹ was arrested, meetings were held across the city, a rescue was attempted, and a group of anti-slavery lawyers—Sumner included—enlisted every measure they could to save Sims.²⁵⁰ But commissioner George T. Curtis²⁵¹ decided against him, and Sims was marched to the harbor under the guard of three hundred armed men. Webster was in Boston during the proceedings, in part, as Longfellow surmised, to see that the act was enforced.²⁵² Thus, the slave-hunters were, for a time, victorious in the city of Boston.

On April 23rd, with the friends of freedom still grieving over the return of Sims to slavery, and after a fortnight’s intermission in balloting for the senatorship, the Massachusetts House again held a vote. Sumner was within a single vote of victory. On one ballot, he was thought to be elected; but it was called into question, revised, and he continued to lack one vote.²⁵³ On the following day, procedure was altered slightly: ballots were enclosed in envelopes. This measure, as Edward L. Pierce theorized, was intended by its proponent, a Boston Whig, to allow Democrats “to vote unobserved against Sumner,” thus disguising their betrayal of the coalition.²⁵⁴ But when the twenty-sixth ballot was counted,

Sumner had received precisely the required number—193. It remained a matter of speculation whose vote had, under the protection of secrecy, been granted to the Free Soilers: one of the Democrats, or one of the Whigs. Thus, on the afternoon of April 24th, 1851, after four months of contention, Charles Sumner was elected senator from Massachusetts, as successor to Daniel Webster.

The Free Soilers rejoiced at their momentous victory, hard-won and, indeed, nearly-lost. Some would say that this was “the happiest moment of their lives.”²⁵⁵ Henry Wilson addressed a crowd in front of the Old State House and declared, in reply to an incongruous cheer for Webster, that the election of Charles Sumner was Massachusetts’s answer to March 7th, 1850.²⁵⁶ There were celebratory lights to illuminate the office of the Free Soil paper; the next day, there was a canon salute from the Public Garden—also an answer to 1850, when Boston saluted instead the Compromise.²⁵⁷ Even Whittier, Quaker though he was, heard the canons “with real satisfaction.”²⁵⁸ Charles Francis Adams’s young son Henry²⁵⁹ brought the news of victory to his father and Sumner himself.²⁶⁰ Twenty or thirty people arrived at the Adams house with congratulations. Sumner enjoined them to prevent any public display which would “denote the success of a person instead of a cause.”²⁶¹ Later, when another group of Free Soilers hurried about Beacon Hill in search of their senator, they searched in vain.²⁶² He had escaped across the river to Cambridge, where Longfellow described him “sitting quietly . . . , more saddened than exalted.”²⁶³ He hoped he did not seem “cold or churlish” in thus withdrawing, he wrote to Wilson.²⁶⁴ And then he gave Wilson his thanks: “To [your] ability, energy, determination, & fidelity our cause owes its present success. For weal or woe, you must take the responsibility of having placed me in the Senate” of the United States.

While defeated Whigs were observed in the streets wearing black armbands to signify their dismay, the friends of freedom sent their congratulations.²⁶⁵ Salmon Chase and Horace Mann both began with, “Laus Deo!”²⁶⁶ Mann wrote to Sumner, “By the necessity of the case, you are now to be a politician,—an honest

one.” Whittier, considering “all the circumstances of this election,” felt compelled to regard it as God’s work. “I rejoice,” he wrote, “that thy triumph is such a direct rebuke to politicians, hoary with years of political chicanery and fraud;—that unpledged, free, and without a single concession or compromise thou art enabled to take thy place in the U.S. Senate.”²⁶⁷ The poet hoped “great things” of Sumner, and did “not fear for his integrity and fidelity, under any trial.”²⁶⁸

Reformer and minister Theodore Parker²⁶⁹ had congratulations, too, but he warned his friend Sumner that his letter was something of a sermon.²⁷⁰ “You once told me,” Parker began, “that you were in morals, not in politics.” Parker now hoped that Sumner would show himself to be “still in morals although in politics.” The standard of politicians was low. Even John Quincy Adams, Parker argued, “never *led* any moral movement.” Sumner must lead it, or else “woefully disappoint the expectations of the people...” As he took an office of the state of Massachusetts, he was obligated to “perfect” and “deny” himself for the state’s sake. Parker hoped he would “look to eternity for...justification.” He expected “heroism of the most heroic kind,” and hoped “some years hence to say, ‘You have done better than I advised!’” He hoped that Sumner would be “the senator *with a conscience*.”

Conclusion

Once Sumner reached Washington, the question inevitably arose of how, navigating the opposing pressures of his colleagues and his constituents, he could best serve the cause which called him there. It was not until the end of his first session that Sumner surmounted the constraints of the former and satisfied the demands of the latter. On the 26th of August 1852, seizing an opportunity, he rose to deliver a carefully-prepared speech against the Fugitive Slave Bill and finality.²⁷¹ He spoke for nearly four hours, and the acrimonious debate which followed lasted nearly as long—the first of many such disputes which he would face.²⁷² When they could get a word in amid the torrent of pro-Compromise and


pro-slavery outrage, Salmon P. Chase and John P. Hale, his fellow Free Soilers, both declared that Sumner's speech marked, in Hale's words, "a new era in the history of the politics and of the eloquence of the country."²⁷³ The speech's importance, as one historian would write, was due not so much to what it contained as to "the fact that," afterward, "the feeling ran both through the north and the south that a man 'with a conscience' had arisen in the legislative body of the Union."²⁷⁴ Horace Mann reported that Daniel Webster was present in the Senate Chamber for a portion of the speech. This happened to be the speech's "least solid part"; but it scarcely mattered, for, as Mann wrote, "to speak in full," the 26th of August 1852 had "redeemed the 7th of March, 1850."²⁷⁵

* * *

In 1850, Daniel Webster and the Whig Party adopted a stance which divorced them from the anti-slavery cause; and the Compromise, with its Fugitive Slave Act, was claimed by its supporters to be a final settlement of the questions arising from and about slavery. To the Free Soilers of Massachusetts, these events made clear that it was, as Henry Wilson wrote, "a necessity" and "a duty" to secure for their state an advocate of freedom in the United States Senate.²⁷⁶ Their intention in so doing was to rebuke Webster and to correct the course of Massachusetts statesmanship, committing to the anti-slavery principles which they understood to be the true principles of the state. To achieve this, however, they had to employ "the machinery of politics," in the form of a coalition which brought upon its participants accusations of unprincipled conduct, which divided their party, and which very nearly failed in securing their object.²⁷⁷ Compromise was necessary in order to oppose, by prompt and substantive measures, the Compromise itself.

But, though the Free Soilers accepted compromise in the manner of attaining it, their object itself was to send an uncompromising man—a man of conscience—to the Senate. In Charles

Sumner, they found such a man. Yet due to the very devotion to principle which confirmed him as eminently deserving of their support, Sumner was reluctant, to the point of unwillingness, to become a politician. He was in part reconciled to the office of senator by the persistence and persuasion of the anti-slavery forces from Massachusetts and from Washington, and deeply so by the inhumanity of the Fugitive Slave Act. But, as John Greenleaf Whittier admitted, the friends of freedom in the end “forced it upon him.”²⁷⁸ It was, however, to an extent *because* the office sought him, and not he the office, that Sumner went to Washington so well able to be, as he was for two tumultuous decades, “the senator with a conscience.”²⁷⁹



Endnotes

¹ John Quincy Adams, Diary, 11 Feb. 1820, in *Diaries*, edited by David Waldstreicher (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 2017), 1:529.

² Daniel Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *The Works of Daniel Webster* (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), 5:325-326.

³ Charles Sumner, "Freedom National; Slavery Sectional: Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, on his Motion to Repeal the Fugitive Slave Bill, in the Senate of the United States, August 26, 1852" (Boston: Ticknor, Reed, and Fields, 1852), 9-10.

⁴ Kinley J. Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience: Massachusetts Whig Politics and Southwestern Expansion, 1843-1848* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1967), 189.

⁵ For an account of how these factions were named, see Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 159-160.

⁶ The Whigs of Massachusetts opposed the annexation of Texas, but they did not do so uniformly, the conservatives being anxious to preserve harmonious relations with their allies in the South and thus to keep anti-slavery rhetoric to a minimum; for an account of the annexation, see Frederick Merk, *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

⁷ Charles Francis Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 78-79; Henry Wilson, *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America*, Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1874), 118.

⁸ Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 184-186.

⁹ Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 188-190.

¹⁰ Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 190; Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:118; Sumner, *Charles Sumner: His Complete Works*, (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1900), 1:303; C. F. Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams*, 79; Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, Vol. 3 (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), 123.

¹¹ (1809-1894).

¹² (1811-1874).

¹³ The Mexican War was unpopular in the North, especially with the Whigs, and most especially among the Conscience faction; for an account of the controversy between Sumner

and Winthrop, see Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:114-119; Robert C. Winthrop [Jr.], *A Memoir of Robert C. Winthrop, Prepared for the Massachusetts Historical Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1897), 51-56; Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 170-178; and Anne-Marie Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner and the Legacy of the American Enlightenment, 1811-1851* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 210-220.

¹⁴ Sumner, "Speech on the Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party," in *Orations and Speeches* (Boston: Ticknor, Reed, and Fields, 1850), 2:117.

¹⁵ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:118.

¹⁶ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:118-120.

¹⁷ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:120-122.

¹⁸ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:123.

¹⁹ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:123-124.

²⁰ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:124-125.

²¹ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:126-127.

²² Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:127.

²³ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:127-128.

²⁴ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:130.

²⁵ (1782-1852).

²⁶ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:123; Sumner, *Complete Works*, 1:303; for analysis of Webster's "God-like" status, see Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 212-222; Sumner quotes Webster in his speech at the convention; see *Orations and Speeches*, 2:123.

²⁷ Sumner, "Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:128-129.

²⁸ (1779-1861).

²⁹ Sumner, *Complete Works*, 1:303.

³⁰ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:119; Winthrop, “Whig Predictions and Whig Policy,” in *Addresses and Speeches on Various Occasions* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1852), 551-563; Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:124.

³¹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:124.

³² Winthrop, “Whig Predictions and Whig Policy,” in *Addresses and Speeches*, 560; in a “Note” to his volume of speeches, addressing his controversy with Sumner, Winthrop clarifies that this allusion was correctly understood to refer to him; see *Addresses and Speeches*, 770-773.

³³ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:124.

³⁴ Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 184-185, 191-193.

³⁵ (1812-1875).

³⁶ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:120.

³⁷ C. F. Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams*, 79.

³⁸ Pierce remarks, “The scene is still vividly remembered by men now old, or middle aged, who were then young”; see *Memoir*, 3:126.

³⁹ (1792-1855).

⁴⁰ C.F. Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams*, 79.

⁴¹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:127.

⁴² C.F. Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams*, 80; Bauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 193-194.

⁴³ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:127-128; C.F. Adams [Jr.], *Charles Francis Adams*, 80; Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:120-121.

⁴⁴ Webster, quoted in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:127-128.

⁴⁵ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:120-121.

⁴⁶ Brauer, *Cotton versus Conscience*, 65, 100-102.

⁴⁷ Sumner to Webster, 25 Sep. 1846, in *The Selected Letters of Charles Sumner*, edited by Beverly Wilson Palmer, Vol. 1, 1830-1859 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 177.

⁴⁸ Webster to Sumner, 5 Oct. 1846, in Sumner, *Complete Works*, 1:316.

⁴⁹ (1807-1892).

⁵⁰ Whittier to Sumner, 26 Sep. 1846, in John B. Pickard, ed., *The Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier*, Vol. 2, 1846-1860 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1975), 38.

⁵¹ Sumner to Whittier, 26 Sep. 1846, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:128.

⁵² Whittier, *The Complete Poetical Works of John Greenleaf Whittier* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 68.

⁵³ Sumner, "Speech on the Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:128.

⁵⁴ (1767-1848).

⁵⁵ (1807-1886).

⁵⁶ J. Q. Adams, Diary, 23 Sep. 1846, <https://www.masshist.org/publications/jqadiaries/index.php/document/jqadiaries-v46-1846-09-23-p023/dual>.

⁵⁷ (1801-1876).

⁵⁸ Adams, Diary, 14 Sep. 1846, <https://www.masshist.org/publications/jqadiaries/index.php/document/jqadiaries-v46-1846-09-14-p023/dual>; 24 Sep. 1846, <https://www.masshist.org/publications/jqadiaries/index.php/document/jqadiaries-v46-1846-09-24-p023/dual>.

⁵⁹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Union* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 526-527.

⁶⁰ William Lee Miller, *Arguing About Slavery: John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States Congress* (1995; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 209; Sumner to Francis Lieber, 21 Feb. 1842, in Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, Vol. 2, *1838-1845*, 5th ed. (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1881), 201-202; Sumner to Lord Morpeth, 1 Sep. 1843, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 2:268-269.

⁶¹ (1779-1845).

⁶² (1780-1842).

⁶³ Sumner, "The Scholar, the Jurist, the Artist, the Philanthropist," in *Complete Works*, 1:241-302; the scholar eulogized was John Pickering and the artist Washington Allston; Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 139-142; *philanthropist* meant at the time one who was motivated by "benevolence toward the whole human family" and who displayed "readiness to do good to all men," rather than the narrower, more pecuniary meaning in use today; see Noah Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, revised by Chauncey A. Goodrich and Noah Porter (1864; repr., Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam, 1866), 980.

⁶⁴ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:16-19.

⁶⁵ Sumner to Adams, 28 Aug. 1845 [1846], in *Selected Letters*, 1:177; Pierce, 1:38.

⁶⁶ Pierce, 1:38-39; see Webster, "A Discourse in Commemoration of the Lives and Services of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson," in *Works*, 1:111-150.

⁶⁷ Adams, Diary, 31 Aug. 1846, <https://www.masshist.org/publications/jqadiaries/index.php/document/jqadiaries-v46-1846-08-31-p001#sn=15>.

⁶⁸ Adams to Sumner, 29 Aug. 1846, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:18-19.

⁶⁹ This address, entitled “The True Grandeur of Nations,” marked the beginning of Sumner’s career as an orator, and his entrance into public life; see Sumner, *Complete Works*, 1:1-132, and Pierce, *Memoir*, 2:337-384.

⁷⁰ Adams to Sumner, 29 Aug. 1846, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:18-19; “*Alteri sæculi*” translates from the Latin as “another century,” and “*Delenda est servitus*” as “slavery must be destroyed.”

⁷¹ J. Q. Adams, Diary, 25 Dec. 1820, in *Diaries*, 1:580.

⁷² Charles Pinckney Sumner (1776-1839), first a lawyer, then Sheriff of Suffolk County, was rather ironically named for the famed South Carolinian; see Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, Vol. 1, *1811-1838*, 5th ed. (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1881), 11-21.

⁷³ Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 39-47; the Anti-Masonic Party counted John Quincy Adams among its members and sparked the careers of several anti-slavery politicians, including William H. Seward and Thaddeus Stevens.

⁷⁴ Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 229-231.

⁷⁵ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:135-137.

⁷⁶ Sumner, “Refusal to be a Candidate for Congress: Notice in the Boston Papers, October 31, 1846,” in *Complete Works*, 1:330-332.

⁷⁷ Sumner to Nathan Hale, 31 Oct. 1846, in *Selected Letters*, 1:178-179.

⁷⁸ See, for instance, Sumner, “Refusal to be a Candidate for Congress,” in *Complete Works*, 1:332; and Sumner to Fanny Longfellow, [May 1848], in *Selected Letters*, 1:228.

⁷⁹ See Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:136n.

⁸⁰ Howe to Sumner, Nov. 1846, in Laura E. Richards, ed., *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe*, Vol. 2, *The Servant of Humanity* (Boston: Dana Estes & Company, 1909), 248-251.

⁸¹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:138.

⁸² (1807-1882).

⁸³ Longfellow noted on 23 December 1849, “Sunday is Sumner’s day”; see Samuel Longfellow, ed., *Life of Henry*

Wadsworth Longfellow, With Extracts from His Journals and Correspondence, Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1893), 165.

⁸⁴ Longfellow, Journal, 17 Sep. 1848, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:131.

⁸⁵ Longfellow, Journal, 26 Oct. 1848, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:135.

⁸⁶ (1817-1861); Fanny was the daughter of Nathan Appleton.

⁸⁷ Sumner to Fanny Longfellow, [May 1848], in *Selected Letters*, 1:229.

⁸⁸ Longfellow, Journal, 22 Oct. 1848, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:134.

⁸⁹ Sumner to Fanny Longfellow, [May 1848], in *Selected Letters*, 1:229.

⁹⁰ Sumner, "Letter on Parties, and the Importance of a Free Soil Organization; Addressed to a Committee of the Free Soil Party in Boston, Oct. 26, 1848," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:274-275.

⁹¹ Sumner, "Letter on Parties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:276.

⁹² Longfellow, Journal, 29 Oct. 1848, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:135.

⁹³ Pierce, *Memoir and Letters*, 3:175, 138; Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 280-283.

⁹⁴ Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 527-529.

⁹⁵ See Sumner to Joshua R. Giddings, 21 Dec. 1846, in *Selected Letters*, 1:182; and to the same, 30 Dec. 1846, in *Selected Letters*, 1:184; Giddings, an anti-slavery Whig from Ohio, was Adams's closest associate in the House of Representatives, and it was to Giddings that Adams said, "I have more hope from you than from any other man," a phrase which Giddings during the Civil War repeated to Sumner; see George W. Julian, *The Life of Joshua R. Giddings* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1892), 390; Howe, *American Whigs*, 179.

⁹⁶ Bemis, *John Quincy Adams*, 534-537.

⁹⁷ Sumner's comments, with the chronology of Adams's illness and his known meetings with Sumner, suggest this year.

⁹⁸ Sumner to William Jay, 18 Mar. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:213; Sumner gave these words as Adams's own.

⁹⁹ (1777-1852).

¹⁰⁰ Leonard L. Richards, *The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 78.

¹⁰¹ (1782-1850).

¹⁰² Adams, Diary, 11 Feb. 1820, in *Diaries*, 1:529.

¹⁰³ See the epigraph of this paper for the full passage.

¹⁰⁴ Stephen E. Maizlish, *A Strife of Tongues: The Compromise of 1850 and the Ideological Foundations of the American Civil War* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 2018), 16; *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 244-247; Clay's measures, taken one by one, provided, first, for the admission of California as a state of the Union, with, if its citizens chose, the anti-slavery constitution to which Southerners vehemently objected; second, that it was inexpedient for Congress to legislate on slavery in the territories—thus opening them to the system—; third, for establishing the disputed boundary of Texas; fourth, for the United States to assume a portion of Texas's debt; fifth, that it was inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; sixth, that it was, however, expedient “to prohibit within the District the slave-trade,” when involving slaves brought into the District for the purpose of sale or transport; seventh, for a law securing “more effectual provision” for the return of fugitive slaves; and eighth, that Congress had no power to restrict the slave trade between states.

¹⁰⁵ David M. Potter, *The Impending Crisis: America Before the Civil War, 1848-1861*, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher (1976; repr., New York: Harper Perennial, 2011), 100-101; *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 451-455.

¹⁰⁶ Stanley W. Campbell, *Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 15.

¹⁰⁷ Robert V. Remini, *Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 669.

¹⁰⁸ (1796-1859).

¹⁰⁹ Mann to Mary Mann, 1 Mar. (8 Mar.) 1850, in [Mary Tyler Peabody Mann], *Life of Horace Mann* (Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1865), 293.

- ¹¹⁰ Sumner to Lord Morpeth, 11 Sep. 1842, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 2:225; Sumner to William Jay, 23 Mar. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:213.
- ¹¹¹ Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:129 and 2:156.
- ¹¹² Whittier, "Ichabod," in *Poetical Works*, 146-147.
- ¹¹³ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:325-326.
- ¹¹⁴ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:353.
- ¹¹⁵ Hermann von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, Vol. 3, *1846-1850: Annexation of Texas—Compromise of 1850*, translated by John J. Lalor and Paul Shorey (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1881), 504.
- ¹¹⁶ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:359.
- ¹¹⁷ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:350-352.
- ¹¹⁸ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:360-363.
- ¹¹⁹ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:358.
- ¹²⁰ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:355.
- ¹²¹ Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:364; Webster here references the idea of colonization, which abolitionists rejected.
- ¹²² Webster, "The Constitution and the Union," in *Works*, 5:364-366.
- ¹²³ Sumner to Jay, 23 Mar. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:213.
- ¹²⁴ "Address to Mr Webster," *Daily Evening Transcript* (Boston), 3 Apr. 1850.
- ¹²⁵ Sumner to Jay, 9 Apr. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:214.
- ¹²⁶ "Address to Mr Webster," *Daily Evening Transcript*, 3 Apr. 1850.
- ¹²⁷ Mann to Mary Mann, 6 Apr. 1850, in Mann, *Life*, 299.
- ¹²⁸ Mann to Mr. and Mrs. Combe, 5 Dec. 1851, in Mann, *Life*, 354.
- ¹²⁹ Sumner to Jay, 18 Mar. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:213.
- ¹³⁰ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:247-258.
- ¹³¹ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:252-258.
- ¹³² Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:257.

- ¹³³ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:258.
- ¹³⁴ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:341.
- ¹³⁵ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 341; Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:223-224.
- ¹³⁶ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:342.
- ¹³⁷ Sumner to Howe, 27 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:311.
- ¹³⁸ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:342.
- ¹³⁹ Mann, *Horace Mann's Letters on the Extension of Slavery into California and New Mexico; and on the Duty of Congress to Provide the Trial by Jury for Alleged Fugitive Slaves* ([Washington, D.C.]: Buell & Blanchard, 1850); Webster, "To Citizens of Newburyport, Mass.," in *Works*, 6:551-563; Webster, "To Citizens on the Kennebec River," in *Works*, 6:566-575; Jonathan Messerli, *Horace Mann: A Biography* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 515-517.
- ¹⁴⁰ Sumner to Mann, 28 Apr. 1850, 3 Jun. 1850, 10 Jun. 1850, 26 Jun. 1850, and 5 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:292-293, 295-297, 299-300, 305-307.
- ¹⁴¹ (1800-1874).
- ¹⁴² Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 642.
- ¹⁴³ Remini, *Webster*, 684-685.
- ¹⁴⁴ Remini, *Webster*, 682-687.
- ¹⁴⁵ Sumner thought Webster could "hardly dare confront the people of Massachusetts at the next election"; see Sumner to George Sumner, 15 Apr. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:214.
- ¹⁴⁶ (1796-1861).
- ¹⁴⁷ Sumner to George Sumner, 18 Mar. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:213.
- ¹⁴⁸ Remini, *Webster*, 686; Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:225-226.
- ¹⁴⁹ Sumner to Howe, 30 Jul. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:305.
- ¹⁵⁰ Sumner to Mann, 5 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:307.
- ¹⁵¹ Sumner to Howe, 30 Jul. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:305.
- ¹⁵² (1798-1862).
- ¹⁵³ Sumner to John Bigelow, 2 Sep. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:217.
- ¹⁵⁴ Sumner to William Bates and James W. Stone, 12 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:308-309; the *Boston Evening Transcript* reported 2,355 votes for Eliot and 489 for Sumner; see "The Election Yesterday," *Boston Evening Transcript*, 20 Aug. 1850.
- ¹⁵⁵ Nicholas A. Basbanes, *Cross of Snow: A Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 278.

¹⁵⁶ Longfellow, Journal, 20 Aug. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:187.

¹⁵⁷ Webster to Franklin Haven, 12 Sep. 1850, in Fletcher Webster, ed., *The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster*, Vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1857), 387.

¹⁵⁸ Webster to Haven, 12 Sep. 1850, in Fletcher Webster, ed., *Private Correspondence*, 2:387-388.

¹⁵⁹ Webster to Peter Harvey, 10 Sep. 1850, in Fletcher Webster, ed., *Private Correspondence*, 2:385.

¹⁶⁰ (1807-1859).

¹⁶¹ Sumner to Chase, 29 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:313; Stanley Harrold, *Gamaliel Bailey and Antislavery Union* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), 136; *Uncle Tom's Cabin* would be serialized in the *Era*, Bailey's newspaper, in 1851 and 1852; see Harrold, 143; Whittier was corresponding editor of the paper; see "Prospectus for 1850," *The National Era*, 29 Aug. 1850; the date may have been August 11, when the Longfellows mention visits from Sumner and Whittier, as well as an excursion to Lynn, if Bailey was then at Swampscott; see Longfellow, Journal, 11 Aug. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:186, and Fanny Longfellow to Emmeline Austin Wadsworth, 14 Aug. 1850, in Edward Wagenknecht, ed., *Mrs. Longfellow: Selected Letters and Journals of Fanny Appleton Longfellow (1817-1861)* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956), 172.

¹⁶² Whittier, "To Charles Sumner," in *Poetical Works*, 199.

¹⁶³ Samuel T. Pickard, *Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894), 1:351; Pickard explains the connection of this meeting with Whittier's 1854 poem, "To Charles Sumner"; Whittier wrote, 18 May 1851, to Grace Greenwood, that the plan for Sumner's candidacy "was worked out last summer at Phillips Beach," and that he "sounded Sumner upon it the evening we left you at that place"; see Pickard, ed. *Letters of Whittier*, 2:161.

¹⁶⁴ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:229.

¹⁶⁵ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:229; the quoted passages are Pierce's narration, not Sumner's words.

¹⁶⁶ Whittier to Elias Nason, Aug. 1874, in Elias Nason, *The Life and Times of Charles Sumner: His Boyhood, Education, and Public Career* (Boston: B. B. Russell, 1874), 142.

¹⁶⁷ Pickard, *Letters*, 2:167-168; Whittier scholars understandably stress the importance of this meeting in bringing about Sumner's consent to the nomination, but Sumner's letters evince his continuing reluctance; see, for example, Sumner to C. F. Adams, 16 Dec. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:316-317; regardless, Whittier was certainly one of "the first to suggest to him...the possibility of his election to the Senate," as Whittier recollected; see Whittier to Elias Nason, Aug. 1874, in Nason, *Charles Sumner*, 142.

¹⁶⁸ Whittier, "To Charles Sumner," in *Poetical Works*, 199-200.

¹⁶⁹ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:342.

¹⁷⁰ Richard H. Sewell, *Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837-1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 202-230.

¹⁷¹ (1815-1882).

¹⁷² (1778-1856).

¹⁷³ (1796-1881).

¹⁷⁴ (1801-1857).

¹⁷⁵ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:342; Howe to Mann, April 1851, in Richards, ed., *Letters and Journals*, 343.

¹⁷⁶ Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 314-317; Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:222.

¹⁷⁷ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:222.

¹⁷⁸ Sumner to Howe, 27 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:311; Sumner to Chase, 29 Aug. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:313.

¹⁷⁹ Sumner to Wilson, 9 Sep. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:222-223.

¹⁸⁰ (1808-1873).

¹⁸¹ Chase to Sumner, 8 Sep. 1850, in American Historical Association, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902*, Vol. 2, *Sixth Report of Historical Manuscripts Commission: with Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 219.

¹⁸² Chase to Sumner, 22 Jun. 1850, in *Annual Report*, 213.

¹⁸³ Chase to Sumner, 8 Sep. 1850, in *Annual Report*, 219.

¹⁸⁴ *Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 1807; *Journal of the Senate*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 583.

¹⁸⁵ Mann to Mary Mann, 12 Sep. 1850, in Mann, *Life*, 326; *Journal of the House*, 31st Congress, 1st Session, 1451; Mann recorded the yeas and nays as 105 to 73, which the *Journal of*

the House gives for the question of a third reading, not the bill's passage.

¹⁸⁶ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 *Stat.* 462; Campbell, *Slave Catchers*, 23-25.

¹⁸⁷ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 463.

¹⁸⁸ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 462.

¹⁸⁹ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 463.

¹⁹⁰ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 463-464.

¹⁹¹ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 464.

¹⁹² Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 463.

¹⁹³ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 465.

¹⁹⁴ Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 464.

¹⁹⁵ Mann to Mary Mann, 12 Sep. 1850, in Mann, *Life*, 326.

¹⁹⁶ Mann to Samuel Downer, 13 Sep. 1850, in Mann, *Life*, 329.

¹⁹⁷ (1807-1881).

¹⁹⁸ Longfellow, *Journal*, 14 Sep. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:189.

¹⁹⁹ Mann to Samuel Downer, 13 Sep. 1850, in Mann, *Life*, 329.

²⁰⁰ Longfellow, *Journal*, 26 Oct. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:192.

²⁰¹ (1824-1900) and (1826-1891).

²⁰² Mark Peterson, *The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 611-612.

²⁰³ (1797-1871).

²⁰⁴ Samuel J. May to John Bishop Estlin, 6 Nov. 1850, in [William Craft], *Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom; Or, the Escape of William and Ellen Craft from Slavery* (London: William Tweedie, 1860), 89.

²⁰⁵ Peterson, *The City-State of Boston*, 612.

²⁰⁶ May to Estlin, 6 Nov. 1850, in Craft, *Running a Thousand Miles*, 91.

²⁰⁷ Sumner, "Speech on Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties, at the Free Soil State Convention in Boston, Oct. 3, 1850," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:396-420; "Our Immediate Antislavery Duties: Speech at a Free-Soil Meeting at Faneuil Hall, November 6, 1850," in *Complete Works*, 3:122-148.

²⁰⁸ "Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:396-397.

²⁰⁹ “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:397-399.

²¹⁰ “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:399.

²¹¹ Sumner insisted on referring to the act as the Fugitive Slave *Bill*, “refusing to call it Law”; see *Complete Works*, 3:122.

²¹² “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:400.

²¹³ “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:404.

²¹⁴ “Our Immediate Antislavery Duties,” in *Complete Works*, 3:137.

²¹⁵ “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:410.

²¹⁶ “Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties,” in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:411.

²¹⁷ “Our Immediate Antislavery Duties,” in *Complete Works*, 3:123-124.

²¹⁸ Longfellow, *Journal*, 13 Nov. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:194.

²¹⁹ *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 10 Jan. 1850; Sumner to George Sumner, 26 Nov. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:230; Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:347.

²²⁰ “Mr. Palfrey’s Circular,” *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 4 Jan. 1850.

²²¹ *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 7 Jan. 1850.

²²² Whittier to Wilson, 18 Nov. 1850, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:166-167.

²²³ C. F. Adams to Sumner, 10 Dec. 1850, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:233.

²²⁴ See Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:232; Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 322-324.

²²⁵ Sumner to C. F. Adams, 16 Dec. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:317.

²²⁶ Sumner to George Sumner, 23 Feb. 1851, in Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 325.

²²⁷ Sumner to C. F. Adams, 16 Dec. 1850, in *Selected Letters*, 1:317.

²²⁸ (ca. 1812-1859).

²²⁹ E. L. Keyes to Sumner, 7 Jan. 1851, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:235.

²³⁰ (1800-1879).

²³¹ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:348; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 9 Jan. 1851.

²³² Samuel D. Bradford to the *Morning Post*, in Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:348.

²³³ *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 22 Jan. 1851.

²³⁴ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:348.

²³⁵ Longfellow to Sumner, 15 Jan. 1851, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:200.

²³⁶ Longfellow, Journal, 14 Jan. 1850, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:200.

²³⁷ Fanny Longfellow to Mary Greenleaf, 27 Jan. 1851, in Wagenknecht, *Mrs. Longfellow*, 175.

²³⁸ Whittier to Sumner, 16 Jan. 1851, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:171.

²³⁹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:238-239.

²⁴⁰ Sumner to Wilson, 22 Feb. 1851, in *Complete Works*, 3:154.

²⁴¹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:237-241; Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:348-349.

²⁴² Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:237; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 12 Mar. 1851 and 2 Apr. 1851.

²⁴³ Howe to Mann, February 1851, in Richards, ed., *Letters and Journals*, 336; and 23 Jan. 1851, in Richards, ed., *Letters and Journals*, 334.

²⁴⁴ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:239.

²⁴⁵ Sumner to John Bigelow, 11 Jan. 1851, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:239.

²⁴⁶ (ca. 1814-1875).

²⁴⁷ Campbell, *Slave Catchers*, 148-150.

²⁴⁸ Campbell, *Slave Catchers*, 150; see *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 31st Congress, 2nd Session, 292-326, for the lengthy debate which Shadrach's rescue sparked in the Senate.

²⁴⁹ (ca. 1828-1902).

²⁵⁰ Campbell, *Slave Catchers*, 117-121; Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:193-194.

²⁵¹ (1812-1894).

²⁵² Longfellow, Journal, 5 Apr. 1851, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:206; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 9 Apr. 1851; on April 22nd, Webster was greeted by an admiring crowd of

thousands as he prepared to leave for Washington; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 22 Apr. 1851.

²⁵³ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:242; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, 23 Apr. 1851.

²⁵⁴ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:242.

²⁵⁵ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:243.

²⁵⁶ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:243; Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:350.

²⁵⁷ Taylor, *Young Charles Sumner*, 333.

²⁵⁸ Whittier to Sumner, after 24 Apr. 1851, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:176.

²⁵⁹ (1838-1918).

²⁶⁰ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:245; Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918), 50-51.

²⁶¹ Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:245.

²⁶² Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:244.

²⁶³ Longfellow, *Journal*, 25 Apr. 1851, in Longfellow, *Life of Longfellow*, 2:207.

²⁶⁴ Sumner to Wilson, 25 Apr. 1851, in *Selected Letters*, 1:325-326.

²⁶⁵ Thomas H. O'Connor, *Lords of the Loom: The Cotton Whigs and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 89; Henry Adams, *Education of Henry Adams*, 51.

²⁶⁶ Mann to Sumner, April 1851, in *Life*, 348; Chase to Sumner, 28 Apr. 1851, in *Annual Report*, 235.

²⁶⁷ Whittier to Sumner, after 24 Apr. 1851, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:176.

²⁶⁸ Whittier to Grace Greenwood, 18 May 1851, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:177.

²⁶⁹ (1810-1860).

²⁷⁰ Theodore Parker to Sumner, 26 Apr. 1851, in John Weiss, *Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker, Minister of the Twenty-Eighth Congregational Society, Boston* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1864), 2:111.

²⁷¹ Sumner, "Freedom National; Slavery Sectional: Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, on his Motion to Repeal the Fugitive Slave Bill, in the Senate of the United States, August 26, 1852."

²⁷² *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, 1102-1125.

²⁷³ *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, 1119 and 1121.

²⁷⁴ Von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, Vol. 4, *1850-1854: Compromise of 1850—Kansas-Nebraska Bill*, translated by John J. Lalor and Paul Shorey (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1881), 220.

²⁷⁵ Mann to Mary Mann, 27 Aug. 1852, in Mann, *Life*, 381.

²⁷⁶ Wilson, *Rise and Fall*, 2:342.

²⁷⁷ Sumner, "Our Present Anti-Slavery Duties," in *Orations and Speeches*, 2:411.

²⁷⁸ Whittier to Grace Greenwood, 18 May 1851, in Pickard, ed., *Letters of Whittier*, 2:177.

²⁷⁹ See Sumner to John Bigelow, 11 Jan. 1851, in Pierce, *Memoir*, 3:239; and Sumner, "Freedom National; Slavery Sectional," 10.

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FROM FOLKTALES TO FAIRY TALES: THE
GRIMM BROTHERS' MOTIVATIONS

Shinyi Li

Once upon a time, a beautiful princess overcomes a challenge, meets Prince Charming, falls in love, and they live happily ever after. Most children know a version of this tale, whether it be “Cinderella,” “Rapunzel,” or “Sleeping Beauty.” Though fairy tales, or magical stories for children, have seemingly existed forever, the recent involvement of entertainment corporations drastically reshaped the roles of fairy tales. Rather than being tasked with reading stories out loud, parents now can simply turn on a film. Thanks to Disney, fairy tales have become a staple in most households. The tales serve to instill values in children—hence why princesses and princes are popular role models. Disney’s Snow White implies that children shouldn’t trust strangers, Cinderella stresses the importance of being kind, and Beauty and the Beast emphasizes inner beauty. These stories continue to be passed on as educational lessons, wrapped up in the gift of a happy ending. However, fairy tales haven’t always been this way.

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Originally, many fairy tales bordered on the genre of horror—heavy violence, mature themes, and sad endings were quite common.¹ One version of “Little Red Riding Hood,” for instance, ended with a note that stated, “There are various kinds of wolves. There are also those who are charming, quiet, polite, unassuming, complacent, and sweet, who pursue young women at home and in the streets. And unfortunately, it is these gentle wolves who are the most dangerous ones...”² Though not all traditional fairy tales were meant to be scary and teach children lessons, they certainly weren’t as pure as the ones depicted on television today. Out of many recognized fairy tale authors, the Grimm brothers were two of the most influential, shaping the development of children’s literature in 19th-century Europe by publishing more than 156 folktales in a German collection titled *Kinder-und Hausmärchen*, which translates to *Children’s and Household Tales*. Eventually, the brothers’ collection grew to over 200 pieces.³ Some especially well-known tales of theirs included “Rapunzel,” “Hansel and Gretel,” and “Cinderella.” Believing that folktales were for everyone, the Grimm brothers did not shy from horror—most of their tales were, in fact, rather “grim.” And although they originally had no intent to write for children, the development of popular tales like “Rapunzel” indicated a complete change of heart. While the tales in the final edition of *Children’s and Household Tales* still remain different from modern portrayals, it can be argued that the Grimm brothers’ decision to focus on a younger audience was mainly motivated by literary criticism and financial concerns—such pressures were what led them to achieve global recognition and success.

Most modern fairy tales have origins in folktales, or traditional stories that were passed down orally. According to recent studies, folktales can be traced to about 6,000 years ago.⁴ Folktales varied in characters and themes, but most sought to share cultural elements, instill moral values, and maintain harmony amongst a community, so it was tradition to pass down folktales to following generations. Fairy tales, on the other hand, are generally regarded as a branch of folktales. They can be defined as children’s stories that are typically fictional and include magical elements. Officially, the term “fairy tale” was born in 1697 when French storyteller

Marie-Catherine d'Aulnoy published her own collection of tales titled *Les Contes des Fées*, or *Tales of the Fairies*. However, the term remained unpopular until the mid-18th century.⁵ Given that many of the Grimm brothers' tales fit under the current definitions of both folktales and fairy tales, the two terms will be used interchangeably. However, it should be noted that the Grimm brothers mainly referred to their works as "folk poetry" or "folktales."⁶

Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm were born in Germany as the oldest two brothers in a family of six children. Since their father was a lawyer, they intended to study law upon enrolling at the University of Marburg. Later, a growing fascination with the themes of folk writing prompted them to turn to the field of literature.⁷ They delved into the world of German folk literature but were disappointed with how difficult it was to find folk poetry and folktales. Encouraged by close friends and professors, the Grimm brothers eventually decided to publish a collection of folktales for the purpose of preserving folk culture and making research easier. In the preface to the first edition of *Children's and Household Tales*, published in 1812, they wrote, "The custom of storytelling is on the wane...we don't want to praise the tales or even defend them against a contrary opinion: their very *existence* suffices to protect them."⁸ As it was, the brothers viewed themselves as protectors of sorts and strongly believed in the custom of storytelling, hoping that their work would allow German folk culture to stay alive.

Originally, the Grimm brothers did not limit who their tales were for. By naming their collection *Children's and Household Tales*, it appeared that they emphasized families. However, the collection was formatted like an academic work, with numerous footnotes and no images, so while the title implied that the tales were child-friendly, the Grimm brothers expected scholars to be their primary readers.⁹ Therefore, the title was most likely written to reflect the collection's content, not its audience. Children were almost always the main characters of the tales, and many plots revolved around family conflicts. Another reason for titling the collection with children was that the term demonstrated the simplicity and creativity that the Grimm brothers believed their

tales held. The preface of the Grimms' tales states, "these stories are suffused with the same purity that makes children appear so wondrous and blessed to us," suggesting that the tales themselves were precious due to their childlike qualities.¹⁰ The vast majority of the collections' readers misunderstood the title and thought that the tales were for children, so the collection did not achieve immediate success. However, it slowly gained a sizable audience and became the second-most popular text in Germany, placing only behind the *Bible*.¹¹ One important detail to note is that the Grimm brothers themselves weren't the authors of their tales. Rather, they were collectors. Some of their tales were found by listening to various folk people—others were taken from already published stories.¹² Either way, the Grimm brothers paid close attention to their collection's content, revising each accumulated tale. In total, seven editions of *Children's and Household Tales* were published, ranging from the years 1812 to 1857.¹³ Over that period, fairy tales were deleted, rewritten, or added, and Wilhelm Grimm took charge of most of the collection. Through a heavy process of revisions, the brothers were able to intentionally shift the nature of their collection to better suit younger audiences, and these revisions were the main factor behind the growing popularity of their tales.

To determine how the Grimm brothers effectively changed the audience of their tales, one can track the differences between each edition of *Children's and Household Tales*. Specifically, "Rapunzel" is one of the few tales that appeared in every edition and experienced various changes, so it can be used to examine the brothers' motivations. While the Grimm brothers sourced most of their tales from oral accounts of friends and folks people, "Rapunzel" was a retelling of an already published story. In the first edition of their collection, the brothers referenced the 1790 "Rapunzel" written by Friedrich Schulz as their primary source, noting that they believed his to be closest to oral tradition.¹⁴ As a result, their version remained fairly similar to Schulz's. To summarize, the Grimm brothers' "Rapunzel" tells the tale of a pregnant wife who craves rapunzel, a vegetable that resembles radish. Her husband climbs into a forbidden garden to retrieve the plant, but the next

day, he is caught by a sorceress who demands their firstborn child in exchange for the rapunzel. The husband agrees out of fear, so upon birth, the sorceress takes the baby and names her Rapunzel. When Rapunzel grows up, she is locked away in a tall tower with no doors or stairs, just a window at the top. The sorceress can only enter by asking Rapunzel to throw down her long hair as a ladder. One day, a prince passing by hears Rapunzel singing, and he falls in love with her voice. Soon after, he spots the sorceress climbing up Rapunzel's hair, and he decides to try the same thing when the sorceress leaves. While scared at first, Rapunzel eventually falls in love with the prince, and they meet every day behind the sorceress' back. When the sorceress finally learns of Rapunzel's betrayal, she cuts off Rapunzel's hair, leaves her in the wilderness, and lures the prince to the tower. In his devastation, the prince jumps out of the tower, losing his eyesight. Years later, Rapunzel and the prince are reunited, and his eyesight is magically restored from Rapunzel's tears. Most people have probably heard a version of "Rapunzel" similar to this, given the tale's immense popularity. However, there are many details that have been modified or deleted since the first edition of the Grimms' tales.

In almost every tale, the Grimm brothers aimed to make their tales sound less scholarly by deleting footnotes and increasing description, and "Rapunzel" was no exception. Unbeknownst to most, the first edition of *Children's and Households Tales* included footnotes which often spanned half of each page, specifically meant to credit sources and support other scholars' research. However, they were deleted by the second edition, demonstrating that the Grimm brothers quickly decided against pursuing entirely academic audiences.¹⁵ The brothers also added more colorful language and increased the length of their tales. In a comparison of their first and final edition of "Rapunzel," the phrase, "No one dared enter this garden," was extended to, "The garden was surrounded by a high wall, and no one dared enter, because it belonged to a sorceress who possessed great power and was feared by everyone."¹⁶ It seemed that the Grimm brothers increased the clarity of their words while incorporating imagery. Both of these steps were likely to keep children engaged. In addition, dialogue took up a greater

part of the later editions, and illustrations were added. This pattern of adding details meant that the brothers “fleshed out the texts to the point where they were often double their original length.”¹⁷ Generally, the revisions made to “Rapunzel” and other folktales made it clear that the Grimm brothers completely remodeled their collection for a new audience: children.

As for why the collection underwent extensive changes, many scholars point to literary criticism as a main cause. Among the scholarly community, it was a common practice for writers to leave each other reviews, so after the very first edition of *Children's and Household Tales* was published, the Grimm brothers kept a close eye on feedback. They hoped for remarks from prominent writers such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, a German playwright and poet. However, not only did they mostly receive reviews from aspiring authors who lacked notable works, an overwhelming amount of them were negative. Previously, the Grimm brothers had also engaged in commenting on other writers' works, and they bluntly criticized a majority of folktale collectors. Their comments sparked competition between the brothers and several other authors. One such author, Johann Gustav Büsching, had published a collection of similar tales three months before the brothers, titled *Volks-Sagen, Märchen und Legenden*, or *Folktales, Fairy Tales, and Legends*. Jacob Grimm wrote him a dismissive review. When it was finally time for Büsching to review the Grimm brothers' first volume of folktales, he accused them of downplaying the work of other scholars, claiming, “the Grimms see in themselves the sole source of salvation.”¹⁸ Büsching even compared their collection with *Folktales, Fairy Tales, and Legends*, for he thought they viewed themselves as the only credible folktale collectors. Lastly, he noted that the brothers' collection was more French and Italian than German, implying in his review that the Grimm brothers failed to acknowledge outside influences in an effort to protect themselves.¹⁹

Keeping in mind that the original purpose of the Grimm brothers was to preserve German folk culture, it's safe to say that they were displeased with Büsching's review and may have taken steps to further emphasize German aspects. In the first edition of

“Rapunzel,” the woman who takes away Rapunzel and locks her in a tower is a fairy, whereas she is a sorceress in the last edition.²⁰ A similar change happens in “Briar Rose,” where wise women replace fairies.²¹ Some scholars have suggested that the brothers shied away from the term “fairy” in “Rapunzel” in order to depict the old woman in a more negative light, thus increasing the educational value of the tale. Others believed the term to have been too mystical. However, it seems more probable that the Grimm brothers avoided using “fairy” due to its association with France.²² Since the brothers were researchers of German linguistics, they were well-informed on the definition and origins of the term. Religion was also more prevalent in later editions, as references to the “good Lord” were added in “Rapunzel,” and the brothers commented on the *Bible’s* content in the preface to their second volume.²³ Raised in a Christian family, the brothers’ grandfather and great-grandfather were both well-known clergymen in Germany. The Grimm brothers viewed religion as another integral part of German culture, so it is likely that they wanted to emphasize Christianity more.²⁴ Eventually, people came to regard their tales as having a strong nationalistic voice.²⁵ Though one may never know if the Grimm brothers made specific changes due to Büsching’s review, they were probably aware of such comments when they made revisions to “Rapunzel.”

Another competitor of the Grimm brothers was Albert Ludwig Grimm, who was also a fairy tale collector. In 1816, A.L. Grimm (not related to the brothers) published *Lina’s Book of Fairy Tales*, where he criticized the Grimm brothers in the preface of his book, most likely as payback to previous feedback from the brothers.²⁶ Like Büsching, A.L. Grimm made it a point to compare his own writing with the Grimms’, and he believed that his book was much better for the sole reason that it was appropriate for children. He accused the Grimm brothers of trying to “serve two masters” (scholars and children) but coming up short for both audiences.²⁷ A.L. Grimm was not entirely wrong. To tell the truth, the Grimm brothers had made it easy for others to misinterpret the intentions of their collection by titling it *Children’s and Household Tales*. Had they clarified their audience sooner, they probably

would've received different feedback. Another critic, Friedrich Rühls, questioned, "What proper mother or nanny could tell the fairy tale about Rapunzel to an innocent daughter without blushing?"²⁸ These criticisms offended Wilhelm Grimm, who quickly took up the editing of Rapunzel behind his brother's back. Though the brothers worked on collecting the tales together, Wilhelm was ready to delete or modify parts that could be viewed as inappropriate, and Jacob didn't stop him.²⁹

In response to A.L. Grimm and Friedrich Rühls' feedback, the brothers censored mature themes, demonstrating their willingness to change audiences. In the first edition of "Rapunzel," Rapunzel asked an old woman after she and the prince fell in love, "Frau Gothel, tell me why it is that my clothes are all too tight. They no longer fit me."³⁰ Turns out, Rapunzel was pregnant with twins, and they were born out of wedlock. Even worse, she was presumed to be in her early teens. Although young pregnancy was not entirely unusual in folktales, the negative stigma surrounding children born out of wedlock remained, so "Rapunzel" was not seen by parents as an appropriate tale for children to read. By the 1957 edition, Rapunzel still had twins, but the timing of the pregnancy was not indicated. However, the brothers specified that she was married to the prince by the time her kids were born, suggesting that she was likely in her upper teens at the age of motherhood.³¹ According to Maria Tatar, a professor of folklore at Harvard University, Wilhelm Grimm's "nervous sensitivity to moral objections to the tales in the collection reflects a growing desire to write for children rather than to collect for scholars."³² Though the Grimm brothers had once wanted to stick to the original tales, they now strictly filtered explicit content.

Among other German literary figures, Clemens Brentano and Ludwig Achim von Arnim were heavily involved in the Grimm brothers' work. The brothers were first acquainted with Brentano, a poet, at the University of Marburg in 1803. Brentano influenced Jacob and Wilhelm's choice to pursue roles in the field of literature instead of law. In 1806, the brothers met Arnim, who was already good friends with Brentano, and the four of them

shared interests in traditional German literature. The Grimm brothers helped Brentano and Arnim collect folk songs in 1807 for their own publication. Afterward, the two friends encouraged the brothers to start their own collection of folktales.³³ Arnim was especially involved and oversaw much of *Children's and Household Tales*' birth, so he was well aware of its reception. When negative reviews all focused on the inappropriate content within the tales, the Grimm brothers expressed anger with how the literary community misunderstood their collection. To friend and philosopher Karl Lachmann, Jacob Grimm wrote, "Reviewers, who have a habit of praising idiotic things, ought to stop making such foolish statements about our collection of legends and fairy tales... Those who do not object to our purpose and substance are so refined that they hold their tongues."³⁴ Without a doubt, the brothers' frustrations were increasing.

Eventually, the brothers turned to Arnim and Brentano, who both agreed to provide feedback. In Arnim's case, this was "singularly inappropriate since the book was dedicated to [his] wife and son."³⁵ However, even he did not stay wholly positive, commenting that there should be a content warning for parents who wish to share the tales with children. Brentano, the more critical of the two, didn't hold back on advice. Believed to be talking about the first edition of *Hansel and Gretel*, Brentano left a comment that translates to, "If you want to display children's clothing, you can do that quite well without bringing out an outfit that has buttons torn off it, dirt smeared on it, and the shirt hanging out of the pants."³⁶ Granted, this letter wasn't published as an official review, but the words were still passed on to the brothers. Although neither Brentano nor Arnim worked mainly with folktales, the brothers held them in extremely high regard. In 1813, one year after *Children's and Household Tales* was published, Jacob Grimm sent a letter to Arnim in which he defended the collections' content. Jacob wrote, "I believe that, in God's name all children should read the entire folk tale collection and be left to themselves in this process... My old principal, that I've already defended earlier, has always been that one shall write to please oneself rather than to give in to external pressures... I would not have worked on it with

such a pleasure if I had not believed that with respect to poetry, mythology, and history it would have appeared just as important to the more serious and older adults as it has to me.”³⁷ Though Jacob Grimm was under the opinion that children could handle the content of the folktales just as much as adults, the honest comments of his closest friends clearly struck a nerve and prompted both of the brothers to reconsider their goals.

Overall, recognition among the literary community was something that the Grimm brothers struggled with. When the general public reacted, the brothers could say that the comments were from uninformed readers, but they couldn't put aside the words of fellow authors as easily. Noticeably, negative feedback made the brothers question whether they were going in the right direction with their work or not. In 1825, the brothers published a mini collection of 50 tales that were picked specifically for children. This smaller edition was received well in Europe and further encouraged the brothers to focus on children. Ten editions of the mini collection were published in total from 1825 to 1858, even more than the full collection.³⁸

In a way, the Grimm brothers were wholly aware of the perception of their readers, and they tailored their stories to fit best. Although Jacob Grimm once revealed, “the book of folktales was not at all written for children,” the Grimm brothers did not stray completely from their original purpose by shifting audiences.³⁹ In the preface to the second edition of *Children's and Household Tales*, the brothers added, “We are not aiming at the kind of innocence achieved by timidly excising whatever... simply cannot be kept hidden. In doing that you can fool yourself into thinking that what can be removed from a book can also be removed from real life. We are looking for innocence in the truth of a straightforward narrative that does not conceal anything wrong by holding back on it. Nonetheless, in this new edition, we have carefully eliminated every phrase not appropriate for children. If there is still a strong feeling that one thing or another might embarrass parents or seem offensive to them and that they therefore might not want to put this book directly into the hands of their children...the parents

can then simply make selections.”⁴⁰ As the preface suggests, they made no effort to hide that they kept children in mind while preparing for their second edition. However, the Grimm brothers still strongly believed that their folktales were more innocent in their truth than in their content, and they wished the emphasis to be placed upon the former. In other words, the Grimm brothers believed that their tales were innocent because they did not hide anything. They wanted their tales to be like children—curious and open to the world.⁴¹ To cut out pieces of folktales meant hiding children from the truth, even if the tales were partly fictional. Although the brothers continued to censor their tales for children, they hoped people would look beyond the words and simply enjoy folktales for what they were.

The development of “Rapunzel” suggests that the Grimm brothers carefully handled reviews from other authors, and they were motivated by such comments to focus on children. However, literary criticism was not the only challenge they faced during their careers. The Grimm brothers also had to consider their financial state when publishing *Children’s and Household Tales*. While the brothers were born relatively well-off and received high degrees of education, they were met with sudden financial difficulties at many points in their life, so economic factors played a role in their decision to write for children. Having grown up with three younger brothers and one younger sister, the Grimm brothers depended financially on their father, Philipp Grimm, who was appointed as a district magistrate in Steinau, Germany.⁴² Unfortunately, their father died in 1796 when Jacob was eleven and Wilhelm was just ten, so the Grimms suddenly needed the support of relatives in order to fund their education. The Grimm brothers’ aunt was able to send the brothers to a school for university preparation, and from there they entered the University of Marburg. However, Wilhelm suffered from a grave illness, and none of the five Grimm brothers received state aid for education, so the brothers struggled to make ends meet.⁴³ Wilhelm once wrote to his aunt, “We five people eat only three portions and only once a day.”⁴⁴ After graduating, Jacob joined a professor for research in Paris and then took on the job of an assistant secretary in the war depart-

ment when he returned.⁴⁵ He found the job dull but desperately needed the salary, so he spent his free time continuing literary research. Over the next few years, the brothers worked mainly as librarians and secretaries.⁴⁶ These jobs had light requirements and left the brothers with both enough time and funding to work on *Children's and Household Tales*. Though the brothers faced great financial challenges in their youth, they were well on the way to overcoming them when they were writing folktales.

When the Grimm brothers were still working on their collection, close friend Ludwig Achim von Arnim connected them with Berlin publisher Georg Andreas Reimer. The brothers expressed that they were more interested in getting the tales in print than anything else. Even if they didn't get any royalties, they still had a source of income. The brothers partnered with Reimer. By 1812, 86 tales were ready to be published in Volume one.⁴⁷ 900 copies of *Children's and Household Tales* were printed, and they almost sold out by 1815.⁴⁸ In a period where children's literature was growing, these sales were very strong. Projected royalties were about the same as each brother's annual income, so they were determined to continue publishing more volumes and editions. For this reason, the brothers tried to make their tales more appealing to children. They were convinced that people who had bought the first edition would also purchase the second. However, the Grimm brothers did not foresee conflicts with their publisher Reimer. Since the brothers had been so excited to get their work published, they had not asked for specific numbers and rates from Reimer, and there was no signed contract to prove anything. Royalty payments were delayed, and there was no progress on Reimer's side toward a second edition by 1817. Finally, the brothers caught Reimer's attention by threatening to find a different publisher. Reimer agreed to publish the second edition, and once again, no terms were written clearly. In 1833, the brothers calculated their earnings from *Children's and Household Tales* and finally realized that Reimer had cheated them out of a considerable sum of money: at least a few times their salary. The relationship between the two parties declined until the brothers left Reimer and found publishers in Germany to work on their third edition.⁴⁹ Though the Grimm

brothers were not entirely focused on the possible financial gains that their collection could provide them, they clearly expected to make a profit as the years went on.

Political circumstances in the 19th century also affected the Grimm brothers' ability to financially support themselves. In around 1830, the brothers became professors of German studies at the University of Göttingen. By this time, the brothers were already accepted as influential German writers, but in 1837, the former duke of Cumberland, Ernest Augustus, became the king of Hanover. Augustus disagreed with the previous management of Hanover and set out to repeal the constitution of 1833. However, all the professors at Göttingen were technically bound by oath to the constitution since they were civil servants. Along with five other professors, the Grimm brothers led a protest against the king's decision and were immediately dismissed from the school. These seven professors became known as the "Göttingen Seven," and many students supported them. However, the main leaders of this protest—Jacob Grimm and two other professors—were ordered to leave the kingdom in three days, essentially being exiled. Although the Grimm brothers were practically a household name at this point, being dismissed meant that they lacked a stable source of income and had to look abroad for more opportunities.⁵⁰

Additionally, the Grimm brothers did not solely publish fairy tales. Though they were most known for their folktale collection, they worked on numerous research projects in their career, and they needed to do well financially on some of them in order to continue pursuing other interests. In their lifetimes, the two brothers were especially devoted to one other project: a dictionary that focused on Germany's history in terms of linguistics.⁵¹ They began in 1838 with the hope of recording every single term in German history and tracking its usage over time. Similarly to their fairy tales, the Grimm brothers hoped their dictionary would bring some sense of unity to Germany. Unsurprisingly, they weren't able to complete this project before their deaths in 1859 and 1863 even with the help of many collaborators. They far underestimated how time-consuming this project would be, and they hadn't even reached

the letter G at Jacob's death.⁵² Aside from just the dictionary, the Grimm brothers took on many jobs and projects to pursue their interests in the literary field. Jacob worked on a book of German grammar and created the terms "Old High German" and "Middle High German" to describe German dialects, while Wilhelm collected and published German heroic tales that dated back to the sixth century.⁵³ With all of these other works, it is understandable that the Grimm brothers hoped to gain some flow of income from *Children's and Household Tales*. Although financial concerns were not the main reason why the brothers tried to market their tales toward children instead of scholars, they certainly played a role in how many editions of the Grimms' tales were published (seven full-sized editions and ten mini editions) and gave the brothers more pressure to gain recognition.

Ultimately, the Grimm brothers succeeded in producing a successful collection of folktales that, to some extent, preserved German folk culture. However, by the last edition of their collection, the tales were no longer for scholars. Instead, they were read by parents to children, and the brothers had to undergo a heavy process of modifications in order to increase the collection's reputation among literary critics and secure financial stability. Although the brothers benefitted from shifting to a younger audience, "that is not to say that the Grimms were rank opportunists. Rather they were part of a tendency that had become a trend by the early nineteenth century. The stories collected by the two young students of folklore and philology... could still be considered a source of entertainment for all age groups. They appeared in print just when folktales were moving out of brand and spinning rooms and into the nursery. The process by which adult entertainment was translated into children's literature was a slow one with a long transitional period when the line between the two was by no means clear. In many ways, the Grimms' collection... straddled the line between adult entertainment and children's literature."⁵⁴ Simply put, the transition from folktales to fairy tales was partly accidental, partly intentional. Though the brothers recognized why collections aimed toward younger children tended to succeed, had it not been for public disapproval at precisely the right time, they

likely would have continued to write for scholars, and the fairy tales one might see today would be vastly different. In addition, the Grimm brothers were writing in a historical time frame—the 19th century—where fairy tales were rising in popularity, so they were able to make their names known and engage a large audience easily by directing more attention to children.

Although the Grimm brothers altered their folktales, they still made much more of an effort to stay true to oral stories than modern corporations. Using “Rapunzel” again, one may notice many differences between the Grimm brothers’ “Rapunzel” and Disney’s film counterpart, *Tangled*. For instance, in “Rapunzel,” none of the characters were gifted with special abilities, and the brothers left them that way. However, Disney’s *Tangled* gave Rapunzel’s golden hair both healing and youth-preserving powers.⁵⁵ A common theme of modern fairy tales involves magical elements. Although the Grimm brothers included magic in some of their fairy tales—for instance, Cinderella’s transformation from rags to riches—a majority of them focused on commoners. In fact, their version of Cinderella never involved a fairy godmother.⁵⁶ The addition of magical powers by Disney was likely meant to address the imaginations of children, but the Grimm brothers stayed closer to early narratives by keeping characters relatively simple.

Another major difference between the two versions of “Rapunzel” is the ending. Though Rapunzel and her husband live happily ever after in both works, the fate of Mother Gothel, the old woman who takes Rapunzel away from her birth parents, differs drastically. This difference can be mainly attributed to the portrayal of Mother Gothel by the authors. In the Grimm brothers’ telling of Rapunzel, Mother Gothel was either a fairy or a sorceress.⁵⁷ However, she was never referred to as a witch or a villain. As a result, she wasn’t punished. Normally, the villains in the Grimm brothers’ tales are punished for their wrongdoings. Snow White’s evil stepmother dances in hot iron shoes until she dies, Cinderella’s jealous stepsisters get their eyes pecked out by birds, and the wolf who tries to eat Little Red Riding Hood drowns.⁵⁸ In choosing not to make Mother Gothel a villain, the brothers acknowledged the


complexities of Rapunzel's relationship with her. Though over-protective and selfish, Mother Gothel allowed Rapunzel's father to save his wife's life by taking all the plants that she craved, so some scholars believe that she stole Rapunzel out of loneliness, for she had never raised a child.⁵⁹ However, the Disney version portrays Mother Gothel as an old crone who has no redeemable qualities. When Rapunzel finally loses her magical hair, Mother Gothel ages, falls out of the tower, and turns into ashes.⁶⁰ Her classic villain ending demonstrates how modern versions of fairy tales aimed to teach children lessons by clearly distinguishing between good and bad characters.

The behavior of Rapunzel's husband, the prince, is also greatly modified in *Tangled*. In the Grimm brothers' tale, the prince jumps out of the tower due to his sadness and ends up losing his eyesight. This detail existed in the first edition and remained untouched in the collection, even though signs of grief and self-harm were apparent. While "Rapunzel" is relatively nonviolent compared to many of the brothers' other tales, this choice demonstrated how the brothers preferred keeping violence in their tales even if they were already making revisions. On the other hand, most Disney films are nonviolent. In *Tangled*, Rapunzel's lover doesn't jump out of the tower. Instead, he is saved by Rapunzel shortly after Mother Gothel dies. Disney's version of "Rapunzel" strays far from the written version in order to create an entertaining and satisfying piece for children. Former Walt Disney Corporation CEO Michael Eisner once claimed, "We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make a statement. To make money is our only objective."⁶¹ Therefore, entertainment companies generally viewed children as easy consumers to sell their movies to, and they had no desire to stick to the original fairy tales. In comparison, the Grimm brothers modified the tales to a much lesser extent, avoiding revisions where they could.

Even if the Grimm brothers were motivated by the prospects of wealth and recognition, one cannot doubt the longevity and impact of their work. They continued to believe that folktales were immensely powerful and revealed a great deal about one's

culture, so they didn't attempt to modify that. In the words of the Grimm brothers, "Poetry has nothing to gain from [reworking], for where else does it live than where it touches the soul, cooling and refreshing it, or heating and fortifying it?...Wittiness becomes dull through repetition, and what lasts is peaceful, quiet, and pure."⁶² The Grimm brothers hoped that their readers would understand the value of a hungry family, a lonely woman, or a simple story, for these were the pieces of true folktales.

By analyzing the various editions of "Rapunzel" in the Grimm brothers' folktale collection, it is evident that major revisions were made from 1812 to 1857. Tales that were first compiled to protect folk culture in Germany became popular children's tales across the world, so to suggest that the Grimm brothers held the same intentions as they originally had would be far from true. In order to mark their place in the field of children's literature, the Grimm brothers treated their stories as dynamic beings. As Jack Zipes, a professor of German literature and comparative studies, put it, "To grow and survive, [the whale] constantly adapted to its changing environment. The fairy tale is no different."⁶³ Essentially, the Grimm brothers added achieving recognition to their already hefty list of goals, so they proceeded to modify their collection with careful intent. The resulting focus on children contributed to the rise of the fairy tale both in Germany and worldwide, and what were once seen as dark folktales became modern fairy tales.



Endnotes

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⁸ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, 4-5.

⁹ Tatar, *The Hard*, 11.

¹⁰ Tatar, *The Hard*, 206.

¹¹ Jack Zipes, *Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion: The Classical Genre for Children and the Process of Civilization* (New York, NY: Wildman Press, 1983), 54, accessed January 8, 2023, <https://archive.org>.

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¹³ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, xix.

¹⁴ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, 483.

¹⁵ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, xxxi.

¹⁶ Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, "Rapunzel by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm a Comparison of the Versions of 1812 and 1857," ed. D. L. Ashliman, University of Pittsburgh, last modified November 12, 2019, accessed December 4, 2022, <https://sites.pitt.edu>.

¹⁷ Tatar, *The Hard*, 17.

¹⁸ Tatar, *The Hard*, 15.

¹⁹ Tatar, *The Hard*, 15.

²⁰ Grimm and Grimm, “Rapunzel by Jacob,” University of Pittsburgh.

²¹ Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, “Sleeping Beauty,” trans. D. L. Ashliman, University of Pittsburgh, last modified 1812, accessed December 12, 2022, <https://sites.pitt.edu>.

²² Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, xli.

²³ Grimm and Grimm, “Rapunzel by Jacob,” University of Pittsburgh; Tatar, *The Hard*, 214.

²⁴ Patrick Rogers, “Germanic Mythology and Christian Story in the Grimms’ Fairy Tales” (doctoral thesis, Georgetown University, 2016), 11, accessed January 2, 2023, <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu>.

²⁵ Haase, “Yours, Mine,” 389.

²⁶ Tatar, *The Hard*, 16.

²⁷ Tatar, *The Hard*, 17.

²⁸ Tatar, *The Hard*, 18.

²⁹ Tatar, *The Hard*, 18.

³⁰ Grimm and Grimm, “Rapunzel by Jacob,” University of Pittsburgh.

³¹ Grimm and Grimm, “Rapunzel by Jacob,” University of Pittsburgh.

³² Tatar, *The Hard*, 19.

³³ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, xxiv.

³⁴ Tatar, *The Hard*, 16.

³⁵ Tatar, *The Hard*, 15.

³⁶ Reinhold Steig, comp., *Achim von Arnim und Clemens Brentano* (J.G. Cotta, 1894), 309, accessed December 26, 2022, <https://archive.org>.

³⁷ Christa Kamenetsky, *The Brothers Grimm and Their Critics: Folktales and the Quest for Meaning* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992), 193, accessed January 2, 2023, <https://archive.org>.

³⁸ Jack Zipes, “Two Hundred Years after Once upon a Time: The Legacy of the Brothers Grimm and Their Tales in Germany,” *Marvels and Tales* 28, no. 1 (2014): 56, <https://doi.org/10.13110/marvelstales.28.1.0054>.

³⁹ Christa Kamenetsky, “The Brothers Grimm: Folktale Style and Romantic Theories,” *Elementary English* 51, no. 3 (1974): 379, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41387176>.

⁴⁰ Tatar, *The Hard*, 217.

⁴¹ Alfred David and Mary Elizabeth David, "A Literary Approach to the Brothers Grimm," *Journal of the Folklore Institute* 1, no. 3 (1964): 181, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3813902>.

⁴² Crane, "The External," 580.

⁴³ Crane, "The External," 581.

⁴⁴ Jack Zipes, *The Brothers Grimm: From Enchanted Forests to the Modern World* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1988), 35, accessed January 9, 2023, <https://archive.org>.

⁴⁵ Crane, "The External," 585-586.

⁴⁶ Crane, "The External," 587.

⁴⁷ Grimm and Grimm, *The Original*, xxvii.

⁴⁸ Tatar, *The Hard*, 11.

⁴⁹ Tatar, *The Hard*, 13-14.

⁵⁰ Jeffrey L. Sammons, "The Dismissal of the Brothers Grimm from the University of Göttingen," *The Yale University Library Gazette* 50, no. 4 (1976): 234-235, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40858602>.

⁵¹ Kelly Kistner, "A Dictionary without Definitions: Romanticist Science in the Production and Presentation of the Grimm Brothers' German Dictionary, 1838-1863," *Science in Context* 27, no. 4 (November 13, 2014): 1, accessed January 5, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889714000258>.

⁵² Ralph A. Brenninger, "Predictions as to the Size of the Grimms' *Deutsches Wörterbuch*," *The German Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1951): 105, <https://doi.org/10.2307/401566>.

⁵³ Donald R. Hettinga, *The Brothers Grimm: Two Lives, One Legacy* (New York, NY: Clarion Books, 2001), 156-158, <https://archive.org>.

⁵⁴ Tatar, *The Hard*, 21.

⁵⁵ *Tangled*, directed by Nathan Greno and Byron Howard, screenplay by Dan Fogelman, produced by Roy Conli, by Alan Menken, Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, 2010.

⁵⁶ Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, "Cinderella," trans. D. L. Ashliman, University of Pittsburgh, last modified June 1, 2011, accessed January 8, 2023, <https://sites.pitt.edu>.

⁵⁷ Grimm and Grimm, "Rapunzel by Jacob," University of Pittsburgh.

⁵⁸ Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, "Little Snow-White," trans. D. L. Ashliman, University of Pittsburgh, last modified November 15, 2005, accessed January 16, 2023, <https://sites.pitt.edu>; Grimm and Grimm, "Cinderella," University of Pittsburgh; Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, "Little Red Cap," trans. D. L. Ashliman, University of Pittsburgh, last

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⁵⁹ Jessica D'Aquin, "The Motherly Sorceress: Frau Gothel as a Non-Villainous Mother-Figure," *Ellipsis: A Journal of Art, Ideas, and Literature* 42 (2015): 5, accessed December 7, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.46428/ejail.42.24>.

⁶⁰ *Tangled*.

⁶¹ Linda Pershing, Lisa Gablehouse, and Jack Zipes, "Disney's Enchanted:," in *Fairy Tale Films: Visions of Ambiguity*, by Pauline Greenhill and Sidney Eve Matrix (n.p.: University Press of Colorado, 2010), 140, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt4cgn37.12>.

⁶² Tatar, *The Hard*, 222.

⁶³ Zipes, "The Meaning," 221.

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LESSONS FROM WATERGATE: WHAT WE
LEARNED FROM THE MEDIA IN SCANDAL

Ethan Y.C. Yang

“Never forget, the press is the enemy, the press is the enemy...Write that on a blackboard one hundred times.”

—Richard Nixon

In the early hours of June 17, 1972, five masked men entered the Watergate Office Building, carrying all kinds of burglary tools: surgical gloves to hide fingerprints, tear gas guns to stun the unexpected, and shortwave transmitters to detect police radio chatter.¹ Their target lay on the sixth floor—the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee.² But this was no robbery. In an act of unimaginable unscrupulousness at the highest level of American political life, these five—led by a certain Committee to Re-elect the President—aimed to wiretap the offices of their political opposition.³ And if not for one observant security guard, they may very well have succeeded.⁴

The arrest of these five men set in motion a cataclysm that saw Richard Nixon resign and a nation upended. All the while, Americans watched, read, and listened to that cataclysm closely as it was uncovered, as congressional hearings and court

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proceedings were broadcast gavel to gavel.⁵ This was a muckraker's paradise, where brave journalists and bold headlines took centre stage. Indeed, Watergate made heroes out of two journalists, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—Davids armed only with the truth against the duplicitous Nixonian Goliath.⁶ Their Pulitzer Prize-winning investigatory contributions, including the bestseller book and later film adaptation, *All the President's Men*, continues to shape the public narrative—if not the historical narrative—of the media's pivotal role in bringing down a President.⁷

Understanding the media in respect to the defence of democratic institutions has never been more important. For decades, Watergate as an attack on the democratic process stood alone, but that is no longer the case: June 17, 1972 now shares its pedestal of infamy with January 6, 2021. To that end, this essay will explore the Watergate scandal to answer one question: how did the media shape Watergate, and vice versa? Overall, the media as a whole contributed little to the investigation, acting primarily as a medium through which revelations uncovered by internal governmental efforts—the FBI investigations, the courts, the whistleblowers and the congressional committees—were communicated to the public. It was these governmental efforts—not the media's reporting—that ended Nixon's presidency. Despite this, Watergate's legacy remains one of deep skepticism of government as a whole: the media cast itself as an external force for truth and transparency, thrusting itself into the separation of powers as a fourth actor beyond the legislature, judiciary and executive.

Watergate neither began nor ended with the break-in; rather, Watergate arguably began with the media—in the form of the Pentagon Papers leak. In 1967, U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara began to reach the same conclusion as increasingly many Americans: that American policies in Southeast Asia—particularly its military intervention in Vietnam—had failed.⁸ “Scholars,” as McNamara states in his memoirs, “would undoubtedly want to know why.”⁹ On June 17, 1967, a team of researchers and analysts began gathering documents to answer that question. Objectivity was key to the endeavour's scholarly usefulness; “tell your researchers not to hold back,” said McNamara to John Mc-

Naughton, then-director of the task force, and “let the chips fall where they may.”¹⁰

The result was a damning 7,000-page report, later known as the Pentagon Papers. According to historian John Prados, this document “demonstrated beyond questioning the criticisms that antiwar activists had been making...were not wrong but, in fact, were not materially different from things that had been argued inside the U.S. government.”¹¹ Daniel Ellsberg, a major contributor to the development of the Pentagon Papers, took its prescriptions to heart: once a hawk, Ellsberg turned dove, believing that the Vietnam War “should be ended and that above all must not be escalated.”¹² However, it became clear that numerous administrations, from Truman to Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson, had systemically lied about the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam; the public deserved to know.¹³

In October of 1969, Ellsberg planned to leak the Pentagon Papers to an anti-war senator “who[m] he hoped would hold hearings and thereby shift the onus of the release from him.”¹⁴ All refused, including William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and George McGovern, who would eventually run for president against Nixon in 1972.¹⁵ Unable to find a willing senator, Ellsberg sent copies to a think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies, but only in a partial and piecemeal fashion as he “feared that its liberal bent would taint the historic impact of what the study contained.”¹⁶ Only then were the Pentagon Papers leaked to the press, and not by Ellsberg himself; rather, in 1970, Marcus Raskin—co-founder of the Institute for Policy Studies—had surreptitiously compiled its fragmentary contents and given it to the *New York Times*.¹⁷ Ellsberg was not informed.¹⁸ In 1971, Raskin convinced Ellsberg to send the Pentagon Papers in their entirety to the *New York Times*, which was—still unknown to Ellsberg—already in partial possession of it.¹⁹

Popular recollection of the Pentagon Papers leak tends to omit much of Ellsberg’s attempts to work with the legislative branch in favour of an abridged sequence of events: Ellsberg photocopied the Pentagon Papers and leaked them directly to the press. This is far from what happened in reality; leaking to the media was

not Ellsberg's first choice, or even his second choice, and for good reason. Congressional oversight is a key component of the separation of powers, and there are established mechanisms for protecting congressmen should doing so bring them into conflict with the executive branch.²⁰ Had any senator agreed to work with Ellsberg, and by doing so introduce the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record, they would have been protected by congressional immunity.²¹

In contrast, the First Amendment rights of the press to publish classified documents—and to what extent that right was subject to the “maintenance of an effective national defense requir[ing] both confidentiality and secrecy”—had yet to be clearly established by legal precedence; this would only be established after publication by *New York Times Co. v. United States*.²² The precedence set here would enshrine the media as another mechanism by which holding the executive to account could occur in spite of legal repercussions. Until then, however, the Nixon administration would extensively pursue both legal and illegal means to suppress both the media and Ellsberg. These efforts would eventually culminate in broader efforts to stymie political opposition, leading directly to Watergate.

The *New York Times* began to publish excerpts of the leaked Pentagon Papers on June 13, 1971.²³ The Pentagon Papers were not politically damaging to Nixon; on the contrary, they largely implicated the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson—Nixon being a Republican.²⁴ Nevertheless, as Nixon recalled, “there was every reason to believe this was a security leak of unprecedented proportions.”²⁵ Within a week, he authorized the formation of the Special Investigations Unit; its purpose, according to Nixon himself, “was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters.”²⁶ John Ehrlichman was assigned to supervise this endeavour; in turn, he appointed Egil Krogh to lead it directly.²⁷ This unit would come to be known colloquially as the “White House Plumbers,” in reference to their role in combating information leaks.²⁸ Indeed, failing to punish the leak's perpetrators would set a terrible precedent as Nixon's main concern was that it would compromise his administration's

ability to effectively pursue foreign relations.²⁹ This belief was proved correct by another leak on July 23, 1971.³⁰ That the *New York Times* was again involved only “added insult to injury” for Nixon.³¹ Here, the *New York Times* exposed the United States’ fallback position during the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, placing Nixon at a disadvantage and threatening to sabotage negotiations altogether.³² This leak marked a turning point for the Plumbers; “new urgency” was attached to their work as a result.³³

“As a matter of first priority,” Nixon said to Krogh, “the [Special Investigations] unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg’s associates and his motives.”³⁴ And so, they did: the Plumbers launched an investigation into Ellsberg, separate from the ongoing investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigations.³⁵ As part of the Plumbers’ investigation, they illegally wiretapped Ellsberg and Neil Sheehan, the *New York Times* reporter who received the Pentagon Papers.³⁶ But increasingly the Plumbers’ efforts turned to Ellsberg himself, turning from investigatory to political.³⁷ Fearing that Ellsberg would be “martyred” if prosecuted by the Nixon administration, the Plumbers aimed to gather information to damage his credibility.³⁸ On September 3, 1971, operatives of the Plumbers—two of whom would later participate in the Watergate burglary—broke into the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, to acquire a psychological profile. These efforts demonstrated a ruthless willingness on the part of the Plumbers to advance the interests of the Nixon administration—regardless of legality.

Overall, the Nixon administration’s extreme response to the Pentagon Papers leak is key to understanding Nixon’s fraught relationship with the media. During his impeachment, Nixon’s written statements to Congress asserted that he “did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used” to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers.³⁹ However, his response to *New York Times Co. v. United States* implies otherwise:

Do you think, for Christ sakes, that the *New York Times* is worried about all the legal niceties? Those sons of...are killing me...we’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy. They’re using any means. We are going to

use any means...the press now is putting their right to make money, to profit, to profit from publication of stolen documents under the First Amendment and that overrides the right of an American who is fighting for his country...I know how this game is played.⁴⁰

Such was the enmity Nixon had for the media; to some extent, it was personal, and featured prominently throughout his political career. Nixon attributed negative media coverage to his loss in the 1962 California gubernatorial election: “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore,” he said to a crowd of reporters; “all members of the press are so delighted that I lost.”⁴¹ Eventually, Nixon’s hostility towards journalists evolved from a personal feud to a shrewd political tactic. Under Nixon, ‘the press’ became “the media”—a less favourable phrase that was aimed at dismissing negative coverage.⁴² Journalist Martin F. Nolan goes as far to compare this change in wording to Orwellian newspeak: “Media’ was just such a grand Latinism, an apt word for those seeking to create a grand conspiracy.”⁴³

Hostility to the media eventually found its place within the broader context of Nixon’s overarching political strategy. In his 1968 speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, Nixon defined his constituency as the “the forgotten Americans—the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators.”⁴⁴ The national media’s perceived sympathy to the anti-war counterculture increasingly alienated these “non-shouters” and “non-demonstrators”—in more familiar terms, Nixon’s “silent majority.”⁴⁵ That year, liberal *Washington Post* columnist Joseph Kraft conceded that media coverage was often biased towards “young people [and] minority groups.”⁴⁶ Indeed, attacking the media also found salience in supporting Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy,’ which aimed to capitalize on the Democratic Party’s support for the Civil Rights Act to attract disaffected white Southerners to the Republican side.⁴⁷

Further reinforcing Nixon’s rhetoric, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew delivered a fiery condemnation of the media at a Des Moines Republican party conference; both scholars and modern commentators point to this speech as a “foundational moment for the conservative critique of liberal media bias in U.S. politics.”⁴⁸ According to Agnew:

The power of the networks...represents a concentration of power over American public opinion unknown in history...The American people would rightly not tolerate this kind of concentration of power in government. Is it not fair and relevant to question its concentration in the hands of a tiny and closed fraternity of privileged men, elected by no one, and enjoying a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by government?⁴⁹

Overall, the Nixon administration's electoral strategy increasingly asserted that this "closed fraternity" of out-of-touch New Yorkers and Washingtonians were staring down a widening credibility gap with the common American.⁵⁰ If this line of reasoning sounds familiar, it is because accusations of a liberal media are today "one of the most successful and visible brands of media criticism in the United States."⁵¹

But as modern commentators draw parallels with Nixon's anti-media bent with that of today's conservatism, often forgotten is that this hostility was quite mutual. Marvin Kalb, a journalist who ended up on Nixon's infamous enemies list, conceded that "at one level, Watergate was a battle between a President and a newspaper."⁵² Another contemporary journalist noted the "bloodlust" his friends in the press had for Nixon: "All they seemed to be able to think of was 'get him, get him, get him.'"⁵³ Even as contemporary journalists acknowledged Nixon's achievements, they often did so begrudgingly and reservedly, "fault[ing] his manner, style, and person."⁵⁴

Understanding this mutually hostile dynamic between Nixon and the media is key to analyzing its eventual role in Nixon's downfall. Ruth P. Morgan contends that "[h]ad the press liked Nixon, he might have been given the benefit of the doubt."⁵⁵ Instead, the media viewed Nixon through an "unforgiving lens."⁵⁶ Although the Plumbers' clandestine activities regarding the Pentagon Papers leak "tapered off" after the Ellsberg break-in, many were quickly reassigned to overtly political work in the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP).⁵⁷ There, the former Plumbers would bring their willingness for lawless machination to bear against Nixon's political enemies in the 1972 presidential election. And when those machinations began to hound the President, the press would have the last "get."

There is no shortage of primary sources on Watergate; many of its primary actors wrote extensive memoirs. But unlike the later events of Watergate, where the perpetrators' accounts could be corroborated in part by taped recordings, congressional hearings, and whistleblowers, Nixon's earlier presidency is far less documented by incontrovertible evidence. As such, one of the few scholarly attempts to establish a historical chronology of the CRP by Justin Coffey relies heavily on Nixon's post-presidency autobiography, which was likely written in part to rehabilitate Nixon's legacy. Nevertheless, Coffey asserts that the idea for a covert political arm began shortly into Nixon's first term. Nixon had won the 1968 presidential election with a significant margin, with 301 electoral votes to Democrat Hubert Humphrey's 191, but the Republican Party failed to capture the House or the Senate; in fact, Nixon would be the only president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to govern without either chamber of Congress.⁵⁸ And despite Nixon's wide lead in the presidential election, Democratic majorities in Congress were anything but slim: in 1968 Democrats led Republicans by 14 seats in the Senate and 51 seats in the House.⁵⁹

As Nixon's legislative agenda stagnated, many contemporary pundits predicted he would be a one-term president.⁶⁰ The dismal results of the 1970 midterm elections "seemed only to confirm the gloomy forecasts of political pundits."⁶¹ Nothing could be left up to chance in the 1972 presidential election, lest Nixon confirmed the media's prophesied one-term presidency. In response, Nixon sent a memo to his Chief of Staff, H. R. "Bob" Haldeman: his administration must "get politics out of the White House by introducing dynamic campaign management...or [by] setting up a special presidential re-election committee."⁶² Nixon chose the latter option: John Mitchell, Nixon's Attorney General and "most trusted confidant," would lead the committee, whereas Maurice Stans, Nixon's Commerce Secretary, would serve as its Finance Chairman.⁶³ Mitchell and Stans would be powerful figures in the CRP, but their fervor would be surpassed by "an odd assortment of shady characters"—many of whom were former Plumbers—who would increasingly push the CRP in a radical and lawless direction.⁶⁴

One such character, Gordon Liddy—who had participated in the Ellsberg break-in—would propose some of the most outrageous plans in the history of American electioneering. Chief among these sinister schemes was “Operation Gemstone,” which he pitched to Mitchell on January 27, 1972—a “\$1 million political intelligence operation, which contemplated the use of electronic surveillance of political opponents, abduction of radical leaders, muggings, and the use of call girls.”⁶⁵ Mitchell rejected this proposal.⁶⁶ Liddy would then propose a scaled-down version in March involving a break-in at the Democratic National Committee, which would be approved in some manner by the CRP, although whether Mitchell did so remains disputed.⁶⁷ Regardless, Liddy’s operation was underway.

Its target was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Larry O’Brien, whose “pointed barbs at the Nixon White House” had won him a high position on Nixon’s list of enemies.⁶⁸ In fact, in the leadup to the 1972 presidential election, Nixon would constantly ask the CRP to take action against O’Brien.⁶⁹ To that end, Liddy and Howard Hunt—another former Plumber who also participated in the Ellsberg break-in—recruited five men to wiretap the DNC at the Watergate Office Building.⁷⁰ These five men first entered the DNC and installed wiretaps in May, but they stopped working in early June. And so, in the early hours of June 17, five masked men were arrested in the Watergate Office in the burglary that once exposed by the press in the form of two *Washington Post* journalists—Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—would bring down a President. But that narrative is far from what happened.

Later that morning, Woodward and Bernstein would receive a call from their editor at the *Washington Post*; they were to be assigned to a developing story about a break-in at the DNC.⁷¹ At the time, both journalists had led somewhat insignificant careers. Woodward’s claim to fame was a series on the attempted assassination of George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, but he had done little beyond that. Bernstein was a college dropout who “occasionally wrote about rock music.”⁷² In fact, that was what many observers viewed the Watergate break-in as: an insignificant event

that would soon blow over, like most of Woodward and Bernstein's earlier reporting had. Indeed, initial reactions to the burglary were largely muted. While O'Brien was quick to claim that the burglars were acting under the White House, other Democrats were less accusatory.⁷³ For example, Democratic Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield told journalists that he did not believe that the Nixon administration was involved.⁷⁴ Apart from the *Washington Post*, most of the media was also unconvinced: The *New York Times* featured the story on its thirtieth page; NBC allotted it a mere ten seconds on that evening's news broadcast; *Newsweek* gave it a rather flippant headline, "Capers."⁷⁵

Nixon claimed that he learned of the break-in the day after and held a similar view as the media. Nothing tied his administration to this "third rate burglary," as his press secretary famously dismissed it as; Nixon's reaction was initially "pragmatic and cool."⁷⁶ But that changed quickly as the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police began their investigation in earnest. The burglars had rented rooms at a motel across the street from the Watergate Office Building; there, police discovered a check signed with Howard Hunt's name and a notebook bearing the address "W. House."⁷⁷ Under questioning the burglars admitted to working for the CRP under Hunt and Liddy—ironically now the committee's legal counsel—to wiretap the DNC.⁷⁸ By then, the FBI was called to take over the investigation, wiretapping being a federal crime.⁷⁹

The FBI quickly made a startling breakthrough: one of the burglars, who had used a fake name when arraigned, was revealed to be James McCord, Chief of Security for the CRP.⁸⁰ Now emerged conclusive evidence that tied the CRP to the burglary, as although CRP denied employing McCord, their own payroll records proved otherwise.⁸¹ As these revelations made their way to Nixon, panic set in. His re-election was jeopardized, and now key members of his administration faced potential criminal charges: Liddy and Hunt had close ties to the White House, and their long record of employment in the administration was undeniable.⁸² "Unless we could find a way to limit the investigation," wrote Nixon, "the trail would lead directly to CRP, and our political containment would go by the boards."⁸³ His Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, had

a plan to prevent that by claiming that the CRP's break-in was a CIA operation; Nixon approved.⁸⁴ CIA involvement was a possibility the FBI was already considering given the involvement of Hunt and McCord—both of whom had served in the CIA in the past, and the FBI informed the White House that they had ended their investigation.⁸⁵ “As far as I was concerned,” wrote Nixon in his memoirs, “this was the end to our worries about Watergate.”⁸⁶

But the FBI did not end their investigation. Also worrying for Nixon was that new developments began to make it to the media—especially the “hated” *Washington Post*.⁸⁷ On August 26, 1972, just three days after Nixon was renominated as the Republican presidential candidate, the General Accounting Office released a report to the *Washington Post* requesting a Justice Department inquiry alleging “apparent and possible [financial] violations” made by the CRP.⁸⁸ “They’ve got so much money,” remarked *BusinessWeek*, “that they don’t even count it. They weigh it.”⁸⁹ That was not far from the truth: the CRP did not count their money, and nor did they weigh it. According to the GAO’s report, they laundered it: \$350,000 in total had passed through a Mexican bank without any documentation.⁹⁰ Nixon’s response to the matter in a press conference was the height of equivocation: it was a “technical violation” that was occurring on “both sides.”⁹¹ On October 10, Woodward and Bernstein exposed another appalling revelation: an anonymous FBI source, later revealed to be FBI Deputy Director Mark Felt, revealed that the FBI had discovered that much of the CRP’s laundered and unaccounted money was to finance “an extensive undercover campaign aimed at discrediting individual Democratic presidential candidates and disrupting their campaigns.”⁹² Over fifty agents were employed to conduct all manner of “dirty tricks”:

Following members of Democratic candidates’ families and assembling dossiers on their personal lives; forging letters and distributing them under the candidates’ letterheads; leaking false and manufactured items to the press; throwing campaign schedules into disarray; seizing confidential campaign files; and investigating the lives of dozens of Democratic campaign workers.⁹³

In spite of these early exposés, ongoing investigation, and the Nixon administration’s frustrating evasiveness, the Watergate

break-in gained shockingly little traction with the public. At this stage, hardly any newspapers picked up Woodward and Bernstein's Watergate stories that went out on the *Washington Post's* newswire.⁹⁴ Plenty of skepticism existed within the *Washington Post* as well: Bernstein was even briefly reassigned from the Watergate case, as the newspaper "could no longer spare one of its...political reporters in an election season."⁹⁵ Indeed, few believed that the White House had anything to do with this "third rate burglary" in spite of Democrats' best efforts—efforts that voters largely viewed as "hysterical, even absurd"—a sentiment also shared by the media at large.⁹⁶ Similarly little attention was paid to the CRP's financial and electoral shenanigans. That four of the five burglars were Cuban cast further doubt as the *Washington Star* falsely reported that "sources close to the investigation" declared the Watergate break-in to be the work of Cuban anti-communists, out of fear that leading Democrats were supportive of Fidel Castro.⁹⁷ Despite the lack of public interest, those leading Democrats—especially O'Brien, whose office was targeted—grew increasingly interested in what little information was uncovered and pledged to launch an inquiry into Watergate and the CRP.⁹⁸

Whether Democrats would be able to launch their congressional inquiry would be decided on November 7, as millions of Americans cast their ballots in the 1972 elections. More than 60% would vote for Nixon, who would go on to win in every state except Massachusetts in one of the largest landslide victories in American electoral history.⁹⁹ Crucially, however, Republicans had failed to win either chamber of Congress, even losing two seats in the Senate. This was in part Nixon's own doing. The CRP had raised vast sums of money, which was now public knowledge as a result of the GAO's report. Additionally, much of the CRP's financial success had come at the expense of other Republican fundraising efforts, but Nixon expressly forbade the CRP from distributing any of its coffers to the "cash-starved [congressional] Republican candidates."¹⁰⁰ The Committee for Re-electing the President would do exactly that—and only that. Congressional Republicans would remember this when Democrats launched their promised inquiry.

The looming Senate inquiry was not the White House's only headache. Earlier that September, Liddy, Hunt, and the Watergate burglars had been indicted on multiple counts of burglary, conspiracy, and interception of wire and oral communications.¹⁰¹ Their trial began only a few months after the election on January 10, 1973, with Judge John Sirica presiding, nicknamed "Maximum John" for his harsh sentencing.¹⁰² Recognizing the weakness of their case, Hunt and the four Cuban burglars quickly pled guilty on January 11 and were subsequently released on bail; Liddy and McCord did not, and both were found guilty on January 30.¹⁰³ All, however, attempted to downplay their connections with the White House: the Cubans claimed that they were anti-communists acting "on behalf of Cuban liberation"; Hunt denied any knowledge of "higher-ups" and insisted he had acted "in the best interest of my country"; McCord and Liddy offered what Sirica called the most "ridiculous" argument by claiming that they believed the burglary was "necessary...in order to protect [CRP] officials from bodily harm."¹⁰⁴ Sirica was deeply skeptical of these seemingly conflicting motives: "I am still not satisfied that all the pertinent facts that might be available...have been produced before [this] jury."

Sirica believed that the Senate might "get to the bottom of what's happened in this case."¹⁰⁵ This would prove prophetic: in the wake of Nixon's electoral triumph and general popularity, the Watergate trial proceeded without much media attention. Newspapers treated it as a "commonplace criminal event."¹⁰⁶ The defendants' stonewalling and misdirection appear to have succeeded in drawing attention away from the Nixon administration. Indeed, historian Stanley Kutler notes that "Watergate might have remained as the story-that-never-was had it not been for the determination of [Senators] Mike Mansfield and Sam Ervin."¹⁰⁷ On February 5, 1973, Ervin introduced a resolution for the creation of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, also known as the Watergate Committee.¹⁰⁸ It passed unanimously.¹⁰⁹ "Had Republicans achieved...a majority," contends historian Justin Coffey, "in all likelihood no such committee would have ever been created."¹¹⁰ Overall, Nixon's conduct in the 1972 elections left congressional Republicans both largely unable and unwilling to intervene on Nixon's behalf. Nevertheless, a few attempts were

made to limit the Watergate Committee's unprecedentedly broad scope; all would fail as Republicans found themselves routinely outvoted.¹¹¹

The unanimous approval for the creation of the Watergate Committee, while a coup for Democrats, cast a pall over the White House: "Much of the post-election brazenness and euphoria had evaporated, and Nixon warily glimpsed the future."¹¹² A similar sentiment gathered on the judicial front, as "Maximum John" proved his moniker's accuracy. The Nixon administration's cover-up relied heavily upon the intransigence of the burglars, Hunt and Liddy, but as they faced years in prison, a weak link emerged. McCord, who had pled not guilty and as a result was likely to receive a harsher sentence, sent a letter to Sirica on March 19, 1973.¹¹³ Here, among other things, McCord revealed that defendants were pressured to remain silent by pleading guilty; perjury had occurred in the trial; the individuals involved in the break-in were not identified, "when they could have been by those testifying"; and it was in no way a CIA operation.¹¹⁴ In his memoirs, Sirica points to McCord's letters as a vital turning point in accelerating Nixon's downfall by pinning Watergate directly on the White House, but by that point, historian Stanley Kutler notes that the "cover-up already had begun to fray."¹¹⁵

Similarly, the media's indifference finally began to melt as revelations heated up: "Watergate' rapidly became a meaningful—and loaded—political term that spread across the nation, raising far reaching political concerns."¹¹⁶ Where weeks earlier newspapers had only bothered to cover Watergate as a "commonplace criminal event," they now attacked with vigour: in March of 1973, White House reporters asked 478 questions on Watergate alone.¹¹⁷ Another newspaper, the Republican Illinois *Rockford Morning Star* "recognized the transformation of Watergate from an imbecilic bugging to more a case of high-level government dishonesty."¹¹⁸ Watergate was no longer just a Beltway affair, but a real concern for even America's Republican heartland. However, in view of the whole scandal, the media's attention came incredibly late. Months earlier, the GAO had already publicly requested a Justice Department inquiry into the CRP's money laundering: Woodward and

Bernstein had already reported that this laundered money was used to finance a vast—and most definitely illegal—campaign of “dirty tricks,” and the Watergate burglars, Hunt, and Liddy’s connections to the CRP had already been publicly confirmed during their trial. This was the Committee to Re-elect the President; who else, other than incumbent President Nixon, were they working for to re-elect? But so long as Nixon remained popular, and the notion that he had anything to do with the CRP remained hysterical and absurd, the media at large would insinuate nothing. It was ironically when the media began to pay attention to Watergate that its relative influence—its ability to drive public discussion forward with novel information—declined most precipitously. There was no point for informants to leak incriminating details to Woodward and Bernstein—and the scores of other now-interested journalists—when there now existed a Senate committee for that very purpose. The media now acted solely as a platform through which new revelations uncovered by the judiciary, the Senate, and the FBI were communicated. Tellingly, Woodward and Bernstein’s reporting on Watergate had largely ceased at this point; they were likely writing the manuscript for *All the President’s Men*, which would be published the next year.¹¹⁹

On May 1, 1973, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Richard Kleindienst—the Chief of Staff, Director of the CRP, and Attorney General, respectively—resigned, whereas White House Counsel John Dean, who had up until that point played a major role in the coverup, was fired when it was revealed that he had begun cooperating with the FBI.¹²⁰ Also in May, Kleindienst’s successor appointed Harvard Law School professor Archibald Cox to be the Special Prosecutor of the Justice Department’s investigation into Watergate.¹²¹ On May 17, the Watergate Committee began public, televised hearings.¹²² This would arguably have the largest impact in shifting public opinion against Nixon, as well as making the media’s attention towards Watergate permanent. From that point onwards, Americans watched damning testimony after testimony from White House officials. Chief among these was Dean’s week-long testimony, “describing his role in the Watergate cover-up and his dealings with an extraordinary range of characters, headed, of course, by the President.”¹²³ Alexander Butterfield, a former

White House aide, delivered another crucial testimony revealing the existence of a secret taping system that recorded numerous conversations involving Nixon.¹²⁴ Should the Watergate Committee come into possession of these tapes, they would have conclusive evidence to support Dean's testimony. Nixon was quick to reject any access to the White House Tapes. The Watergate Committee responded by voting unanimously to issue a subpoena for them, and Cox followed suit, issuing his own subpoena; Nixon "respectfully" refused both.¹²⁵

By the summer's end of 1973, practically all individuals connected to the Nixon administration had testified, revealing the true extent of the administration's abuses of power—related to Watergate or otherwise. As a result of these congressional testimonies, the public was now aware, among other things, that the Plumbers were behind the Ellsberg break-in, the White House kept an "enemies list," and Nixon had pressured the Internal Revenue Service to investigate such "enemies."¹²⁶ The White House Tapes were the last missing link; both the Watergate Committee and the Special Prosecutor attempted to enforce the subpoena through legal action—but Nixon again refused.¹²⁷ Nixon's thrice-refusal to release the tapes drained his "political sinew, his moral authority, and his credibility," editorialized the conservative *National Review*—one of Nixon's few remaining allies in the media.¹²⁸ Instead, the White House released transcripts of the tapes with all incriminating references to Watergate scrubbed. These omissions notwithstanding, the transcripts still "astonished and outraged" the public: Nixon's conversations were littered with vulgarity, malice, and ethnic slurs.¹²⁹ In response, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in *United States v. Nixon* that the actual tapes must be released in their entirety.¹³⁰ The resulting tapes included one conversation in which Nixon approved of Haldeman's plan to end the FBI investigation by claiming that the Watergate break-in was a CIA operation.¹³¹ This "smoking gun tape," as it came to be known, directly implicated Nixon in the cover-up attempt; impeachment was now certain.¹³² As every member of the House Judiciary Committee declared support for impeachment—even those that had been Nixon's fiercest defenders—Nixon saw the writing on the wall: Nixon's presidency was finished, and he resigned on August


9, 1974. Nixon was succeeded by his Vice President Gerald Ford, who declared that “our long national nightmare is over.”¹³³ On September 8, Ford pardoned Nixon, ending investigations.¹³⁴

According to Michael Schudson’s *Watergate in American Memory*, two competing narratives on Watergate have emerged. One is the ubiquitous “mystery novel” narrative popularized by Woodward and Bernstein’s widely read—and now, widely watched—book and film adaptation, *All the President’s Men*.¹³⁵ The other narrative, that being the scholarly interpretation of Watergate, also traces its origins to a book: Stanley Kutler’s *The Wars of Watergate*, which was “the first comprehensive history of Watergate by a professional historian.”¹³⁶ The dissimilarities between these two narratives are in no way negligible; in broad strokes, they can be summarized by the narrative’s differing answers to one question: When does Watergate begin? Woodward and Bernstein’s account begins no earlier than the break-in. Like this essay, *All the President’s Men* begins with “June 17, 1972”—and hardly one paragraph after is dedicated to events prior.¹³⁷ Subsequently, key background in regard to the Pentagon Papers, the Plumbers, and Nixon’s relationship with the press is often lost on the public at large. Here, Watergate is presented as a “detective story,” where the sleuthing press uncover clues and follow leads until eventually the weight of evidence culminates in Nixon’s resignation. In contrast, while scholarly interpretation is divided on where to begin, practically all agree that its beginnings must be placed before the break-in—such as Nixon’s failure to win Congress in 1970 and the Pentagon Papers leak in 1971.¹³⁸ Watergate, as Kutler puts it, was “more than a burglary.”¹³⁹ In this view, Watergate was not only a criminal case, but a constitutional crisis on the separation of powers.

Given the magnitude of Watergate’s significance, it is unsurprising that the media would seek to mythologize its role in uncovering it; public confidence is good business, after all. Watergate involved a staggering assortment of characters, events, and institutions; it remains one of the most complicated political scandals in American political history. But in one book and one movie—from the hundreds of thousands of testimonies, court proceedings, and investigations—the media forged one convenient

narrative for public consumption, and in doing so, overemphasized its own role in uncovering Watergate. Compared to detective stories, the Congressional Record makes for dull reading; likewise are movies to C-SPAN. As a result, there was no room to remember the efforts of Congress and the judiciary. In popular recollection, brave journalists and bold headlines did take centre stage; Woodward and Bernstein did bring down a presidency.

But for a “remarkable account of investigatory journalism at work,” *All the President’s Men* contains very little original investigation.¹⁴⁰ If not for a remarkable array of informants—including then-Deputy Director of the FBI Mark Felt—it is difficult to say whether Woodward and Bernstein could have gotten very far.¹⁴¹ Indeed, practically every major exposé was leaked to the *Washington Post* by one government official or another. Instead, *All the President’s Men* is an account of just two individuals’ experiences in one newspaper—hardly indicative of the media as a whole. Cravenly shadowing the currents of public opinion, the media at large was neither courageous nor expeditious in their coverage of Watergate—or lack thereof; only when Nixon faced significant headwinds did the media begin to pay attention. Overall, our democracy is not upheld—to reluctantly borrow the words of Spiro T. Agnew— by this “tiny and closed fraternity” and an unelected one at that.¹⁴² Rather, our democracy is only as strong as its primary institutions: the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive. Should any one of those stray from democracy’s path, salvation must come from within.



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¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 372-373.

¹⁰⁵ John J. Sirica, *To Set the Record Straight: The Break-in, the Tapes, the Conspirators, the Pardon* (New York: Norton, 1979), 61-90, as quoted in Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 372.

¹⁰⁶ Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 374.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Sam J. Ervin Jr., "A Resolution to Establish a Select Committee of the Senate to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Extent, If Any, to Which Illegal, Improper, or Unethical Activities Were Engaged in by Any Persons, Acting Individually or in Combination with Others, in the Presidential Election of 1972, or Any Campaign, Canvass, or Other Activity Related to It," 119th Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119 Cong. Rec. 3831-3851.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 3849.

¹¹⁰ Coffey, "Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President," 43.

¹¹¹ Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 375-377.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 379.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 381-382.

¹¹⁴ James W. McCord, Jr., Letter to Judge John Sirica, March 19, 1973, filed in *United States v. George Gordon Liddy, et al.*, C.R. 1827-72, United States District Court for the District of Columbia; Records of District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹¹⁵ Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 384.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 397.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Woodward and Bernstein, *All the President's Men*.

¹²⁰ Coffey, "Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President," 47.

¹²¹ Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, 18.

¹²² Stanley Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 481.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 508.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 522-523.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 549.

¹²⁶ Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, 18.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

¹²⁸ "Buzhardt, Garment, and Wright to the President," *National Review*, August 22, 1973, as quoted in Stanley Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 543-544.

¹²⁹ Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, 20.

¹³⁰ *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (U.S. Supreme Court 1974).

¹³¹ Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 753-756.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 758.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 778.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 793.

¹³⁵ Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, 21.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Woodward and Bernstein, *All the President's Men*.

¹³⁸ Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, 21.

¹³⁹ Kutler, *The Wars Of Watergate*, 13.

¹⁴⁰ Woodward and Bernstein, *All the President's Men*.

¹⁴¹ John O'Connor, "I'm the Guy They Called Deep Throat," *Vanity Fair*, October 17, 2006, <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2005/07/deepthroat200507>, accessed June 30, 2023.

¹⁴² Christopher Cimaglio, "A Tiny and Closed Fraternity of Privileged Men," 1.

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SCANDAL AND SACRIFICE: HOW *THE RITE OF
SPRING* CREATED A FRONTIER FOR MODERNISM

Andrew Su

Who wrote this fiendish “Rite of Spring”?
What right had he to write the thing?
Against our helpless ears to fling
Its crash, clash, cling, clang, bing, bang bing?

Letter to the *Boston Herald*, 1924¹

On the night of May 29, 1913, a fashionable Parisian audience came to the newly opened *Théâtre des Champs-Élysées*. For the past four years, the dance company Ballets Russes had captivated Western Europe with its flamboyant spectacles. Rumors had spread that the night’s performance would be especially unconventional—they would not be proven wrong. As the “savage” music and “contorted” dancing began, riots exploded throughout the theater.² Nevertheless, the Ballets Russes finished the performance to applause.

The Rite of Spring (*Le Sacre du Printemps* or *Le Sacre*), a story about Pagan Russia, defied audience expectations. Critics argued over whether the ballet was futuristic or derivative. Whatever its

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controversy, the ballet would popularize modernist art to global audiences. Its defiance of Victorian-tradition influenced music and dance after World War I, and by the 1940s, *Le Sacre* would appear in popular media without its scandalous connotations.

The premiere of *Le Sacre* was a watershed moment for music history, creating a frontier for modernism and music of the twentieth century. It signaled the arrival of a new era where composers sought to break free from traditional tonality and embrace innovative techniques and unconventional sounds. As a seminal masterpiece in the history of modernist music and ballet, *The Rite of Spring* was both inventive and innovative, inspiring generations of artists to explore music and artistic possibilities for the past century and more.

Richard Wagner and the Late-Romantic Tradition

In the late nineteenth century, German composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883) dominated European music through his legendary works. Hundreds of people from around the world, mostly prominent in power and wealth, frequently pilgrimaged to Bayreuth, Germany to attend festivals showcasing Wagner's operas.³ His 1876 *Der Ring des Nibelungen* (*The Ring of the Nibelung* or the *Ring*), widely considered his *magnum opus*, is a massive four-part epic spanning over 15 hours of playing time.⁴ Its plot, woven from German and Nordic folklore, follows gods, heroes, and mythical creatures struggling for an all-powerful ring and contains common themes of love, power, and greed.⁵ The orchestration's recurring motives, melodious German folk tunes, and sheer intensity set the standard for the Romantic musical style.

While his pieces were already extremely popular, it was Wagner's underlying beliefs that truly revolutionized the artistic world and defined its future. In the *Ring* and subsequent works, Wagner utilized every type of art—from dramatic acting to immersive set design to thematic orchestration—in order to reinforce and advance the artistic experience. In his 1850 essay *The Artwork of the Future*, he called this intertwining of art forms “*gesamtkunstwerk*,” or “total work of art.”⁶ His desire for this ultimate form to

serve the “*Volk*,” or the people, supported German nationalism and rejected individualism and iconoclasm.⁷ Wagner’s larger-than-life operas, combined with populist motifs, underlined the music world for years to come.

After Wagner’s death, new composers largely remained in the Romantic tradition. Writing in the German opera style, Richard Strauss found popularity through works such as *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (1896) and *Salome* (1905), which featured familiar aesthetic flourishes.⁸ Gustav Mahler developed Wagner’s grandiosity in the symphonic form. Mahler’s symphonies blended large, shimmering melodies with deeply emotional narratives.⁹ Though both Strauss and Mahler partly experimented with dissonance and less idealistic scenes, their innovations were still built from Wagnerian formulas of programmatic structure, glimmering magnitude, and sentimentalism.¹⁰ By the time of Mahler’s death in 1911, many composers believed Mahler had perfected the symphonic form and began to look for something new.¹¹

Music and Culture in the Early Twentieth Century

At the turn of the century, figures in nearly all aspects of society and culture began to diverge from convention, a trend which music would soon follow. Albert Einstein’s 1905 Theory of Special Relativity contradicted the longstanding principles of Newtonian physics.¹² In 1908, the Ford Model T revolutionized private transportation.¹³ These achievements in science and technology seemed to birth a “modern” age, a newness that would completely break with past norms. In culture, the “modernist” movement focused on innovation and experimentation to challenge artistic tradition.¹⁴ Paris was the epicenter of these artistic innovations. The Eiffel Tower, built in 1889, attracted millions of visitors despite prominent artists protesting its industrial and useless design.¹⁵ Pablo Picasso debuted his 1907 cubist painting *Les Femmes d’Alger (O. J. R. M.)*, whose geometric shapes were among the first to defy traditional figurative art.¹⁶ Blooming with tourists and new ideas, the city became the desired stage for cultural innovation.

Seizing the Parisian performance stage was Russian art critic Sergei Diaghilev. Since 1906, Diaghilev's shows and exhibitions had been spreading Russian art to Western Europe. In 1909, Diaghilev founded the Ballets Russes, later the company behind *Le Sacre*. Immediately, the Ballets Russes caused a sensation in Paris because of its extravagant productions.¹⁷ Their ballets combined Russian folklore and dance with set designs from cutting-edge artists such as Picasso, Jean Cocteau, and Coco Chanel.¹⁸ Although the combination of avant-garde Russian and French styles challenged the German tradition, the Wagnerian conservatives found familiarity in the Ballets Russes' pursuit of Wagner's "total art," which grandly intertwined music, dance, visual art, and folk imagery. Thus, early 20th-century Parisian musical culture held to the past. Despite radical innovations elsewhere, composers and performers still catered to the musical traditions their conservative—and generally upper-class—patrons expected.¹⁹

Conventional musical audiences would soon find their values clashing with the modernist *avant-garde*. The classical repertoire followed a set of traditional, renowned works with modest themes. When anyone tried to break tradition and feature modernist music, their performances would face protests and negative reactions. In March 1913, overwhelming whistling and laughter prematurely ended Austrian composer Arnold Schoenberg's *Skandalkonzert*.²⁰ Critics claimed Schoenberg had "abandoned all form, all rhythmic accent, and all logical musical development as we understand it to-day."²¹ The concert's modern techniques were subject to criticism. Compared to visual art or other mediums, *avant-garde* music was scientifically harder to enjoy. When the ratio between frequencies of sound waves becomes more complex, one experiences an unpleasant or "dissonant" sensation.²² Pieces played at the *Skandalkonzert* were abundant in these harsh intervals, and when compared to the traditional repertoire, came across as abstract, jarring, and utter noise. Combined with the simultaneous and continuous nature of live concert viewing, any new piece, regardless of brilliance or innovation, would be collectively ridiculed and struggle to find a following.

Within this reactionary context, Diaghilev wanted to find new ways to shock. In 1912, star dancer of the Ballets Russes, Vaslav Nijinsky, choreographed his first original ballet—*L'après-midi d'un faune* (*The Afternoon of a Faun*).²³ The ballet's suggestive and unnatural movements sparked controversy among the arts community. Conservative newspapers called the performance “neither a pretty pastoral nor a work of profound meaning.”²⁴ Aligning themselves with the spirit of the new, a group of bohemian artists and audiences emerged to rebel against the elitism of classical music. The enthusiasm of some, however, was often as stubborn as the system they sought to destroy. Artist and critic Jean Cocteau claimed they supported, “right or wrong, anything that [was] new because of their hatred of the [elite].”²⁵ Thus, the *avant-garde* bohemians were more concerned with creating controversy than lasting change. Diaghilev would become increasingly frustrated with both the conservative gatekeepers and the feckless bohemians; he wanted, ultimately, to create a lasting revolution.²⁶

Creation of *The Rite of Spring*

In 1910, Diaghilev was approached by Russian composer Igor Stravinsky with a new ballet idea.²⁷ Stravinsky, whose past work had already premiered with the Ballets Russes, had built a reputation as someone whose works flourished in the style of the late-Romantic era as well as in new artistic paths. His first major work, *The Firebird* (1910), depicted a prince's journey to save princesses in a Romantic-like fairytale.²⁸ The music used impressive techniques but was also similar to existing works. Though derivative, *Firebird* achieved immediate critical acclaim and put Stravinsky at the forefront of prominent classical music.²⁹ Stravinsky's next work, *Petrushka* (1911), tells the story of a living, dancing puppet.³⁰ Like Diaghilev, Stravinsky too wanted to challenge artistic tradition. *Petrushka* found innovation in Russian folk tunes and rhythmic irregularity—both of which would later saturate the whole of his next ballet, *Le Sacre du Printemps*, about an ancient spring ritual.³¹ Stravinsky described *Le Sacre's* conception in his autobiography:

Isaw in imagination a solemn pagan rite: sage elders, seated in a circle, watched a young girl dance herself to death. They were sacrificing her to propitiate the god of spring.³²

Together with Nicholas Roerich, a painter and expert in Slavic folklore, the two developed the idea with an adherence to historical accuracy rather than fairytale.³³ To a Western European audience, *Le Sacre's* display of pagan Russia would be bleak, vulgar, and from a foreign world. On top of an already daring musical score, Stravinsky's ballet thus rejected the Romantic tropes that originally brought him fame.

Following *Le Sacre's* story, Diaghilev ensured areas of production would be equally startling. Fearing the current choreographer was too conservative, Diaghilev chose the controversial Nijinsky.³⁴ Already notorious with the Russes for the scandalous *The Afternoon of a Faun*, the young star "rehearsed like an inexhaustible demon until he nearly dropped in his tracks" and left other dancers with "heads throbbed in pain...nerves jangled and bodies that ached."³⁵ When conductor Pierre Monteux disliked the piece, Diaghilev told him his involvement would "completely revolutionize music."³⁶ To the public, Diaghilev promoted the ballet as "a new thrill which will undoubtedly inspire passionate discussions."³⁷ The impresario not only expected a riot, but deliberately sought to create one.

In the spring of 1913, the ballet was ready to make its debut.³⁸ With the sensational notoriety of the Ballets Russes, a cast of trailblazers, and rumors about an especially provocative performance, both the Parisian elite and the bohemians came to the premiere with high expectations.

The Premiere

On the evening of May 29, 1913, at the brand-new *Théâtre des Champs-Élysées* in Paris, the stairways and corridors were crowded with audiences eager to see and to be seen.³⁹ Already, sights at the theater foreshadowed the riot to come. Parisian elites in "pearls, egret and ostrich feathers" lined up next to the "sack suits, headbands, and showy rags" of more eccentric art enjoyers.⁴⁰ The venue

itself, built from reinforced concrete and lacking the usual embellishments, was criticized as being too foreign and too modern.⁴¹ Before the performance, Diaghilev, anticipating an uproar, told Monteux and the dancers to keep performing regardless of what happened: “Whatever happens, the ballet must be performed to the end.”⁴² They would not let audience reactions hinder their innovation. The evening began with Chopin’s *Les Sylphides*—a short, inoffensive Romantic piece aligning with the expected tradition.⁴³ The classic music and dance were undoubtedly meant to draw a contrast with the radical styles of Stravinsky and Nijinsky. *Le Sacre* was performed next.

From the very first few notes, as a solo bassoon played an uncomfortably high melody, laughs could be heard across the theater.⁴⁴ When the curtain rose, a musical theme without a melody emerged—only loud, pulsating, dissonant chords with jarring accents.⁴⁵ Immediately, the audience responded with laughter and hissing so loud that the performers could barely hear each other.⁴⁶ “It was as if the auditorium had been shaken by an earthquake and seemed to quiver in the tumult,” writes Valentine Gross-Hugo. “Shrieks, abuse, howls, sustained whistles drowned the music and then came slaps and even blows.”⁴⁷ The demonstrations, at first isolated, soon developed into mass uproar.⁴⁸ Audience reactions separated into two warring groups: one protesting the performance with laughter, the other replying to the first with equally loud applause. From the wing, Nijinsky shouted numbers at the dancers to keep them in rhythm while Diaghilev tried to suppress riots by flashing the theater lights. Stravinsky held Nijinsky by his clothes to prevent him from confronting the protesters.

If the music had not already enraged the audience, then the dancing certainly did. Wearing ancient tunics and animal skins, dancers seemingly repeated the same motions over and over. “Like people possessed,” critic Adolphe Boschot wrote, “they stamp in place, they stamp, they stamp, they stamp, they stamp.”⁴⁹ Like in the music, this repetition would become the defining characteristic of *Le Sacre*.

To be sure, the reliability of accounts of the night's spectacles must be considered. Many critics attended the dress rehearsal the day before and therefore were not present at the actual premiere.⁵⁰ Articles by these authors tended to neglect the riot, and those who mentioned it wrote as though they had been there, often with generic language. For example, Louis Vuillemin, in his review, reduced the audience reaction to "they whisper, they whistle. They applaud, they yell 'Bravo!'...And *voilà*, the first performance of *Le Sacre du printemps*."⁵¹ And as for any tumultuous event, there existed an intent, not separate from the engineered chaos by Diaghilev or clashing identities of the audience, to magnify the scandal. Among the unclear details include the arrival of Parisian police, the offering of refunds, and the times for which specific events took place.⁵² These discrepancies in the proceedings of the actual premiere add to the night's overall sense of chaos.

Undeniable, however, was the perseverance of the musicians and dancers. "Everything available was tossed in our direction, but we continued to play on," noted Monteux.⁵³ Heeding the wishes of Diaghilev, they continued until the chaos died down. The unrest receded in the second act, and the audience was relatively quiet during the final "Sacrificial Dance."⁵⁴ At the end, the performers received several ovations, though not without shouting.⁵⁵ The premiere left the Ballets Russes with mixed feelings: "We were excited, angry, disgusted, and...happy," recalls Stravinsky.⁵⁶ Diaghilev, however, called the performance "exactly what [he had] wanted."⁵⁷ Diaghilev was satisfied; compared to the failures of previous modernists, the riot proved that he had achieved his revolution.

Initial Reactions

Why did the premiere receive such an uproar? Besides any incentive to dramatize the event, the audience found unfamiliarity in all aspects of *Le Sacre*. For one, the primitive theme was unlike anything they had seen before. While Romantic performance generally relied on fables and fairy tales, the new ballet's story centered around the sacrifice of a young girl. In stark contrast to

traditional ballet, Roerich costumed dancers “in the most garish colors, pointed bonnets and bathrobes, animal skins or purple tunics.”⁵⁸ His set design created “by itself the atmosphere for sacrifice, for astral dance, for the gestures of a frenetic and not fully organized cult.”⁵⁹ Thus, the Russian landscapes immersed viewers in an ancient, faraway world rid of Western elegance. Despite a similar foundation in national folklore, compared to Wagner’s heroic fantasies, the world on the stage was raw and steeped in realism by “one of Russia’s greatest painters and one of the most knowledgeable persons in the matter of Russian prehistory.”⁶⁰ However, one must also acknowledge connotations towards the “primitive” in 1913. One account states that an audience member shouted “They are ripe for colonization!,” in reference to the dancers on stage.⁶¹ Perhaps hostility was the result of cultural superiority rather than artistic taste.

The strangeness of the music, despite its modernity, would also support the primitive setting. Right as the dance begins, the orchestra starts to pound a loud and dissonant chord over and over again.⁶² Although the chord is played a mind-numbing 212 times, Stravinsky marks the rhythm with wild accents that remove any possibility of predictability.⁶³ The music’s dissonance and visceral pulsations, therefore, created an elemental feel that seemed to reject conventional sophistication and institutions. Instead, the techniques used were unsentimental and crude, far from anything seen before in Western composition.⁶⁴

The choreography, too, seemed to ridicule tradition. Rather than elegant solos, large groups of dancers, “packed like sardines,” uncomfortably stood “all congealed in this contorted pose by a unanimous crick in the neck.”⁶⁵ Instead of turning their feet outwards, they leapt in unsettling poses with locked knees and inward toes.⁶⁶ Their repeated motions mimicked rhythms in the music, emphasizing a simplicity that disregarded the elegance associated with ballet.⁶⁷

Everywhere, Nijinsky’s choreography sought to be the opposite of traditional dance, which aligned with the prehistoric theme.

In the days after the premiere, reactions to *Le Sacre* largely admitted its innovation. The same critic who claimed the music gave “the impression of the darkest barbarity” nonetheless praised Stravinsky for achieving something “no one—not even M. Richard Strauss—had dared until now.”⁶⁸ Likewise for Nijinsky, another acknowledged that “even if the principle is criticized, the realization [of the dance] is absolutely perfect.”⁶⁹ By rejecting artistic tradition, *Le Sacre* opened possibilities for riskier art styles, carving a new frontier for modernism. French musicologist Léon Vallas went as far as to say that “to those of us in 1913 it seems ugly... [but Stravinsky has] offered us this year the music we should hear around 1940.”⁷⁰ Rather than criticizing the work as noise, some respected it as the music of the future.

Still, many noticed the ballet’s continuity with the music of the past. Though it “appeared complex,” the ballet’s dissonance was not entirely new.⁷¹ Romantic era composers, including Wagner, had experimented with chromaticism and obscure rhythms.⁷² Louis Vuillemin wrote that Stravinsky had simply “exaggerated” the work of the past, and thus owed “enormous debts to his ancestors.”⁷³ It was only the fact that Stravinsky had fully embraced the possibilities—writing music entirely structured with these experimental patterns to the point of “noise”—that made his work revolutionary.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, all agreed that the performance on May 29 challenged expectations and sparked discourse.⁷⁵ Perhaps this uproar was an emotional reaction to the piece’s conflicting nature. The idea of spring—once a time for growth and new life—had been transformed into a frightening display of death. Its content simultaneously embodied ancient folktales and the *avant-garde*. As reports focused on its controversy, awareness of radical possibilities in music spread to a wide audience: “Even those who most dislike it [could not] pass it by in silence.”⁷⁶ Although *Le Sacre*’s innovation had not yet convinced everyone, its media exposure and infamy turned it into a symbol of modernism.

The Ballets Russes managed another five performances at the *Théâtre des Champs-Élysées* in Paris and another four performances at Drury Lane in London.⁷⁷ As *Le Sacre*’s reputation

grew, negative reactions began to subside. Any disgust turned into astonishment.⁷⁸ A year later, after concert performances in the Casino in Paris, Stravinsky was surrounded by admirers.⁷⁹

Transformation of the Frontier

One year after *Le Sacre's* premiere, World War I began, resulting in never-before-seen destruction and violence across Europe. A radical new world emerged from the war, giving rise to substantial changes in the political climate, economies, and science and technology.⁸⁰ Traumatized soldiers came home with feelings of aloofness and detachment, and the deaths of nearly twenty million created widespread disillusionment towards Romantic decadence and optimism.⁸¹ As a result, social values changed. Romantic heroism was replaced by realism, the metaphysical by the scientific, and materialism became the leading philosophy of the era.⁸² People wanted to distance themselves from not only the horrors of the trenches but also the melodrama of the immediate past. Artistic tastes also shifted—composers moved away from the subjectivity of Romanticism, favored the innovation and objectivity of *Le Sacre*, and embraced experimentation in music.

Especially scrutinized were the operas of Wagner. In his 1918 manifesto, Jean Cocteau reduced the once-foremost composer to “music which is listened to through the hands”—lacking spirit and liable to suspicion.⁸³ His works were now “long works which are long, and *long-drawn-out*” and boring.⁸⁴ The war had tarnished the grandeur of blissful melodies and expansive sagas; any reminders from before the war seemed vain and ignorant towards recent tragedies.

Besides shifting musical taste, Wagner's authority and German nationalism played another role in the criticism. As Germany was largely blamed for the war, many Europeans afterward became hostile toward its culture. Stravinsky called the Germans ones “who do not understand and who have never understood music.”⁸⁵ Musicians began to resent the near-religion of Wagnerism, of Bayreuth, and of Teutonic hegemony in the arts. *Le Sacre*, in contrast, was neither German nor nationalist. Its creation upheld not a cult of

personality, but rather “an almost miraculous fusion of associated energies, of men who disappear one behind the other, no one ever passing in front of his neighbor to parade.”⁸⁶ In other words, *Le Sacre* resonated because it felt real and human. It was clear: composers were jaded with the facade of Wagner’s grand style. They cried “Down with Wagner!” and sought to build something new.⁸⁷ As composers relinquished Wagner, Romanticism, and the war, they increasingly searched for the structured and orderly.

Le Sacre satisfied these new demands. After disillusionment with traditional narratives, composers sought stability and tried to create music that was “purely a matter of substances, combinations, geometric patterns, abstract architecture, aural sensations.”⁸⁸ Almost identically, Stravinsky in a 1920 interview called his score “architectonic, not anecdotal; objective, not descriptive construction.”⁸⁹ The score’s simple melodies and refined pulses, resembling some sort of “cubist music,” resonated with the post-war search for objectivity.⁹⁰ Soon, modern approaches to structure and harmony pioneered by *Le Sacre* inspired some of the most successful post-war *avant-garde* artists. For example, French-American composer Edgard Varèse, who had attended the 1913 premiere, was especially drawn to *Le Sacre*’s harsh chords and explosive rhythms, which he adopted in his 1921 *Amérique*.⁹¹ George Antheil’s 1924 *Ballet Mécanique* tried to “out-Stravinsky Stravinsky” with even more bizarre instruments and repetitive forms.⁹² While most had already recognized its brilliance and innovation before the war, new social mores solidified the ballet’s importance.

At the same time, jazz and other African-American music became popular for having nearly identical structure and techniques as *Le Sacre*. Entering the 1920s, massive improvements in sound recording technology meant that entire performances could be listened to anytime and anywhere.⁹³ When introduced to Europe by American soldiers during the war, African-American music quickly became fashionable. In 1923, the young French composer Darius Milhaud unveiled his ballet *La Création du Monde*, boasting an “authentic” portrayal of black civilization not dissimilar from that of Pagan Russia by *Le Sacre*.⁹⁴ Rather than fitting jazz themes

over an otherwise conventional score, which was more frequent among his European contemporaries, Milhaud faithfully intertwines elements of jazz and Bach into a piece that, interestingly enough, is “cacophonous, dissonant, and pounding.”⁹⁵ Despite developing on separate continents, the characteristics of *Le Sacre* and African-American music are remarkably similar—the new music from America emphasized repetitive “call-and-response” forms, unexpected rhythms, and non-Western European tonality resembling that of Stravinsky.⁹⁶ In dance, the “Charleston” featured inverted feet and strange “flapping” motions reminiscent of Nijinsky’s choreography.⁹⁷ In a similar way to *Le Sacre*, jazz music offered what Stravinsky called “the musical ideal, music spontaneous and ‘useless,’ music that wishes to express nothing.”⁹⁸ Without excess emotion or attachment to the past, jazz-inspired culture provided a blank slate for creativity. As the jazz craze died down, composers started developing new ways to reflect post-war changes in society.

Among the many new ways composers experimented, two different approaches emerged, one embracing the past and the other inventing a future. The former, a movement known as Neoclassicism, believed that the desired structure could be found in older music, before Romantic excesses or utopian notions of progress.⁹⁹ Similar to how *Le Sacre* used Russian folk tunes, the Neoclassicists borrowed from the orderly and precise styles of the Classical, Baroque, and pre-Romantic periods.¹⁰⁰ Stravinsky spearheaded the movement in his composition for the 1920 ballet *Pulcinella*, reviving pieces by Baroque composer Pergolesi (1710-1736).¹⁰¹ The result, a blend of past transparency and new irregularities, was a uniquely modern musical work.¹⁰²

However, others believed that Neoclassicism was not serious enough; rather, a complete transformation was necessary to depart from the immediate past.¹⁰³ The latter approach, also known as “atonalism,” instead sought to invent a future for music. Adamant in the idea of progress in the arts, Arnold Schoenberg would take musical harmony to another level.¹⁰⁴ In a 1911 treatise dedicated to Mahler after his death, Schoenberg expressed concern that “music has rather exhaustively exploited the possible relations of

seven tones,” and was determined to overshadow the past.¹⁰⁵ He pioneered the “twelve-tone method” in works such as his *Variations for Orchestra* (1928), using all twelve notes between two notes of an octave and subsequently, boiling melodies down to select permutations from a finite set.¹⁰⁶ This systematic approach, like a new musical language, provided the necessary structure.

Unsurprisingly, music from Stravinsky’s Neoclassicism and Schoenberg’s atonalism often overlapped, sharing detached and mechanical feelings. In a war-torn and rapidly changing world, industrialization and technology seemed to become the new folklore.¹⁰⁷ One way or another, perhaps as a by-product of rapid innovation, modernist composers found stability in music through machine-like repetition and mathematical harmony.

Though well-received, modernist music throughout the 1920s gave way to many conflicting ideas that challenged its footing. While composers strove to write more modest music, stages remained in salons funded by the wealthy.¹⁰⁸ Revivals of Baroque forms tried to create familiarity, yet, at the same time, cultivated a movement of disobedience towards tradition.¹⁰⁹ Modernism, then, represented a diverse assortment of ideas, united only by a desire to move on from Romanticism.¹¹⁰ *Le Sacre’s* influence continued to exist in niches outside of the mainstream, and composers wrote with little regard for public reception.¹¹¹ Soon, those composing “seriously” (for pure experimentation) and those composing for mass appeal would form two distinct paths in modernism.¹¹² While Stravinsky’s post-war Neoclassicism and Schoenberg’s atonalism outlined future concert music, others at the innovative forefront would soon enter the ever-growing popular culture.

By the 1930s, the Great Depression made writing for niche and experimental styles increasingly unprofitable.¹¹³ At the same time, many European composers, including Stravinsky and Schoenberg, immigrated to the United States to escape political persecution and rising threats of war in Europe.¹¹⁴ Their arrival accelerated the development of modernism in the U.S. A new wave of American talent emerged, who also sought to establish a new American style distinct from European tradition.¹¹⁵ Whether

for money or patriotism, many modernist composers were driven to create music that resonated with popular audiences. Ironically, the very techniques *Le Sacre* used to unnerve were now used to soothe. Aaron Copland, for example, used themes of pastoral America in his 1938 *Billy the Kid* and 1944 *Appalachian Spring*.¹¹⁶ Like *Le Sacre*, these ballets relied on folk identity and chaotic polyrhythms.¹¹⁷ Compared to Stravinsky's display of a savage Russian ritual, though, Copland sought to evoke America's past. His music has since become the musical emblem of America.¹¹⁸ This new "populist" style pioneered by Copland, with the purpose of composing for the audience, differentiated itself from other modernist styles that focused only on experimentation.¹¹⁹

While composers now wrote for mass appeal, audiences outside of the concert hall had not yet embraced the modern. Prior to 1939, Hollywood remained closed off to modernist composers, as their reputation of "high-brow music" could not synergize with "low-brow" popular film.¹²⁰ However, as the Great Depression ended and the film industry started searching for new scores for their next blockbuster movie, modernist music soon made its debut on the silver screen. In the 1939 film *Of Mice and Men*, Copland thrived with his modern techniques; his pastoral elements complemented the movie's Western setting.¹²¹ In 1940, Disney used music from *Le Sacre* to score scenes about dinosaurs in the animated film *Fantasia*.¹²² Compared to the high-end snobs and bohemians in 1913, now middle-class families enjoyed the piece with their children for entertainment. Nonetheless, *Fantasia*'s innovative animation left a lasting impact on popular culture, thereby introducing millions (generations of new audiences) to *Le Sacre* and modernism.¹²³ The success of both movies, both of which would receive or be nominated for Academy Awards, solidified a spot for modernism in film music.¹²⁴ No longer groundbreaking nor controversial, *Le Sacre* ultimately transformed into a masterpiece welcomed by mainstream audiences, becoming, as Léon Vallas had predicted, the music heard around 1940.¹²⁵

Lasting Change

By 1940, *Le Sacre* had already ushered in the rise of modernism and played a pivotal role in shaping the music world—both intellectual and popular. New performances of the piece no longer shocked, but instead were “of a work now fairly familiar.”¹²⁶ Even so, the ballet has remained newsworthy and stayed relevant, as depicted by its coverage in mainstream media and unceasing choreographic adaptations from the past century and more.

Not surprisingly, “new” is the most frequently mentioned word by media coverage of *Le Sacre*. Still, the context and usage of “new” has changed. Over the past 110 years, perceptions of *Le Sacre* have evolved from a budding movement to an important masterpiece to a symbol of continuous innovation. For example, in articles from 1913, the word simply refers to the premiere of the “new ballet.”¹²⁷ Reporters emphasized the “Russian art,” “discordant music,” and “barbaric choreography” as well as that *Le Sacre*’s music was “more revolutionary than Strauss’s.”¹²⁸ Even though it was difficult to enjoy, people from early on recognized the ballet as a departure from Wagner and a harbinger of the *avant-garde*. From 1963-1973, “new” referred to how *Le Sacre* had helped music enter the contemporary era.¹²⁹ Media described performances of the 50-year-old piece and its reactions with key words such as “masterpiece,” “blaze of glory,” “historic occasion,” and a “joyful storm” of applause.¹³⁰ After half a century of impact, audiences readily celebrated the modernist innovation of *Le Sacre*. Now, more than a century since the premiere, the ballet continuously receives “new versions” of choreography, “new ways to interpret the music,” and crossovers with “new cultural influences.”¹³¹ The focus is on “interpretation,” “themes,” “experimentation,” and “rebirth,” as artists seek to apply the old story to modern issues.¹³² Their reconsidering of the symbolism of *Le Sacre* has eternalized the piece itself into a medium for further innovation.

While *Le Sacre* is mostly remembered for its music, the ballet remains relevant today in part because of its many choreographic adaptations. Just months after the 1913 premiere, the relationship between Diaghilev and Nijinsky had soured.¹³³

When Diaghilev revived the ballet in 1920, he used choreography by Léonide Massine instead of Nijinsky.¹³⁴ All manuscripts of the original Nijinsky choreography were lost, so future productions had to create unique dances of their own.¹³⁵ For example, Pina Bausch's 1975 version used a young woman in a red dress as the sacrifice, transforming *Le Sacre* into a story about misogyny.¹³⁶ In 1987, the Joffrey Ballet worked to reconstruct choreography and set design from the premiere with Marie Rambert, a dancer who worked closely with Nijinsky.¹³⁷ Despite the near-authentic recreation, ballet productions have continued to opt for experimental choreography. In 2023, the Yale Symphony Orchestra and Yale Dance Laboratory performed *Le Sacre* to celebrate its 110th anniversary.¹³⁸ Among many other adaptations of the original story according to contemporary concerns, this performance took liberties creating a narrative about climate change. Today, *Le Sacre* has been subject to more than 150 new choreographers.¹³⁹ By focusing on modern issues such as arranged marriage, climate change, and multiculturalism, new artists, much like the Ballet Russes in 1913, seek to provide an "answer" to the ever-changing world.¹⁴⁰


Throughout the past 110 years, *Le Sacre*'s newness has never faded. No matter the social, political, or economic environment, *Le Sacre* has remained relevant. Even though the music no longer provokes outrage, it anticipated and supported a radical movement of change. Artists continue to innovate by reimagining the core theme of rebirth around original choreography and topical issues.

Conclusion

From a scandalous beginning to a symbol of modernism, there is no doubt about the influence *Le Sacre* has had on 20th-century music history. The story of the premiere, then, remains vital in understanding the modernist movement and the development of music in the 20th century. As author, scholar, and musicologist Thomas Forrest Kelly puts it, the premiere of *Le Sacre du Printemps* was "the most important single moment in the history of twentieth-century music."¹⁴¹

At its premiere, *Le Sacre* created a new frontier for modernism and opened musical possibilities. Its boldness and originality inspired generations of composers and dancers to explore new avenues of musical expression and seek radical change. The aftershocks of the work are sensed beyond the world of concert music, having an impact across different musical genres from jazz to cinema.¹⁴² Twenty-seven years after the premiere, in 1940, the piece was adapted to depict the early history of the planet. Despite Stravinsky's horror at Disney's reinterpretation, *Fantasia* brought his music to a whole new audience and helped to cement modernism in popular culture, establishing *Le Sacre* as a landmark work that was not just for a specialized concert audience but could also be appreciated by the wider public.¹⁴³ Since then, *Le Sacre* has continued to inspire countless film scores, from *Psycho* to *Star Wars*.¹⁴⁴

If *Fantasia* helped broaden the influence of *Le Sacre*, the numerous reinterpretations of *Le Sacre* have contributed to the ongoing innovation and experimentation of the work, keeping modernist values relevant and meaningful to new generations. Therefore, 110 years later, both artists and audiences still recognize the piece as fresh and relevant. The riot and reaction to the original premiere have ultimately become synonymous with the forefront of innovation in music and art. Thanks to their willingness to shock the world, the pioneers of 1913 not only created controversy, but also lasting change—forever opening a new frontier for innovative, progressive, and resolute skepticism of tradition within music.



Endnotes

¹ Letter to the *Boston Herald*, 1924, quoted in *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, by Modris Eksteins (New York: Mariner Books, 2000), 9.

² Adolphe Boschot, "Le Sacre du printemps," *Écho de Paris*, May 30, 1913, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k8072921/f5.item>.

³ Special Correspondent to *The New York Times*, "The Wagner Banquet: Closing Scenes of the Great Festival," *New York Times*, August 19, 1876, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/wagner-banquet/docview/93505090/se-2>.

⁴ Donald Jay Grout, J. Peter Burkholder, and Claude V. Palisca, *A History of Western Music*, 9th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 687-688.

⁵ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 687-688.

⁶ Richard Wagner, *The Art-work of the Future*, 1849, in *The Art-work of the Future and Other Works*, trans. William Ashton Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 88.

⁷ Alex Ross, *The Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century* (New York: Picador, 2007), 20.

⁸ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 738. The opening brass fanfare from *Also Sprach Zarathustra* is famously featured in Stanley Kubrick's 1968 film *2001: A Space Odyssey*.

⁹ Erwin Stein, "Mahler Today," *Tempo*, no. 6 (1944): 5-6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/942574>.

¹⁰ Ross, *The Rest*, 24.

¹¹ Austin M. Doub, "Mahler the Protomodernist," *Musical Offerings* 11, no. 1 (April 29, 2020): 26, accessed July 26, 2023, <https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/musicalofferings/vol11/iss1/2>.

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¹³ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 765-766.

¹⁴ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, xv-xvi.

¹⁵ Bertrand Lemoine, "The Artists Who Protested the Eiffel Tower," *Tour Eiffel*, last modified June 24, 2019, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.toureffel.paris/en/news/130-years/artists-who-protested-eiffel-tower>.

¹⁶ Melissa McQuillan, "Picasso [Ruiz Picasso], Pablo," *Grove Art Online*, 2003, accessed April 7, 2023, <https://www-oxfordartonline-com.westminster.idm.oclc.org/>

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¹⁷ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 21-26.

¹⁸ Thomas Forrest Kelly, *First Nights: Five Musical Premieres* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 264.

¹⁹ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 721-724.

²⁰ Joy H. Calico, "Noise and Arnold Schoenberg's 1913 Scandal Concert," *Journal of Austrian Studies* 50, nos. 3-4 (2017): 31, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26534267>.

²¹ Bureau of Musical America, "Hisses for Schönberg in Chicago," *Musical America* (Chicago), November 8, 1913, accessed July 17, 2023, https://www.musicalamerica.com/pages/?pagename=11-8-1913_p36&historical.

²² Ross, *The Rest*, 52. For example, two notes an octave apart have ratios of 2:1, but that of a minor second and major seventh are 16:15 and 15:8, respectively, and therefore sound more dissonant.

²³ Kelly, *First Nights*, 270-271.

²⁴ Gaston Calmette, "Un faux pas," *Le Figaro* (Paris), May 30, 1912, accessed June 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k289598g.r=gaston%20calmettel%27apres%20midi%20d%27un%20faune%20l%27apres%20midi%20d%27un%20faune?rk=21459;2>.

²⁵ Jean Cocteau, *Cock and Harlequin: Notes Concerning Music* (United Kingdom: Egoist Press, 1921), 48.

²⁶ Olin Downes, "The Revolutionary Mr. Diaghileff," *New York Times*, Jan 23, 1916, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/revolutionary-mr-diaghileff/docview/98021978/se-2>.

²⁷ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 39-40.

²⁸ Stephen Walsh, "Stravinsky, Igor," *Grove Music Online*, 2001, accessed February 22, 2023, <https://www-oxfordmusiconline-com.westminster.idm.oclc.org/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000052818>.

²⁹ Kelly, *First Nights*, 268.

³⁰ Ross, *The Rest*, 76.

³¹ Walsh, "Stravinsky, Igor."

³² Igor Stravinsky, *An Autobiography* (New York: Norton, 1962), 31.

³³ Kelly, *First Nights*, 269-270.

³⁴ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 40-41.

- ³⁵ Kelly, *First Nights*, 279.
- ³⁶ Doris Monteux, *It's All in the Music: The Life and Work of Pierre Monteux* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965) 90-92.
- ³⁷ Truman Campbell Bullard, "The First Performance of Igor Stravinsky's *Sacre du Printemps*" (PhD diss., Eastman School of Music, 1971), III:1, accessed July 24, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b52501393w>.
- ³⁸ Kelly, *First Nights*, 274.
- ³⁹ Gustave Linor, "Le sacre du printemps," *Comoedia* (Paris), May 30, 1913, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k7653237w/f3.item>.
- ⁴⁰ Cocteau, *Cock and Harlequin*, 48.
- ⁴¹ Kelly, *First Nights*, 276-277.
- ⁴² S. L. Grigoriev, *The Diaghilev Ballet*, trans. Vera Bowen (London: Constable, 1953), 83-84, quoted in Kelly, *First Nights*, 317-318.
- ⁴³ Bullard, "The First Performance," I:124-125.
- ⁴⁴ Ross, *The Rest*, 65.
- ⁴⁵ Florent Schmitt, "Les Prèmières," *La France* (Paris), June 4, 1913, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k16466687/f2.item>.
- ⁴⁶ Marconi Transatlantic Wireless Telegraph to *The New York Times*, "Parisians Hiss New Ballet," *New York Times*, Jun 08, 1913, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/parisians-hiss-new-ballet/docview/97463053/se-2>.
- ⁴⁷ Kelly, *First Nights*, 322.
- ⁴⁸ Stravinsky, *An Autobiography*, 47.
- ⁴⁹ Boschot, "Le Sacre du printemps."
- ⁵⁰ Stravinsky, *An Autobiography*, 47. The dress rehearsal was held to give critics time in advance to write reviews and free up seats for the premiere night.
- ⁵¹ Gustave de Pawlowski, Louis Vuillemin, and Louis Schneider, "Le Sacre du Printemps," *Comoedia* (Paris), May 31, 1913, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k76532389/fl.item>.
- ⁵² Kelly, *First Nights*, 292. Alternatively, if performers could not hear each other, then reports that both audience reactions and dissect the musical score, too, must be questioned.
- ⁵³ Kelly, *First Nights*, 292.
- ⁵⁴ Kelly, *First Nights*, 292-293.
- ⁵⁵ Linor, "Le sacre."

⁵⁶ Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Expositions and Developments* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 47-48.

⁵⁷ Stravinsky and Craft, *Expositions and Developments*, 47-48.

⁵⁸ Boschot, "Le Sacre du printemps."

⁵⁹ de Pawlowski, Vuillemin, and Schneider, "Le Sacre."

⁶⁰ de Pawlowski, Vuillemin, and Schneider, "Le Sacre."

Roerich's interpretations of prehistoric Russia, though the leading theories of the time, have since been challenged by modern anthropologists.

⁶¹ Bullard, "The First Performance," III:94.

⁶² Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 834-835. The repeated chord is Eb7/Fb, using all seven notes of the Ab harmonic scale.

⁶³ Marie Rambert, *Music score of Le Sacre du Printemps Igor Stravinsky, with choreographic notes by Marie Rambert, Nijinsky's assistant*, Manuscript/Mixed Material, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.loc.gov/item/ihas.200156332/>.

⁶⁴ Schmitt, "Les Premières."

⁶⁵ Boschot, "Le Sacre du printemps."

⁶⁶ Boschot, "Le Sacre du printemps."

⁶⁷ Kelly, *First Nights*, 278.

⁶⁸ Schmitt, "Les Premières."

⁶⁹ Linor, "Le sacre."

⁷⁰ Léon Vallas, "Le sacre du printemps," *La Revue Française de Musique*, June/July 1913, quoted in Kelly, *First Nights*, 316-317.

⁷¹ Henri Quittard, "Théâtre des Champs-Élysées: Le Sacre du printemps," *Le Figaro* (Paris, France), May 31, 1913, accessed Feb 26, 2023, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k289966x/f6.item>.

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⁷⁵ Linor, "Le sacre."

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⁷⁹ Walsh, “Stravinsky, Igor.”

⁸⁰ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 856.

⁸¹ Wolfgang-Andreas Schultz, “*Avant-Garde* and Trauma: Twentieth-Century Music and the Experiences from the World War” (unpublished typescript, n.d.), 9.

⁸² Winthrop Sargeant, “Mahler – Last of the Romantics,” *Naturlaut* 2, no. 1 (2003): 7, <https://search-ebSCOhost-com.westminster.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=61892977&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

⁸³ Cocteau, *Cock and Harlequin*, 36.

⁸⁴ Cocteau, *Cock and Harlequin*, 15.

⁸⁵ Ross, *The Rest*, 88.

⁸⁶ Bullard, “The First Performance,” III:288.

⁸⁷ Cocteau, *Cock and Harlequin*, 14.

⁸⁸ Sargeant, “Mahler – Last,” 7.

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⁹⁴ Richard Brender, “Reinventing Africa in Their Own Image: The Ballets Suédois’ ‘Ballet Nègre,’ ‘La Création Du Monde,’” *Dance Chronicle* 9, no. 1 (1986): 120, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1567597>.

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¹⁰⁶ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 820-821.

¹⁰⁷ Ross, *The Rest*, 90.

¹⁰⁸ Ross, *The Rest*, 84.

¹⁰⁹ Haimo, "Schoenberg and the Origins," 83.

¹¹⁰ Ross, *The Rest*, 111-112.

¹¹¹ Milton Babbitt, "Who Cares if You Listen?," *High Fidelity*, February 1958, 1, digital file.

¹¹² Babbitt, "Who Cares," 1.

¹¹³ Ross, *The Rest*, 208-212.

¹¹⁴ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 892.

¹¹⁵ Ross, *The Rest*, 203.

¹¹⁶ Howard Pollack, "Copland, Aaron," *Grove Music Online*, 2013, accessed July 25, 2023, <https://www-oxfordmusiconline-com.westminster.idm.oclc.org/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-1002249091>.

¹¹⁷ Ross, *The Rest*, 212-213.

¹¹⁸ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 899.

¹¹⁹ Grout, Burkholder, and Palisca, *Western Music*, 899.

¹²⁰ Sally Bick, “Of Mice and Men’: Copland, Hollywood, and American Musical Modernism,” *American Music* 23, no. 4 (2005): 427, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4153069>.

¹²¹ Bick, “Of Mice and Men,” 427.

¹²² Kelly, *First Nights*, 258.

¹²³ Gillian Moore, “Do the Rite Thing: How Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring Changed Music for Ever,” *The Guardian* (London), February 27, 2019, accessed July 27, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2019/feb/27/the-rite-of-spring-stravinsky-gillian-moore-disney-jazz-john-williams>.

¹²⁴ Sally Bick, *Unsettled Scores: Politics, Hollywood, and the Film Music of Aaron Copland and Hanns Eisler* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), 160.

¹²⁵ Vallas, “Le sacre du printemps,” quoted in Kelly, *First Nights*, 316-317

¹²⁶ Olin Downes, “Stravinsky Leads the Philharmonic,” *New York Times*, April 4, 1940, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/stravinsky-leads-philharmonic/docview/105377511/se-2>.

¹²⁷ Special Cable to *The New York Times*, “New Ballet Puzzles;” Marconi Transatlantic Wireless Telegraph to *The New York Times*, “Parisians Hiss New Ballet.”

¹²⁸ Schmitt, “Les Prèmieres”; Vallas, “Le sacre du printemps,” quoted in Kelly, *First Nights*, 316-317; Boschot, “Le Sacre du printemps”; Special Cable to *The New York Times*, “New Ballet Puzzles.”

¹²⁹ Donal Henahan, “Igor Stravinsky, the Composer, Dead at 88,” *New York Times*, April 7, 1971, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/igor-stravinsky-composer-dead-at-88/docview/119208419/se-2>.

¹³⁰ Allen Hughes, “Fonteyn and Nureyev in ‘Le Corsaire’ – The Rite of Spring’ Introduced,” *New York Times*, May 9, 1963, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/dance-royal-ballet/docview/116578667/se-2>; Howard Klein, “Chicago Symphony Hailed at Carnegie,” *New York Times*, March 12, 1966, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/chicago-symphony-hailed-at-carnegie/docview/117305400/se-2>; James Feron, “‘Rite of Spring’ Is Cheered at 50,” *New York Times*, May 31, 1963, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/rite-spring-is-cheered-at-50/docview/116471033/se-2>.

¹³¹ Sarah Crompton, “‘It’s a Grief and a Healing:’ Why Dance-Makers Love The Rite of Spring,” *The Observer* (London), February 12, 2023, accessed July 24, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2023/feb/12/enduring-power-dance-classic-the-rite-of-spring-dada-masilo-the-sacrifice-seeta-patel-ballet-russes>.

¹³² Crompton, “‘It’s a Grief.’”

¹³³ Jack Anderson, “The Joffrey Ballet Restores Nijinsky’s ‘Rite of Spring,’” *New York Times*, October 25, 1987, accessed July 24, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/25/arts/the-joffrey-ballet-restores-nijinsky-s-rite-of-spring.html>.

¹³⁴ Kelly, *First Nights*, 294. It was widely rumored that Diaghilev chose Nijinsky for *Le sacre* because of romantic interest (Diaghilev was gay). Months after the 1913 premiere, Nijinsky married Hungarian Romola de Pulszky, which led the devastated Diaghilev to remove him from the company and find new choreography.

¹³⁵ Alan M. Kriegsmann, “The Revolution Reborn: In L.A., the Joffrey Restages ‘Sacre Du Printemps,’” *The Washington Post*, September 30, 1987, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/revolution-reborn/docview/139292565/se-2>. Nijinsky had also been diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1919, and subsequently stopped dancing.

¹³⁶ David Jays, “Pina Bausch: The Rite of Spring Review—Gut-Wrenching Brilliance,” *The Guardian* (London), June 8, 2022, accessed July 24, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2022/jun/08/pina-bausch-the-rite-of-spring-review-gut-wrenching-brilliance>.

¹³⁷ Anderson, “The Joffrey Ballet.”

¹³⁸ Tobias Liu, telephone interview by the author, February 22, 2023.

¹³⁹ Crompton, “‘It’s a Grief.’”

¹⁴⁰ Alastair Macaulay, “A Latter-Day American Answer to Stravinsky’s ‘Rite of Spring,’” *New York Times*, June 16, 2013, accessed July 24, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/arts/dance/a-new-rite-by-mark-morris-with-the-bad-plus-at-ojai-north.html>.

¹⁴¹ Thomas Forrest Kelly, Zoom interview by the author, July 14, 2023.

¹⁴² Moore, “Do the Rite Thing.”

¹⁴³ James Barron, "Who Owns The Rights To 'Rite'?", *New York Times*, January 22, 1993, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/109251545/2EE88581C18D4DF2PQ/1?accountid=6>.

¹⁴⁴ Moore, "Do the Rite Thing."

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THE TOKYO 1964 OLYMPICS AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE

Raymond Ge

“Faster, Higher, Stronger.”

—Olympic Motto

Born in Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6th, 1945, Yoshinori Sakai was brought into the world just as the city of his birth disappeared from it. Two hours before Sakai’s delivery, the first atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima, turning half of its buildings and over sixty thousand of its residents into rubble and ash. At three days old, Sakai bore witness to the surrender of his nation. Japan exited World War II a nation on the brink of collapse, with millions of civilians displaced, its economic productivity crippled, and its government put to trial. Yet, in the short span of nineteen years, the nation returned to the world stage, its national anthem ringing out through radios and television sets across foreign nations. All eyes and ears focused on Yoshinori Sakai, now a young track talent, as he carried the Olympic torch up the National Stadium. In front of him cheered tens of thousands of visitors and athletes from around the world, and behind him was the modern metropolis of Tokyo. The year was 1964.

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Dubbed as the “Happy Olympics,”¹ or the “Science Fiction Games,”² the 1964 Olympic Games took place in Tokyo during a period known as the Japanese Miracle. From 1955 to 1991, Japan experienced unprecedented economic growth, turning into the second largest global economy only two decades after it exited World War II. The nation’s GDP multiplied eightfold, with growth averaging 6.8% annually.³ Japanese cars and electronics dominated consumer markets, and the livelihood of Japanese citizens improved dramatically as their real income rose alongside their country’s prosperity. How was it, then, that a ruined ultra-nationalist empire evolved into a peaceful first-world democracy in just a few decades?

According to numerous studies on the Japanese Miracle, research attributes the main factors of prosperity to U.S. intervention or Japan’s unique government-corporation relationship.⁴ Little attention has been paid to the Japanese Olympics. The 1964 Summer Olympics, however, was crucial to Japan’s political and economic growth during the second half of the 20th century. The first Asian Olympics, the first internationally telecast Games, and the nation’s first return to the international stage, the Tokyo Olympics demand attention and acknowledgement. While U.S. assistance helped prevent economic collapse, the Olympics helped Japan transcend its pre-war economy by preserving the Japanese national identity, deescalating national and international political strife, and establishing crucial civilian infrastructure. Finally, the Games catalyzed Japanese reception towards modern technology and art, resulting in the modern, futuristic connotations the nation invokes today.

Politics Within the Modern Olympics

Since its inception, the Olympics have always been interconnected with world politics. While the International Olympic Committee (IOC) stresses the apolitical nature of the sporting event, records of political demonstrations can be traced as far back as the early 20th century. The first occurred in 1906, when Irish track-and-field athlete Peter O’Conner climbed up a flagpole with an Irish banner to protest his designation as a British athlete.⁵

Beyond individuals, countries have also utilized their Olympic host status to perpetuate national agendas. The most famous example is the 1936 Summer Olympics, taking place in Berlin, Germany. Infamously nicknamed the “Nazi Olympics,” Hitler utilized the Games’ platform to promote both his government and ideals of “Aryan racial supremacy.” The Nazi official party paper strongly voiced its opposition against Jewish and Black participation in the Games and used the city’s “clean-up” process as an opportunity to force Romani (Gypsies) into the Berlin-Marzahn concentration camp.⁶ Ironically, support for the Games’ seemingly apolitical nature prevented the Games from being cancelled or boycotted. Avery Brundage, then the President of the United States Olympic Committee, endorsed the Games being in Nazi Germany. He repeatedly argued that “politics [had] no place in sport.”⁷ Regardless of the IOC’s attempts at defining the Games as apolitical, the Olympics became synonymous with politics by the 1940s, often associated with increased political legitimacy and international status.⁸

The Missing Olympics

Japan’s first bid for the Olympics came in 1932. Tokyo city officials hoped to advance Japanese internationalism and nationalism after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which left Japan isolated and alienated from the League of Nations.⁹ Eager to establish itself as a first-rate modern power and to quell the international criticism, Japanese officials saw the Olympics as a method of promoting people’s diplomacy and generating foreign good-will. The Tokyo 1940 Games also coincided with the 2,600th anniversary of the legendary Japanese Emperor Jinmu’s coronation, and state officials planned to utilize the Games’ celebrations to further nationalism within the nation.¹⁰

Japan persuaded the international public by catering to the Games’ internationalism. The Olympic Games had become a symbol for universal peace, the five rings on its flag representing the unity of the five continents;¹¹ however, the Games remained a largely Western affair between Europe and the United States.¹²

Japan argued that by staging the Olympics in Tokyo, the event would finally become a global movement. This proved to be compelling to both Western and Eastern countries, and the United States, Great Britain, China, and India all rose to endorse the Japanese bid.¹³

The IOC awarded Tokyo host city status in 1936, but public celebration turned sour as the country struggled to align Western tradition with its own ultranationalist culture. Japan sought international recognition yet refused to assimilate with international values. Customs such as the Olympic Torch Relay came into conflict with Japanese politics: the empire refused to allow the flame to be run across China.¹⁴ In addition, the emperor's role within the Olympics created further problems. According to IOC rules, the head of the host state must open the Games, but the Japanese government considered the emperor's voice too holy to transmit his voice electronically.¹⁵

As the IOC, Japanese public, military, and government all strove to pull the Olympic event in different directions, it became questionable whether the 1940 Games would ever take off. The difficulty Japan faced in transplanting the Olympic Games into its pre-war political context proved symbolic of its struggle to integrate into the international community. Ultimately, the expanding war in China in 1937 ended all talks of the Olympic Games. The Olympics were given back to the IOC due to reluctance within military circles to use Japan's excess resources on sports instead of warfare.¹⁶ The outbreak of World War II ultimately prevented the Olympics from being hosted until the 1948 Summer Olympics. The IOC denied Japan attendance.¹⁷

Ruin and Revival

Contrary to its pre-war ultranationalism, Japan struggled to maintain its national identity post-World War II. The unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration forced Japan to disband its military, reduced its territory to its pre-1894 archipelago, and allowed the Allies to control Japan's governance indefinitely.¹⁸ Within two weeks of the treaty's creation and passage, Japan's imperial identity was firmly quashed. The military had repeatedly

urged soldiers and civilians to fight to the death and to die “like shattered jewels” yet, the war ultimately ended with the Emperor himself announcing surrender. John Dower notes that after the emperor’s personal surrender, many of the ordinary people were left not with grief, but rather anguish, regret, bereavement, and a loss of purpose.¹⁹ Allied occupation and the rapid political restructuring of Japan detached the nation from its prior history and culture, leaving the nation without the unifying elements needed to construct a national identity.

The solution to Japan’s identity crisis lay in the Olympics, an event that merged Japan’s rich history with its post-war design. In March 1952, just one month after Japan regained sovereignty, Tokyo Governor Yasui Seiichiro proposed that Japan renew its bid for the Olympics. Seiichiro saw the potential for the nation to reinvent its national identity for both the outside world and its internal populace. He argued that Japan’s hosting of the Olympic Games would allow “the true Japan, now restored to peace, to return to the international stage and have the real Japanese, who sincerely aspire to world peace, be recognized by the people of the world.”²⁰ The proposal appealed to persons of all political standings. The liberals in power saw the Olympics as an opportunity to rebrand Japan as peaceful and modern, while the conservatives saw it as a possibility of reinstating Japanese nationalism and economic strength.²¹ To a nation searching for an identity, the Olympic effort gave the nation a unified purpose. Seiichiro’s proposal received unanimous approval by the Tokyo Municipal Assembly, and in May 1952, Tokyo officially announced its intention, both at home and abroad, to host the Olympic Games in Tokyo. Through close work between the National Diet, Amateur Athletic Association, and Ministry of Education, Tokyo mounted a series of bids for the 1960 and 1964 Olympics. Though denied for the 1960 Games, the IOC ultimately granted Tokyo host city status for the 1964 XVIII Olympiad.²² For the next five years, the Olympic flag flew high above Tokyo, a constant symbol of unity in a city undergoing rapid change.

Symbolic Reconstruction

In order to reconstruct Japan's national identity, the repossession and redefinition of the country's pre-war symbols became necessary. Strong anti-war sentiment arose within Japan during the 1950s and 1960s, with the populace shifting from patriotism around "Dai Nippon"—Great Japan—to the anti-militarist and pacifist "Nihon."²³ While Japan's economy, government, and national sentiment changed, its classical national symbols struggled to shed their wartime associations. Historical symbols such as the *tennō* (the emperor), *Hinomaru* (the rising sun flag), and *Kimigayo* (*de facto* national anthem) received international animosity. Since the usage of a host nation's cultural symbols were inevitable in the Olympic Games, the event threatened to resurface Japan's bitter wartime history; yet the Games also provided Japan with the unique opportunity to redefine its national symbols by juxtaposing them with the peaceful, internationalist, Olympic connotation.

A dark shadow of the prior two decades cast itself on the *tennō*, whom much of the international community regarded as a war criminal. Barely escaping trial and execution due to his cultural importance, the U.S. imposed Japanese Constitution reduced Emperor Hirohito to a "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people."²⁴ Much of Hirohito's authoritative power was transferred to the Prime Minister, who unofficially filled the role as the head of state. While most of Japan embraced the shift to pacifist "Nihon," Japanese conservatives grew increasingly alarmed about the erosion of the traditional icons of the *tennō* and state.²⁵ Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japanese Shinto religion centered itself around the *tennō*, who took on the role as the nation's father.²⁶ This connotation would only be exacerbated during the Pacific War. As such, much of the loss of national identity and self-confidence within Japan after the war can be attributed to the sudden reduction of the *tennō's* religious importance within the post-war Japanese Constitution.

The Olympics became a major opportunity for the *tennō* to reintegrate himself into the post-war Japanese cultural landscape. The IOC required a head of state to preside over the Games, a

role which the Prime Minister legally filled. If the Prime Minister were to preside over the Olympic Games—an event which would ultimately draw over 600 million viewers—it is certain that the *tennō*'s cultural status would be taken into question;²⁷ however, in 1962, the Japanese Organizing Committee designated the *tennō* to host the Games. Emperor Hirohito would serve as the “patron” of the Tokyo Olympics instead of the “head of state,” circumventing the legal complexity of the IOC regulations.²⁸ To the international and national public, this was an indistinguishable difference. The public presentation allowed the *tennō* to reconnect with post-war Japan through the Olympics and regain his position as the head of state. Honored as the patron of the Olympics, the *tennō* found his newfound place in modern Japan: union between pacifism and national pride.

Tennō nationalist symbols such as the *Hinomaru* (rising sun flag) and *Kimigayo* (*de facto* national anthem) also underwent Olympic reclamation. The U.S. provisional government placed heavy restrictions on the use of the *Hinomaru* flag during occupation. Restrictions ended in 1948—however, foreign animosity towards the flag persisted into the 1960s.²⁹ Consequently, the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) eagerly embraced the apolitical pretense of the Games. The JOC flew the *Hinomaru* flag as Japan's national flag and included the rising sun in its 1964 logo with little to no opposition. Even former enemies such as Cuba proudly waved the *Hinomaru* flag when parading into the National Stadium.³⁰

The Games reintegrated the *Kimigayo* in a similar manner. Alex Marshall calls the *Kimigayo* the most controversial national anthem in the world, particularly due to its nationalistic connotations. The anthem's title roughly means “imperial reign” and its opening lyrics translates to “may [the emperor's] reign / last for a thousand, eight thousand generations.”³¹ For a nation focused on repentance, the reintegration of the anthem in Japanese society sparked scrutiny both inside and outside of Japan, with some Japanese individuals even committing suicide over the anthem's controversy;³² yet, when the anthem played during the Games'

opening ceremony, the entire audience of 75,000 rose to their feet in respect.³³

As the Games progressed, the reimplementation of Japanese national symbols proved to be a resounding success. The Japanese Broadcasting Company (NHK) reported that besides the Japanese women's volleyball victory, the national rituals and symbols left the deepest impression on the Japanese audience.³⁴ While Germany and Italy both changed their national anthems and flags to separate from their wartime history, Japan managed to retain both symbols.³⁵ The apolitical stance of the Games went as far as to shield Japan's usage of its Self-Defense Forces during the Opening Ceremony. Though intense arguments surrounded the defense force's legality underneath Japan's demilitarization, even prominent anti-war Nobel Prize winner Ōe Kenzaburō praised the soldiers' efforts in the Games.³⁶

The Anpo Protests

Although Japan's negative image largely stemmed from its imperial history, the fracturing of Japanese national identity also resulted from post-war political strife. In 1959, the same year that Japan won its bid for the Olympics, Japan witnessed the largest protests in its history. Named the Anpo protests, the movement originated from the deep-seated public concern about the United States-Japanese Security Treaty. Forced onto Japan in 1951 by the United States as a condition for Japanese sovereignty, it authorized U.S. troops to maintain military bases in Japan with no specified end date. While the treaty received immediate backlash, two specific incidents in 1950 brought anti-U.S. and anti-treaty sentiments to a boil: the Sunagawa struggle, a violent protest against the expansion of a U.S. air base into Sunagawa village, and the Girard incident, the senseless killing of Japanese civilian Naka Sakai by a U.S. soldier.³⁷ When Prime Minister Kishi pushed for the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1959, many of the Japanese left opposed the bill. Discontent with U.S. military occupation mixed with the left's fear of Sino-Soviet aggression, and thousands took to the street in protest. Passage of the treaty

slowed in the Diet (Japanese legislature) due to opposition by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), who used a variety of parliamentary tactics to drag out debate over the bill.³⁸ Kishi, however, persisted, pushing the proposal through the Diet with a forced vote.³⁹ When the JSP staged a sit-in in response, Kishi made an unprecedented move, calling on 500 policemen to physically remove the opposing Communist party from the Diet chamber. He then railroaded the bill through the legislature with only his own party present and no debate.⁴⁰

In response to Kishi's actions, millions of citizens protested. Demonstrations quickly changed from "stop the security treaty" to "protect democracy."⁴¹ Students, workers, and the elderly came together across Japan, protesting in front of the National Diet, the U.S. Embassy, and the Prime Minister's Official Residence in Tokyo on a near daily basis. The protest reached its peak on June 15th, 1960 as 6.4 million workers across the country participated in a general strike, and hundreds of thousands of protesters marched on the National Diet.⁴² Ultrationalist counter-protestors laid into protesters with nail-studded clubs.⁴³ Student activists stormed the gates of the Diet, occupying the inner compound through the night.⁴⁴ The civil unrest in Japan made international news, partially due to the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to the country. Japan relations immediately fell to an all-time low, and Prime Minister Kishi resigned from his position. The treaty, however, still took effect on June 18th, and protests soon died away.⁴⁵

A new wave of political violence plagued the nation in the immediate aftermath of Anpo, culminating in the assassination of Socialist Party chairman Inejirō Asanuma, and the fracturing of the Socialist Party.⁴⁶ However, violence came to an abrupt halt only a couple months after Anpo, and Japan saw no further political assassinations until the 2022 killing of Shinzo Abe. Moreover, the Anpo protests seemed to disappear from public conscience. Historian Hiroe Suraya noted the occurrence in her field research, stating that the Anpo Protests remained "a largely forgotten history." She mentions how in one of her panels discussing her research, even

a Japanese scholar “asked [her] what the historical significance of the protests were.”⁴⁷

Quelling Anpo

The 1964 Olympics played a crucial role in overwriting the political tension caused by Anpo. In a series of political moves hidden behind the apolitical veil of the Olympics, the Japanese Olympic Committee and the Tokyo Government addressed all facets of the protesters’ grievances. In some cases, they physically removed historical sources of anti-occupation sentiment altogether. Washington Heights, a U.S military housing complex in Shibuya, Tokyo, was one such case. Taking up nearly 700,000 square meters of the Shibuya ward, the housing complex resided directly next to the Meiji Shrine. Dedicated to the Emperor Meiji who ruled from 1868-1912, the *tennō* brought Japan into modernity after 200 years of shogun-controlled seclusion from the West. A symbol representing the beginning of industrialization and modernization in Japan, his shrine attracted millions of visitors each year.⁴⁸ After 1945, the U.S built Washington Heights in its immediate vicinity. Barred from foreign entry and filled with American style homes, Washington Heights served as a bitter reminder to Japanese citizens of its continued occupation and Japan’s disconnect from its pre-WWII history.⁴⁹

The Olympics allowed the Japanese government to renew occupation negotiations with the U.S. The nation’s Olympic leverage allowed it to fight for its own national autonomy and appease the anti-occupation movement. After Anpo, the continuation of U.S. military occupation still upset millions, with no legal resolution in sight. Yet when deciding on the construction sites for the Olympic Village, the Japanese Organizing Committee (JOC) saw the opportunity to reclaim U.S. territory. The U.S. agreed to lease two military bases—Washington Heights and Camp Drake—for the Games. Japan later obtained permanent ownership of both territories.⁵⁰

Most importantly, Tokyo 1964 created an Olympic frenzy which shifted attention away from politics to the Olympic endeavor.

The event was one of the largest and most complex events ever hosted in Japanese history, and its preparation amalgamated the attention, talents, and efforts of all levels of Japanese society towards a unified goal. Engineers and construction workers rushed to complete massive plans for roads, railways, and hotels. Government officials plucked hundreds of known pickpockets off the streets, and teachers educated thousands of citizens on public presentation and the English language. At the request of the government, gang leaders even cooperated with the Olympic effort by ordering “unpleasant looking” mobsters in their ranks to leave the city for “spiritual training” away from Tokyo.⁵¹ Furthermore, the city’s municipal government had also managed to convince the city’s 27,000 taxi drivers to stop honking their horns to preserve Japan’s refined image.⁵² The awareness of the connection between Japan’s international stature and the Olympics extended beyond even Japanese working adults, with the dialogue reaching even students. Middle and high-school students published essays in sporting journals such as the *Tokyo Orinpikku*, where they anticipated the event’s development of international amity and friendly exchanges between foreign countries.⁵³ The cooperation between citizens and authority cultivated a national pride and identity previously lost during post-war Japan, allowing for the nation to present a unified front for its international return.

Foreign Relations

At a time when Japanese foreign policy was constrained by the legacies of war and the exigencies of the Cold War, hosting the 1964 Olympics was conceived as an alternative source of diplomatic power. The lack of a national military left Japan defenseless amidst a global arms race, and the Anpo protests represented the culmination of the resulting fear. Many Japanese hoped to chart a more neutral path in the Cold War, yet the continued U.S.-Japanese Security alliance firmly placed the nation on one side of the conflict. Here, the Olympics again served as a solution. Peace became Japan’s defense, and its interest rested in restoring friendly international relations with former allies and enemies.

The rhetoric of Japan as a herald of world peace wove itself into all aspects of the Games. In preparation, Japan worked closely with several sporting associations to promote U.S.-Soviet unity. The Olympic Committee managed to persuade the sporting associations of both East and West Germany, and North and South Korea, to attend the Games as unified countries. In the opening ceremony, Japan purposely placed both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R together in their Olympic march. As the U.S. tipped their cowboy hats and the U.S.S.R waved their red handkerchiefs, commentators around the world noted the act as a “remarkable sight,” praising the “friendship that [was] beginning between East and West.” The ceremony ended with the entrance of the Japanese National Team, who received a resounding standing ovation from the international audience. “Japan has worked hard,” the Olympic Commentators proclaimed, “so very, very hard.”⁵⁴

Behind the scenes, Japan utilized the Olympics to form deeper relations with foreign governments through joint initiatives. The nation convinced the U.S. to convert Syncom-3, the first geostationary satellite, into a television satellite to broadcast the Olympic Games. NASA doubted the proposal’s feasibility, commenting that the satellite was originally only designed for telephone use. The Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) persisted, however, working around the clock to solve all the technical issues in time for the opening ceremony.⁵⁵ Their eventual success enabled Japan to broadcast the Olympics live to a third of the globe, and bolstered diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Japan. When the Games came on international television, U.S. newspapers praised the broadcast’s “magnificent quality,” some even claiming that “[United States] TV Lost the Olympics.”⁵⁶ The newfound respect for Japan, both by the worldwide viewing audience and foreign governments, helped the nation regain its former international standing. The effects of Japan’s efforts were immediate. As the then governor of Tokyo, Azuma Ryūtarō, wrote later in 1965, “the Tokyo Olympics succeeded in playing a vital role in connecting the East and West in terms of worldwide peace and sports. As a result, the world began to show greater respect for Japan and its people.”⁵⁷

The improvement of diplomatic relations led to the re-establishment of national trade. The same year Japan hosted the Games, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offered Japan membership.⁵⁸ With new access to international markets, Japanese-U.S. automotive relations flourished. The year of 1964 saw Ford partner with Nippon Oil Seal, and General Motors began to work with Nittsu, a distribution company.⁵⁹ The newly generated Japanese image proved successful as foreign nations saw reliability and value within Japan's economy. An analysis of U.S. coverage statistics affirms this connection: although the Japanese Economic Miracle began long before the Olympics, reports on Japan by *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* only rapidly increased after the sporting event.⁶⁰

Modernization

While most of the six hundred million television viewers remember the Tokyo Olympiad for its sporting events and ceremonies, the Games' greatest legacy lies in its modernization of Japanese society. Before the Olympic spotlight shone onto the nation, the decline in the living and commuting conditions in the nation was relatively overlooked. Jobs, rising incomes, and corporate profits overshadowed the health and quality of life of its population. The post-war economic plan—the priority production system (PPS)—focused solely on concentrating the nation's limited resources on a few strategically important industries.⁶¹ While it revived Japan's economy, the lack of focus on urban planning and infrastructure left Japanese cities both congested and polluted. By 1960, over 60% of the Japanese population inhabited 2% of the national space.⁶² Traditionally, many companies dealt with public complaints with financial compensation and buyoffs;⁶³ however, the international tourists the Olympics brought meant scrutiny beyond companies' control. Every government official, business leader, and citizen in Japan understood that in 1964 all eyes would be on them. Japan needed to uphold its image as a first world nation.

In preparation for the Games, over 96% of the final Olympic budget went to expenditures related to public infrastructure. The

cost totaled over 800 billion yen (US\$2.2 billion), eclipsing the mere 16.5 billion yen (US\$46 million) spent on direct sporting related costs.⁶⁴ This massive spending made Tokyo 1964 the most expensive Olympics ever, when calculated for inflation and on a per-athlete basis, until Beijing 2008.⁶⁵

Public Transportation

Most of the expenditure on public projects consisted of transportation developments. A joint venture by the Tokyo Expressway Corporation and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government generated over 50 miles of new and improved roads. After three years of around the clock construction, the initiative constructed twenty-two highways and four expressways. Less than twenty years after Tokyo had been reduced to rubble, cars now drove over each other in two or even three layers as they traversed interchanges across the city.⁶⁶ The new infrastructure furthered the incentive for Japanese citizens to utilize private automobiles and acted as a catalyst for the nation's car industry. Alongside the building of highways and expressways, the JOC also organized a 25-kilometer expansion of Tokyo's subway system, widened ports for foreign ships, and renovated the Haneda International Airport.⁶⁷

The Olympiad also influenced Japan's major railway projects, most notably the Shinkansen bullet train and the Tokyo Monorail. Although not listed in the official budget, the Olympics undoubtedly influenced the Diet's approval for the Shinkansen. Approved in 1959—the same year Japan won its bid for the Olympics—the Diet set the Olympic Opening Ceremony as the firm deadline for the project. Project lead designer Hideo Shima said that when the workers expressed anxiety over not meeting the deadline, they united with the slogan, "Be in time for The Olympics."⁶⁸ In the same vein, the Olympics also played a role in the implementation of the monorail in Japan. Planning for the monorail link between Haneda Airport and the Tokyo metropolis started shortly after the announcement of Japan's successful Olympic bid. 910,000 passengers used the airport annually in the early 1960s, and railway corporations expected the number

to dramatically increase during the Games.⁶⁹ Entirely funded, constructed, and developed by private companies, the Tokyo Monorail became the first large-scale commercial application of the air-rail link technology. Both the Shinkansen bullet train and the monorail opened mere weeks before the Games began.⁷⁰ One can imagine the surprise of foreign visitors so used to European technological dominance when they were met with the fastest train in the world and a rail line in the sky.

Japan's pursuit of modern rail lines would pay off immensely during the Economic Miracle. The Shinkansen bullet train revolutionized intercity travel, allowing for a one-day round trip between cities. By the early 1990s, the rail line produced around 500 billion yen, or around 4.8 billion USD, on an annual basis.⁷¹ The Haneda airport monorail also flourished, growing to support an annual ridership of 28 million people—a 60% share of all airline passengers.⁷²

Health

Besides building transport infrastructure, the Tokyo Organizing Committee assisted in the improvement of the nation's public health. While present day Japan—with its advanced sanitation systems and high life expectancy—is world-renowned for its citizens' physical well-being, the health infrastructure in Japan before the 1964 Games bordered primitivity. Tokyo stood out as a significant health concern: sewage systems connected less than a quarter of residents, industrial waste turned the harbor into sludge, and rats infested much of the city. As a result, mercury poisoning became commonplace, infant mortality was 20 times what it is today, and around 40% of the population had tapeworms.⁷³ Much of the health issues can be attributed to the government's prioritization of industrial growth over sanitation.

The Olympics provided the badly needed impetus for government action. In preparation for foreign visitors, the JOC organized the construction of three new waste disposal plants and 360,000 meters of sewer pipes.⁷⁴ Additionally, Tokyo's main river Sumida, previously filled with sludge and emitting a foul

odor, was also thoroughly cleansed.⁷⁵ Perhaps most interestingly, international visitors caused Tokyo city officials to encourage the public to adopt Western sitting toilets. Regional officials began to instruct families to replace squat toilets with sitting toilets in their homes in the possibility of foreign guests. Thousands of households complied, some even taking out loans to meet the request.⁷⁶

The fixation on sports during the preparation and duration of the Games also boosted Japanese citizens' participation in sport and physical activity. Public attitudes translated to public policy, and in 1960, Japan's then minister of education implemented a new national curriculum for physical education in schools ahead of Tokyo 1964. The policy directions, titled "Enhancement of Health and Physical Fitness for Citizens, in particular Youth, in the Face of Tokyo Olympic Games," still impact Japanese society decades after the Olympiad. Due to the focus on lifelong sports and fitness-oriented activities, Japan in 2018 had one of the highest youth engagements in organized sports. 86% of students regularly commute to school actively by either walking or cycling, a number substantially higher than other high-income countries.⁷⁷ For the generations who experienced the 1964 Games in particular, studies observed higher levels of physical activity compared to previous generations.⁷⁸

Invention and Innovation

Japan today has established itself as one of the most technologically advanced nations in the world. Although growth has slowed in the 21st century, the island nation still possesses a GDP of 4.41 trillion USD, the third largest in the world.⁷⁹ World-renowned for its electronics, robotics, and automotive industries, companies such as Mitsubishi, Honda, Toyota, Sony, and Epson have become household names in markets ranging from cars to cinema. Much of the growth behind Japan's domestic companies come from the public's receptiveness towards advanced technologies. The nation leads the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on mobile broadband connectivity, boasting 168 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and is second only to South

Korea in robot density in manufacturing.⁸⁰ This rise in the nation's adoption of modern technology also has roots in the 1964 Games. The urge to modernize and internationalize, combined with the novel environment the Games brought, pushed Japanese consumers to buy cutting edge goods as well as Japanese companies to produce innovative technologies.

Buoyed by the Olympic mood, many Japanese bought their first television—even if a black-and-white set cost a month's salary.⁸¹ Consequently, from 1955 to 1964 television production increased by nearly 40 times, from 140,000 to 5.3 million units.⁸² Riding on the brewing Olympic mood and the mass adoption of television, the television industry exploded during the two-week broadcasting of the Olympic Games. Over 75 million of the 100 million Japanese citizens watched some parts of the 1964 Olympics, for a rating of 97.3%.⁸³ Although television had been in consistent usage before the Games, the Olympics conceived the idea of a national viewing audience in Japan, invigorating the drive for further research in television technology to capitalize on a flourishing national industry. As such, Japan adopted cutting-edge television technologies earlier than the United States. In 1964, Japan Broadcasting Corporation's (NHK) began research on HDTV—a wide-screen and high-resolution system designed to convey a strong sense of reality to its viewers—in the aftermath of the successful Olympiad coverage.⁸⁴ As of 2023, the technology still sees continuous usage across the world.

Within the confines of the arena, Japanese companies strove to outcompete traditional European companies for Olympic contracts. However, since Japanese companies could not compete with the tried-and-true Olympic European brands, even if they provided products with comparable effectiveness, they sought instead to invent new technologies. One such example is the watch company SEIKO, who saw the opportunity to enter the timing industry by outperforming Omega and Longines as the official Olympic timer. Japan had never participated in the industry until then, yet the company produced a novel invention called the printing timer, a machine that electronically timed and printed

results with an accuracy up to 1/100 of a second. The machine played an instrumental role in the decisions for multiple events, most notably the three-way tie in the women's 80-meter hurdles final. Today, SEIKO's invention is most famous for its birth of the global printing company—EPSON—the company's name a simple contraction of the words "son of electric printer."⁸⁵


Although called the "science fiction" Games, Japan invented more than just new technologies. Tokyo 1964 also saw the first ever pictograms for sports and service. Host cities always faced the problem of language barriers between countries during the international event; however, with the Games in Asia, the lack of effective communication became even more apparent. Lead designers Masasa Katsumie and Yoshiro Yamashita stepped up to the challenge, pioneering the first official implementation of pictograms during the Olympics. Together, they developed over 59 pictograms covering subjects from fencing to first aid.⁸⁶ Most famously, the team created the signs for the men and women's washrooms, symbols the world still utilizes today.⁸⁷

Conclusion

The Tokyo 1964 Olympics ended on October 24th in a manner unlike the Games that came before it. Instead of marching in orderly lines or underneath their own country's flag, athletes rushed out in a disordered manner. Some walked out arm-in-arm, some sat on their competitors' shoulders, some were carried by piggyback. Amid the haphazard Olympic crowd, one can see an Australian athlete waving her national flag joyfully on top of the shoulders of a group of European athletes, her flag not tied to a pole, but a broomstick.⁸⁸

Compared to the traditionalist and war-torn state only a few decades prior, Japan demonstrated its readiness to return to the international community as both a pioneer of peace as well as a frontrunner in the global economy. Visitors from around the world arrived to see Japan completely revitalized from its war-torn past. Now a nation with sprawling highways, color televisions, modern cars, and a polished international image, the Olympics

proved pivotal in the construction of the modern, peaceful image of Japan today. As the modern Olympic Games become subject to increasing controversy in the 21st century, it becomes all the more important to look back to young Yoshinori Sakai and his torch, its flames a testament to the power of sport and the capability of a determined nation.



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PROFITLESS PARTISANSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HYPER-POLITICIZATION OF CENTRAL BANKING LEGISLATION

Eli Solomon

While Congress was in the process of composing the legislation needed to establish the Federal Reserve System, Democrats engaged in one of the greatest political schemes in American history. Current literature on the United States Federal Reserve Bank tends to chalk up its creation entirely to the economic demands of the time period, while paying little attention to the legislation and political turmoil that preceded it.¹ In the fall of 1907, one of the largest financial crises of the 20th century struck the United States in the form of a widespread bank panic. After news broke of a failed short squeeze on United Copper, individuals began to make withdrawals from their bank accounts at an extremely high rate, but banks did not have sufficient liquidity to keep up with the skyrocketing demand for cash.² The Panic led to a 69% decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Stock Price Index from its highest point in July to its lowest in November.³ Industrial production also dropped 15%, the largest figure in American history since at least 1820.⁴ To avoid a complete collapse of the U.S. financial system,

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a coterie of Wall Street titans and robber barons headed by J.P. Morgan pooled their money to make loans to banks to meet the demand for cash, bailing them—as well as the entire United States economy—out of trouble.⁵ After the events of the Panic showed that the government was reliant on bailouts from the ultrawealthy and lacked the tools to respond effectively to the failure of big banks, it became evident to lawmakers that establishing a central bank as a lender of last resort was necessary. Several studies were presented to the National Monetary Commission, established in 1908 to help Congress find a solution to the financial issues posed by the Panic, that convinced both Republicans and Democrats that it was imperative to establish a central bank.⁶ Republicans struck first with the Aldrich Plan, a comprehensive bill created by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island that would establish a new central banking system.⁷ Democrats, who claimed that this legislation would hand control of the nation's finances over to the malevolent financiers of Wall Street, immediately killed the Aldrich Plan in Congress after sweeping the 1912 election, preventing it from even going to a vote.⁸ Two years later, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act, which was “almost identical” to the Aldrich Plan.⁹ Every Democrat voted in favor of it and all but four Republicans voted against it.¹⁰ Clearly, the cause of Democratic animus towards the Aldrich Plan was not one of policy, for a few years later they unanimously passed almost identical legislation. In opposing the Aldrich Plan, Democrats were not fighting for the economic health of the United States. Instead, they were trying to advance their own political interests by making an appeal to Progressives, a rapidly growing group of voters who had no particular political affiliation and could therefore be swayed to either party through legislative action that aligned with their ideals.¹¹ Under the influence of widespread muckraking journalism, Progressives feared the large financial powers of Wall Street with which Republicans and Aldrich himself were associated.¹² Most were “generally hostile to Aldrich and wanted a banking reform plan with far greater public accountability.”¹³ Muckraking journalism caused Progressives to harbor a strong distaste for big banks, leading Democrats to make

an appeal to Progressives by opposing the Aldrich Plan and denying the Federal Reserve Act's blatant similarity to it, politicizing the process through which the government established central banking legislation.

The Aldrich Plan was a piece of central banking legislation composed in response to the Panic of 1907. Its contents were inspired chiefly by existing central banking systems in Europe, bringing new ideas about the organization of financial institutions to the attention of United States lawmakers.¹⁴ The bill called for the establishment of a central bank, which would be governed by a board composed of both private bankers and government officials and would be responsible for issuing currency.¹⁵ The central bank would have fifteen branches spread across the country, and each bank would be responsible for rediscounting loans and serving as a lender of last resort.¹⁶ American financial institutions would thus be less reliant on the wealthy because the central banking system, not individuals, would be in charge of bailouts in times of crisis.

The Aldrich Plan was introduced at the height of the Progressive Era (1890-1920), a period in which large swaths of the United States populace adopted the belief that major political, social, and economic reform was necessary to redistribute wealth and increase working class living standards.¹⁷ Progressives lacked a specific political home; a great many of both Democratic and Republican politicians identified themselves as Progressives. For example, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson and his 1912 electoral adversary, former Republican Theodore Roosevelt, both ran campaigns that were primarily focused on Progressive economic reforms through their respective platforms, New Freedom and New Nationalism.¹⁸ Progressives, while an ever-growing group of voters, had no monolithic political affiliation.

Muckraking media caused Progressives to harbor negative views of the Aldrich Plan. Some inspired a general hatred of big banks within Progressives. *McClure's Magazine*, known for its muckraking journalism style, regularly published articles that contained sensationalized accounts of Wall Street conspiracies.¹⁹

McClure's took advantage of growing public discontent with Wall Street monopolies, funding muckraking journalism that purported the existence of a Money Trust and detailed the alleged conspiracies of big banks.²⁰ From 1912 to 1913, *McClure's* published a book in monthly installments, a satirical take on the Panic of 1907 and the role that bankers played in it by Owen Johnson called *The Sixty-First Second*.²¹ In this volume, the meeting in which financial giants pooled their money to bail failing banks out of bankruptcy during the Panic was described as the following:

The group of ten men were assembled...In five years these ten men, without the impediment of law, could own every necessary newspaper and magazine in the country...control every important industry, every necessary chain of banks, the entire food supply of the nation, and control the necessary number of 12 candidates in both political parties in matters essential to their financial interests.²²

Johnson described big bankers as holding immense power in the United States in language that the everyday American could understand, making his message extremely powerful and effective. Another muckraking publication that spoke negatively of big banks was *Everybody's Magazine*, which covered the Pujo Committee hearings, congressional trials meant to determine whether a "Money Trust" of wealthy Wall Street bankers existed.²³ Their coverage stoked fear within Progressives of a Wall Street cabal that wielded enormous power with the sole goal of maximizing profits at the expense of the working man. Muckraking author Ida Tarbell was also able to exert considerable anti-big bank influence upon Progressive voters through her writing. Tarbell was already a widely known journalist at the time; one reporter even called her "the most generally famous woman in America."²⁴ This allowed her article "The Hunt for a Money Trust," published in *American Magazine*, to quickly grab national attention, playing an important role in shaping Americans' view of big banks.²⁵ Tarbell's article was yet another piece of negative media coverage of Wall Street, increasing her Progressive audience's hatred for big banks and their desire to see something done about it in Washington.

Other muckrakers specifically denounced the Aldrich Plan, contributing to Progressives' stance against the act. Cartoonist Alfred Owen Crozier published a book full of anti-Aldrich Plan political cartoons that further lowered Progressive opinions of big banks and the Aldrich Plan.²⁶ The book's title, *U.S. Money Vs. Corporation Currency: "Aldrich Plan,"* specifically associated the Aldrich Plan with the big banks to which Progressives were already so opposed.²⁷ Political satire magazine *Puck* also published political cartoons that depicted the Aldrich Plan as a tool for big banks created by a corrupt, dishonest politician.²⁸ Muckraking magazine *Harper's Weekly* also spoke out against the Aldrich Plan, saying that the Aldrich Plan presents the "greatest and most sinister menace to the popular welfare of the United States."²⁹ Writers for *Collier's Magazine* also advocated for the downfall and replacement of the Aldrich Plan because they objected to the private sector-dominated governance board that it laid out, believing that it would allow Wall Street bankers to have outsized control over the national economy.³⁰ In so doing, *Collier's* catered to the already-prevalent Progressive fear of Wall Street and continued the overall muckraking trend of negatively portraying large financial powers and, by extension, the Aldrich Plan.

The way that muckraking media portrayed big banks fundamentally altered the belief system of a substantial portion of Progressive voters. The first modern survey of public opinion did not occur until the presidential election of 1936, so there is a lack of numerical data that represents public opinion on big banks during the 1910s.³¹ However, it is estimated that in a nation with a population of 76 million people, about 20 million of them were exposed to the top dozen muckraking media outlets at least once per month.³² Additionally, *Everybody's* and *Collier's* sold more than 600,000 issues per month while *McClure's* sold more than 400,000.³³ Logically, this gave muckrakers a far-reaching influence on public opinion. In addition to statistical evidence, there is also scholarly consensus that the media caused a widespread shift in Progressive economic views. In his 1972 book *The Muckrakers:*

Crusading Journalists Who Changed America, investigative journalist and historian Fred Cook wrote,

The effect [of muckrakers] on the soul of the nation was profound. It can hardly be considered an accident that the heyday of the muckrakers coincided with one of America's most yeasty and vigorous periods of ferment. The people of the country were aroused by the corruptions and wrongs of the age—and it was the muckrakers who informed and aroused them.³⁴

Later, in 2015, University of Maryland Professor Jonathan Auerbach wrote in his book *Weapons of Democracy: Propaganda, Progressivism, and American Public Opinion* that “Progressive muckraking” was “highly effective” in “mass persuasion,” and called muckraking a “mode of mass advocacy.”³⁵ Overall, muckraking media had an extraordinarily strong effect on Progressive sentiment.³⁶ The widespread Progressive disapproval of big banks and the Aldrich Plan surely stemmed from the muckrakers. Because of muckraking journalism, Progressives came to believe that demonized big banks were systems of oppression that were destructive to the U.S. economy.

Because of their muckraking-inspired dislike for big banks, Progressives strongly opposed the Aldrich Plan. First, they disagreed with the composition of the Federal Reserve Board laid out in the Aldrich Plan. In the Aldrich Plan, the Federal Reserve System would be overseen by a board of governors, the majority of whom would be private bankers.³⁷ Progressives feared that this would result in a central banking system that worked in the interests of Wall Street—which muckraking media positioned them to hate—and not in the interests of the public.³⁸ The *Philadelphia North American* published a newspaper article showing the extent to which Progressives believed the composition of the board of governors would damage the United States' financial infrastructure:

Absolute commercial and industrial slavery must follow the adoption of the Aldrich Plan, declare the Progressives. Its adoption would place the individual credit of every businessman and every independent corporation under the supervision and control of a committee to be chosen by the money combination. It would place in that committee absolute power to determine which individuals and which corpora-

tions should be permitted to continue in business. It would make control of all lines of industry and all commercial enterprise subject to the will of this committee.³⁹

And so, because of the proposed structure of the Federal Reserve Board, “Progressives adamantly opposed what they called a surrender to the ‘Money Trust’” and blocked the passage of the Aldrich Plan.⁴⁰ Instead, “Progressive Democrats demanded a reserve system and currency supply owned and controlled by the Government in order to counter the ‘money trust’ and destroy the existing concentration of credit resources in Wall Street.”⁴¹ Much of the Progressive critique of the Aldrich Plan was driven by the proposed composition of the oversight board, a critique that was ultimately driven by a muckraking-inspired fear of Wall Street, and their suggested reforms focused solely on changing that one aspect of the Plan.

Progressives also associated the sponsoring Republican party with the big banks that muckrakers caused them to loathe, which further led Progressives to stand against the Aldrich Plan. Republicans were widely seen to represent America’s big financial powers in the North.⁴² The Progressive Era intersected with the latter half of the Gilded Age, in which Republicans vehemently supported Northern banking and industrial interests by advocating for government involvement in the economy to finance industrial growth.⁴³ Consequently, many in the West, the “hotbed of Progressivism,” perceived Republicans as the “party of Wall Street.”⁴⁴ Most Progressives saw the Republican party as the embodiment of the financial powers that muckrakers had caused them to oppose, and were thus unlikely to support any financial legislation that they sponsored.

In addition to this characterization of the Republican party, the creator of the Aldrich Plan was also associated with the type of large financial institutions with which Progressives were at odds. In 1909, there was widespread consensus in Congress that tariffs were too high, but because Aldrich was lobbied heavily by large corporations, he instead sponsored the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, which did not significantly lower tariffs.⁴⁵ Aldrich’s refusal

to support lower tariffs because of his corporate backing led to him becoming known to “leverage his position for private gain... devoting significant time to...his securities transactions and buying a yacht.”⁴⁶ Because of the muckraking-induced Progressive resentment of the large corporate and financial entities influencing Aldrich, he was labeled the “enemy of the Progressives.”⁴⁷ Leading Progressives frequently expressed this sentiment about the senator. Lincoln Steffens, a prominent Progressive of the day, wrote in a letter to Theodore Roosevelt, “What I really object to in [Aldrich] is [that]...He represents Wall Street; corrupt and corrupting business; men and Trusts that are forever seeking help, subsidies, privileges from government.”⁴⁸ In a similar vein, a popular Progressive journalist, David Graham Phillips, wrote in a *Cosmopolitan* article that Aldrich was “rich through franchise grabbing, the intimate of Wall Street’s great robber barons,” and that his “single purpose” was “getting rich at the expense of the labor and the independence of the American people.”⁴⁹ Popular Progressive opinion of Aldrich was extraordinarily low, where they simply would not support a bill associated with him out of a muckraking-inspired fear of the potent financial entities with which he associated. Their disagreement with the Federal Reserve Board laid out in the Aldrich Plan, coupled with a strong distaste for its creator and the political party with which it was associated, led Progressives to strongly oppose the Aldrich Plan on the grounds that they believed it would give Wall Street an outsized share in the United States economy.⁵⁰ Economist Roger Lowenstein wrote that “in the interior of the country, fear of Wall Street domination would not go away. To midwestern progressives it was axiomatic that the Aldrich Plan was a tool of New York bankers. They saw it as a stalking horse for the ‘Money Trust.’”⁵¹ So, because of a policy detail and a strong disdain for its creator and its party sponsor, Progressives outright rejected the Aldrich Plan.

In order to take advantage of Progressive fervor and win over a large group of undecided voters, Democrats tried to distance themselves as far as possible from Wall Street, and by extension from Republicans and Aldrich, so they firmly rejected the Aldrich

Plan, and made opposition to the Plan a key part of their political platform. During the 1912 presidential elections, Democrats released their official platform during their National Convention, in which they explicitly stated that they “oppose the so-called Aldrich Bill.”⁵² Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson actively spoke out against the Aldrich Plan on the campaign trail, declaring “what everyone [already] assumed”—that it had been formulated by a few wealthy private bankers with the sole intention of helping Wall Street get richer.⁵³ Meanwhile, James M. Cox, Wilson’s future replacement as Democratic presidential nominee, was attracting the national attention of voters for his notably strong opposition to the Aldrich Plan.⁵⁴

Democrats fought hard for the end of the Aldrich Bill within Congress as well. On the floor of the House of Representatives, Democratic Representative Carter Glass delivered an impassioned speech against the Aldrich Plan in which he asserted that the Aldrich Plan “blazed no way...for banking and currency reform.”⁵⁵ When Congress was deliberating about the Plan, Glass and his ally, economist Henry Parker Willis, tried to flood hearings with anti-Aldrich bill witnesses.⁵⁶ Willis wrote to Glass, “Mr. Hulbert is a very sharp critic of the Aldrich Plan and has taken an extremely destructive point of view with regard to it. I think he is one of the best men we could get [to testify].” On another occasion, he wrote to Glass, “I think a good man to invite...as a critic of the Aldrich Monetary Commission Plan would be Mr. A.J. Frame... who...has severely criticized the Aldrich Proposition.” Glass and Willis were clearly determined to ensure that the Aldrich Plan would not pass the House. Joining in the chorus of critical voices was Democratic Representative Edward Saunders, who in a speech during floor debates claimed the Aldrich Plan was a “scheme which remits [control of the banking system] to agencies created by, and responsive to the system itself,” suggesting that private bankers and financial institutions would be the sole beneficiaries of the proposed central banking system.⁵⁷ Even Nebraska Representative William Jennings Bryan, “the most revered of Democrats,” put out a statement strongly condemning the Aldrich Plan during

debates on the House floor.⁵⁸ Democratic minority leader Charles Allen Culberson spearheaded opposition to the Aldrich Plan in the Senate, calling for Democratic senators to reject many of the bill's provisions during Senate debates.⁵⁹ His actions prompted the *New York Times* to run the headline "Democrats Oppose the Aldrich Bill" the following day, solidifying Democrats' strong resistance to the Aldrich Plan.⁶⁰ During debates on the Senate floor, Democrat Senator Robert Owen bashed the Aldrich Plan in an impassioned speech, which was followed by a heated exchange with Aldrich himself.⁶¹ Democratic Senator Francis Newlands also put out a statement objecting to parts of the Aldrich Plan.⁶² Democrats used opposition to the Aldrich Plan as a way to earn votes along the campaign trail, and tried their very best to ensure it never got past the walls of Congress. At this point, "opposition to the Aldrich Bill...had been a universally approved plank in the Democrats' platform."⁶³

Democrats also ensured that they disassociated themselves from the so-called "party of Wall Street" during this central banking legislation process.⁶⁴ Glass made a speech against the Aldrich Plan on the House floor entitled "A Republican Invention Exposed," in which he bashed the Aldrich Plan as a Republican conspiracy.⁶⁵ Glass not only created a policy divide between Republicans and Democrats, but also associated Republicans with what Glass painted as an extremely harmful piece of legislation. Glass's efforts reveal the overarching Democratic weaponization of the central banking legislation process at the time. As Democrats swept the 1912 elections, rather than working collaboratively to create legislation to help form a healthier American economy, many Democrats instead thought of the banking reform movement as an opportunity to disassociate themselves with their politically unfavorable opponents.⁶⁶ Democrats attempted to make their fight against the Aldrich Plan seem like an issue of legitimate policy disagreement, but at its core, it was merely an appeal to the "popular distrust of Wall Street power."⁶⁷

Democratic rejection of the Aldrich Plan was motivated solely by a desire to appeal to Progressive voters. Willis argued

to Wilson that “it was vital that the [central banking legislation] movement not be associated with Aldrich” because he was “too toxic politically.”⁶⁸ Aldrich was only a “toxic” figure amongst Progressives, so Willis’ desire to cut him out of the central banking legislation process was an obvious appeal to Progressive voters. President Wilson echoed Willis’ sentiment when he admitted that even though he believed the Aldrich Plan to be “about sixty or seventy per cent (sic) correct,” “[Democrats] would have to craft another bill with another name” because of Aldrich’s poor reputation amongst Progressives.⁶⁹ Because of this reputation, “no bill with Aldrich’s name on it would ever get through Congress,” wrote economist J. Laurence Loughlin in a 1911 letter.⁷⁰ *Banking Law Journal* author Alfred F. White argued that “the Democrats definitely disapproved of the [Aldrich Plan]...the necessary inference is that political leaders feared that the people would not approve of the plan.”⁷¹ Another scholar wrote that Democratic criticism of the Aldrich Plan overall was merely part of a “performance as a Progressive,” a political stunt performed solely to gain the votes of a specific group of voters.⁷² Author Ron Chernow made a similar analysis in his award-winning biography of J.P. Morgan, where he mentioned that, in the Progressive eye, soundly rejecting a bill associated with the “Money Trust” and big banks made “good political theater.”⁷³

Progressive appeal was also apparent in Democratic critique of the Aldrich Plan. When citing his “most prominent criticisms” of the Aldrich Plan, Glass listed first and foremost the reason why Progressives disapproved of it: the composition of the Federal Reserve Board. Glass argued on the House floor that “first, the bill confers dangerously autocratic powers upon the Federal Reserve Board, an alleged political board, and that the banks should be given direct representation upon this board.”⁷⁴ Almost every Democrat also listed this reason as their top critique of the Aldrich Plan, following the Progressive muckraking narrative of the privatized board of governors being a vehicle for Wall Street control of central banking. For example, Congressman Bryan stated that “if the Aldrich plan were implemented, the big bankers would ‘then

be in complete control of everything through the control of our national finances” —a sentiment “shared by many leaders of the Progressive movement.”⁷⁵ Additionally, Senator Owen wrote, “[The Aldrich Plan] proposed one great Central Reserve Bank with gigantic powers...but giving the banks (a private interest) control of the proposed Central Bank, a principle...absolutely intolerable to a free people.”⁷⁶ The board of governors was the primary critique of the Aldrich Plan with many other Democrats as well—Glass’s entire congressional subcommittee dedicated itself to ensuring “federal oversight” of the central bank.⁷⁷ Through analyzing the specific critiques of the Aldrich Plan by Democratic politicians, it is clear that Democratic rejection of the Aldrich Plan was motivated by a desire to appeal to Progressive voters for political gain.

Although Democrats needed to reject the Aldrich Plan to appeal to Progressive voters, they still agreed with most of its principles and recognized the need for a central bank. As previously mentioned, Wilson said that even though he believed the Aldrich Plan to be “about sixty or seventy per cent (sic) correct,” “[Democrats] would have to craft another bill with another name” because of Aldrich’s negative public image.⁷⁸ Following Wilson’s demands, Glass notified the President in a letter that his subcommittee had “formulated, tentatively, a substitute for what is known as the Aldrich Bill.”⁷⁹ A member of that subcommittee, Samuel Untermyer, “was explicit that the legislation preserve ‘the main ideas of the Aldrich bill.’”⁸⁰ As a result, the Federal Reserve Act was born, passed in late 1913 in a vote that went almost entirely along party lines.

The Federal Reserve Act was extremely similar to the Aldrich Plan. Ohio State University Economics Professor William G. Dewald argues in *The National Monetary Commission: A Look Back* that “...It is reasonable to speculate that the Federal Reserve Act...was fundamentally the same as it would have been if it had been the Aldrich Bill that reached President Woodrow Wilson’s desk.”⁸¹ The Federal Reserve Act incorporated the Aldrich Plan’s overall structure consisting of a central bank with regional banks spread throughout the country and a governance board to oversee

it all.⁸² The Act also incorporated the Aldrich Plan's proposal for how the Federal Reserve was to do its job of creating an elastic currency and function as a lender of last resort; the Aldrich Plan pioneered the idea of rediscounting loans to member banks to inject liquidity into the market.⁸³ This vision was copied by Democrats in Section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act.⁸⁴ So the structure of the Federal Reserve under the Federal Reserve Act, along with its main function, was essentially copied directly from the Aldrich Plan. The Federal Reserve Act also incorporated the same provisions as the Aldrich Plan for offering bank acceptances, one of the Federal Reserve's other main sources of revenue.⁸⁵ "The similarities extended to how capital was to be raised, dividend constraints, discount operations lodged in regional and branch banks, discounts based on legitimate commercial and industrial transactions of short duration, an asset-based note issue, and federal and democratic organizational features," wrote Elmus Wicker, a Professor Emeritus of Economics at Indiana State University.⁸⁶ So almost all of the features of the central banking system proposed in both acts were exactly the same.⁸⁷

The two acts are also textually similar. A juxtaposition of the texts of the two acts, as seen in Paul Warburg's *The Federal Reserve System: Its Origin and Its Growth*, demonstrates that the structure and the language of the two acts are exactly the same in many places.⁸⁸ From these similarities, it is clear that Democrats not only "borrowed" policy from the Aldrich Plan, but also agreed with a significant portion of the Plan that they copied word-for-word in their own legislation.

The only major difference between the two acts was the composition of the oversight board of the national bank, the sole component of the Aldrich Plan of which Progressives voiced their disapproval. In the Aldrich Plan, a minority of the individuals on the Federal Reserve's Board of Directors were designated to represent the government, while the rest were to be chosen by private member banks. In the Federal Reserve Act, all members would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.⁸⁹ As previously discussed, governance board composition was

at the core of Progressive fear of “Wall Street domination” of the central banking system. Despite this difference being the main point of contention between the two parties about the Plan, the significance of the composition of the Federal Reserve Board was greatly exaggerated. Both the Federal Reserve Act and the Aldrich Plan originally called for relative independence among the regional banks under the Federal Reserve Board, which meant that each individual bank’s board would be tasked with the bulk of the decision making for the policies of their bank.⁹⁰ After all, a great fear of the day was concentrated, centralized financial power.⁹¹ Under the Act, the boards of regional banks would have extremely important policy making duties like setting the interest rates on loans to banks, a significant portion of the Fed’s revenue stream.⁹² And in both pieces of legislation, these regional boards would be composed entirely of representatives from banks within the region, elected by member banks.⁹³ So even under the Federal Reserve Act (prior to reform movements that began during the Great Depression), the vast majority of important policy making was done by individuals selected by private banks. Thus, the policy making authority of the Federal Reserve Board was limited, deferring instead to the regional boards. As Princeton University professor Michael D. Reagan summarizes,

Bank ownership and election at the base are...devoid of substantive significance, despite the superficial appearance of private bank control that the formal arrangement creates.⁹⁴

Although the Federal Reserve Board composition was different under the Aldrich Plan and the Federal Reserve Act, the Aldrich Plan’s proposed Board composition did not, in fact, lend significant power to large Wall Street banks, and thus this difference between the Plan and the Act was not meaningful. Under the Aldrich Plan, three-fifths of the private bankers on the board were to be elected by a vote from member banks, with each bank casting one vote.⁹⁵ Of the 7,131 member banks, 4,543 (64%) each had less than \$100,000 in capital.⁹⁶ The remaining two-fifths of bankers were to be elected through a voting system that distributed votes based on the number of shares of stock that each bank held

in the Reserve Association.⁹⁷ Through this system, large national and small local banks alike had a similar say in the composition of the Federal Reserve Board, protecting the central banking system from the “Wall Street domination” which Progressives so feared. Despite the muckraking propaganda and the efforts of Democratic politicians to try to distinguish the Aldrich Plan from their central banking proposals in order to attract voters, the *only major difference* between the Federal Reserve Act and the Aldrich Plan was not substantive at all. As Senator Joseph L. Bristow said, “There was not a single criticism that ever had been made against the Aldrich central bank bill that could not be made with equal force against the bill [Federal Reserve Act].”⁹⁸ Yet, instead of attempting to reach a common ground with Republicans based on their shared central banking vision, Democrats shot down the Aldrich Plan only to re-package it themselves a few years later under another name to win over Progressive voters.

Many of the politicians who helped build the Federal Reserve Act and worked in the Federal Reserve later admitted that it was based on the Aldrich Plan. Warburg composed the juxtaposition of texts showcasing the blatant similarities between the two acts and served as the Vice Governor (now called Vice Chair) of the Federal Reserve from 1916-1918.⁹⁹ He also played a key role in constructing both the Aldrich Plan and the Federal Reserve Act.¹⁰⁰ President Woodrow Wilson, when initiating the process of replacing the Aldrich Plan, said in a meeting with prominent Democratic donor Henry Morgenthau that the new Democratic legislation would still include “80 percent of the Aldrich bill.”¹⁰¹ Wilson’s statement led Glass and Willis, the two men whom Wilson originally charged with the task of creating an alternative to the Aldrich Plan, to use the Aldrich Plan “as a guide” to craft the Federal Reserve Act, resulting in “striking resemblances between the provisions of the two bills.”¹⁰² Warburg, Wilson, Glass, and Parker, who played some of the most integral roles in the creation and administration of the Federal Reserve Act, admitted that it was based on stolen legislation.

But it was not only those who worked on the Federal Reserve Act firsthand who noted where it had originated. Years later, politicians would note the Aldrich Plan to be the source of the Federal Reserve Act as well. Ronald Ransom, former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve, listed the Aldrich Bill as part of the “origin of the Federal Reserve Act” in a 1938 letter to then Chairman Mariner Eccles.¹⁰³ Later in a 1944 Congressional hearing, the Aldrich Plan was again referred to as “the original of the Federal Reserve Act.”¹⁰⁴ Between the testimony of those who helped create it and the comments of those who have studied it and helped lead the banking system it established, it is clear that the Federal Reserve Act is based on the Aldrich Plan.

In order to continue their outward opposition to the Aldrich Plan while still putting its policies into place, Democrats attempted to mask the Federal Reserve Act’s similarity to the Aldrich Plan. Glass and Willis went out of their way to “repudiate Aldrich’s influence” on the Act.¹⁰⁵ In a speech delivered by Glass to the House of Representatives on September 7th, 1916, he vehemently denied any relation of the Federal Reserve Act to the Aldrich Plan, daring his colleagues

To show...any part of the Aldrich bill...that has been transferred bodily or otherwise to the Federal Reserve Act impliedly or in text. Why do they not present their parallelisms? Why do they not specifically cite the identical features which would give a semblance of verity to their utterly unsubstantiated assertions? It is because they know they cannot do it, that they have never even attempted to justify their perversions by a presentation of the facts or by contrasting the various provisions of the two measures...They differ in principle, in purpose, and in processes.¹⁰⁶

Later in his book *An Adventure in Constructive Finance*, Glass continued in this spirit of denial, writing, “Mr. Aldrich claimed no share, whatsoever, in the federal reserve bill.”¹⁰⁷ Willis similarly denied such a relation between the two pieces of legislation, saying in his book *The Federal Reserve System*:

1. The Federal Reserve Act was not a copy or derivative of any other bill.

2. It had little or no relationship in principle to the so-called Aldrich bill...
3. It was not derived from, or modeled after, or influenced even in the most remote way by other bills or proposals currently put forward by private sources...¹⁰⁸

This attempted denial of the similarities between the two pieces of legislation went beyond Willis and Glass and reverberated throughout the rest of the Democratic party. Democrats had a “particular determination to have nothing to do with [the Aldrich Plan],” wrote economist George Selgin in his policy review of the founding of the Federal Reserve.¹⁰⁹ While discussing his opposition to the Aldrich Plan, Democratic presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt admitted that there were similarities between the two bills, but focused on defending the false notion that there were extreme differences between them as well:

I want to call particular attention to...the Federal Reserve Act. Two different theories have been clearly represented in the Republican and Democratic parties...the Aldrich Banking Law contained what we believed to be fundamentally wrong principles. It is true that the Aldrich Bill created a reserve system, with regional banks, but it is also true that the Aldrich Bill...left many distinct loopholes for the control of money matters for political and partisan purposes.¹¹⁰

Roosevelt emphasized the unremarkable fact that there were some differences between the two plans and made a vague reference to any notable difference that may have existed. Although he barely delineated any actual substantive changes that Democrats made to the Aldrich Plan, he made one of many Democratic attempts to ensure that constituents thought that the two pieces of legislation were different. Throughout the Democratic party, it had become commonplace to try to emphasize the differences between the two acts, while denying that they had used the Aldrich Plan as a model to build the Federal Reserve Act.¹¹¹


Democrats intentionally disguised the Federal Reserve Act’s similarity to the Aldrich Plan in an effort to disassociate themselves with Republicans and Aldrich to appeal to Progress-

sive voters. And from this manmade partisanship, Democrats benefited tremendously. Wilson won reelection in 1916, defeating Republican candidate Charles Evan Hughes through a “virtual sweep of the West,” the national haven of Progressivism.¹¹² But the electoral success did not stop there. After the Panic of 1907 and the subsequent Democratic central banking charade, the Republican popular vote margin in the next four presidential elections dropped by an average of nearly twenty points from what it had previously been before finally rebounding in the early 1940s.¹¹³ “The Panic [of 1907] was...associated with a change in the voting behavior of the American electorate, away from the Republicans who had dominated the post-Civil War era and toward the Democrats,” noted University of Virginia professor Robert F. Bruner in a Smithsonian interview.¹¹⁴ The rise of Progressivism in the midwest gave Democrats an opportunity to clinch a new group of voters—even if that meant creating a needless partisan divide in the process.

This intraparty scheme unveils something greater about the nature of politics in the United States—that America’s system of government incentivizes partisanship. A 2005 study showed that political parties in the United States tend to be more powerful and engage their constituents more effectively when ideologically homogeneous within themselves but ideologically polarized from their opposite party.¹¹⁵ This idea is known as Conditional Party Government. An ideologically homogeneous majority will have the ability to enact legislation without any support from the minority, thus being able to accomplish more of their agenda and implement policies that are closer to the party’s ideological extreme, which in turn increases constituent interest in their party.¹¹⁶ Because they are ideologically homogeneous, the party will also be able to unite behind powerful, effective leaders.¹¹⁷

The theory of Conditional Party Government can aptly characterize what played out during the battle over central banking legislation. Democrats united behind Wilson and created a strong platform through their divisive opposition to the Aldrich Plan, which worked to their benefit in the next presidential elec-

tion as Wilson swept the Western states—the “hotbed of Progressivism”—in 1916.¹¹⁸ As long as the United States employs a system of government in which it is better to be polarized than unified in order to win elections and gain political power, political and societal progress will stagnate.



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THE PARADOX OF THE MATRILINEAL
IROQUOIS AND THEIR CAPTIVE WOMEN

Zhaohan (Jasmine) Shi

Prologue

February 29, 1704 was a day that Eunice Williams, the seven year-old daughter of the town's Congregational minister, would never forget. Just as the sun was lightening the sky, Native Americans, their faces painted for battle, shattered the silence of the morning with their war cries, causing pandemonium and leaving a trail of death and destruction; after disarming the men, they rounded up the survivors, culling a large group of men, women, and children from the crowd.¹ No one could tell who was going to be taken captive and who was going to be murdered. Two of the children of Reverend John Williams, the father of Eunice Williams, were killed before her eyes.² Yet somehow, Eunice and her parents were spared as they were hauled off along with 109 other townspeople and taken on a long journey, often walking 45 miles a day and trudging through knee-deep snow, far north into modern day Canada.³ As she was dragged away from her home, she

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could see flames engulfing her house. The Native Americans were known to keep some male captives alive for ransom, but Eunice, along with at least four other girls at the end of the journey, was taken to the Caughnawaga, an Iroquois tribe.⁴ This harrowing tale was recorded by her father in his book, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion*.⁵ Yet, despite the trauma and violence she had been subjected to, three years after she was taken to Caughnawaga, Williams refused offers from officials from France to return her to the white settlement; later she went on to marry a Mohawk man, had three children, and lived amongst the Iroquois until her death in 1785.⁶ While Williams's story was the only one recorded of all the females that had been taken captive that fateful day, it is known that at least four others chose to remain with their "adopted" Native American families in Caughnawaga.⁷ A. Irving Hallowell, an American anthropologist, commented that these English girls living with the Iroquois "aroused the astonishment of the early American colonists [by] the fact that captives often refused to be redeemed."⁸ Having witnessed the death of family and friends, why did victims of abduction like Eunice Williams choose to live their lives with the Iroquois? The disbelief felt by European settlers is understandable, especially in light of their perception of Native Americans as cruel, blood-thirsty savages. Yet, upon closer inspection, the reality of Iroquois culture is more complex. The fact is that embarking on a raiding party to capture settlers was a calculated risk—partly driven by necessity, both economic and cultural—as only young girls were integrated into Iroquois society whereas the men were ransomed for money. What do these decisions reflect about Iroquois culture?

Introduction

Long before the European colonizers arrived in North America, Native Americans roamed the continent. For 4,000 years, the Iroquois had inhabited the northeastern lands around the Great Lakes, in what is now known as New York and Pennsylvania in America, and Ontario and Quebec in Canada. Despite speaking a common tongue (Iroquois), five tribes—the Mohawk, Seneca,

Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga—engaged in continual interne-cine conflict; only with the advent of the European explorers and colonizers and their inevitable incursions into Native American territory did these warring tribes come together to form the Iroquois Confederacy.

In the early 16th century, Europeans began to explore and colonize the Americas. Seeking economic opportunity and religious freedom, the European settlements inevitably encroached on Native American territory. The Puritan settlers in the New England colonies drove Native Americans previously living in the region northward, which pushed the Native Americans into alliances with other tribes and even led to alliances with rival European nations, such as the Catholic French.⁹ Anglo-French conflicts became increasingly frequent as both nations continued to push deeper into the continent. As a result of this encroachment and taking advantage of the conflict, many Native American tribes began to raid settlements in retaliation and in search of captives. These captives could be ransomed for large sums, thus serving as an important source of wealth.¹⁰ Unfortunately for the Native Americans, the Europeans brought with them more than weapons and goods: they also brought diseases that decimated the Iroquois population, thus fueling the need to replenish their dwindling numbers by the abduction of European settlers. Contact among Native Americans and Europeans resulted in significant cultural exchange and even, at times, precarious peace and coexistence. However, as the colonists, traders, and hunters continued to expand in number, so did the impetus for territorial expansion. Driven by both greed and a sense of cultural superiority, the Europeans often justified their animus and acts of aggression by the vilification of Native Americans.

One salient example of such demonization can be found in Paul Le Jeune's *From the Jesuit Relations*: "The character of all these [Iroquois] Nations is warlike and cruel," wrote Paul Le Jeune, a Jesuit missionary in 1657.¹¹ While the Iroquois's war-like nature is undeniable, equating this tendency with savagery strays far from

understanding the significance of Iroquois warfare. Le Jeune's fallacy likely reflects a cultural bias, which often served as a justification for European aggression and colonization. This account is typical of many 17th and 18th-century European narratives about Native Americans. The truth of the matter is that North American Iroquois war-like tendencies were not merely a reflection of some innate savagery or aggression, but rather reflected deeply-held cultural beliefs and practices. For example, one such practice was known as "mourning-war."¹² The premise of mourning-war was not only an outlet for the grief of the relatives of the deceased, but also as a means to replenish the spiritual power that the Iroquois believed was inevitably lost when members of their tribe died.¹³ This spiritual replenishment was achieved by the Iroquois by taking captives of the losing side, including their women and children.¹⁴ Before more recent studies of Native Americans and the Iroquois investigated this phenomenon of mourning wars, however, accounts like Le Jeune's shaped the dominant narrative of the Native Americans as cruel, bloodthirsty savages for centuries. In marked contrast to this stereotype, more recent research by historians and anthropologists reveal a very different portrait of Native American culture. Drawing on a variety of sources such as the Iroquois origin myth, scholars point to various aspects of Iroquois life—including mythology, gender norms, and even political structures—to demonstrate that, far from the sanguine savages portrayed by the likes of Le Jeune, the Iroquois possessed a sophisticated culture that was often decidedly matriarchal and meritocratic. That Iroquois women enjoyed a relatively high degree of social, economic, and political freedom repudiates the stereotypical European view of Native Americans as bloodthirsty savages, whooping war cries and scalping hapless innocents that often functioned as justification for policies of continued territorial encroachment and intensified military intervention.

The reality, as is often the case, is more complicated. In the context of the complex dynamics governing gender relations and cultural norms within which these women were forced to operate, these elements of freedom and opportunity presented by the

Iroquois society perhaps are contributing factors that compelled captive women to stay. That there were powerful emotional and psychological forces at work is beyond doubt; however, getting inside the heads of these women whose accounts are recorded, in some cases, decades after the trauma of their abduction, is treacherous terrain for the historian to traverse. Therefore, as opposed to supporting this European representation of the Iroquois as savage and cruel, the practice of capturing and successfully inducting women into their society is more accurately a reflection of the powerful matriarchal dimension of Iroquois culture. The question then becomes, why did the captive women choose to stay, and to what degree did the matriarchal element of Iroquois culture contribute to their decisions?

Origins of Iroquois Captive Women

To understand why the Iroquois were successful in assimilating captive women, it is important to examine the Iroquois' motivation for abducting them in the first place. Young women were often the primary targets in mourning-wars because they believed that these women replenished the spiritual power within their community (not to mention their capacity to replenish the population) while fulfilling significant roles in social and political lives.¹⁵ The Iroquois origin myth provides us with an archetypal underpinning for much of the matriarchal nature of their society. It tells the story of earth, in its primal beginnings, being a deep dark ocean in which aquatic creatures existed; all people lived in the Sky World above, until one day, the Great Chief told his pregnant daughter, the Sky Woman, to descend and bring light upon the world below.¹⁶ Upon her descent, she landed on the back of the Great Turtle and created earth with the mud she found on the Turtle's back.¹⁷ Later, she gave birth to a daughter, and thus began mankind. As the daughter grew older, the spirits in the Sky World above sought to arrange marriages for the daughter of the Sky Woman, but all proposals were rejected by the mother until a man with a bow and arrow visited and was accepted into their house.¹⁸ The Sky Woman turning down proposals for her daugh-

ter serves as a powerful mythic pattern for the matriarchal basis of Iroquois culture; note how the man as suitor for the daughter must be “accepted” by the matriarch and the Iroquois’s matrilineal residence pattern, in which the husband goes to live with the wife’s family—both important elements of Iroquois society.

While multiple versions of the legend of this creation myth were common amongst the northeastern Indians, anthropologists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries recorded the versions told by the Iroquois. One specific version was recorded in 1816 by John Norton, a man of Scottish and Cherokee origin who lived with the Mohawk tribe.¹⁹ In this legend, the earth’s origin was matrilineal as it was created by the Sky Woman and her daughter. It can be inferred that this story reflects the cultural importance of women, especially grandmothers, as they are originating sources of Iroquois culture, and are viewed as the Iroquois connection to deeper spiritual forces of nature. Thus, when an elderly woman dies, the power of her entire lineage is viewed to be diminished in proportion to her own spiritual strength, which is derived from the power of her lineage and clan. Furthermore, without another female figure in the same generation as an Iroquois man who is not yet married, there is a power vacuum within the household; captive women were often abducted precisely to fill that void and, eventually, often gained considerable social standing and economic power in the clan. Therefore the Iroquois had the tendency to treat female captives with special care, with the hopes of integrating them into the clan to replenish its spiritual strength.²⁰ As Joseph-Francois Lafitau, a Jesuit missionary, points out:

If a captive is a girl, given to a household where there is nobody of her sex in a position to sustain the lineage [...] all hope of the family is placed in this captive who becomes the mistress of this family and the branches dependent upon it.²¹

These observations are consistent with the story of another captive woman, Mary Jemison. Recounted later in life, her story clearly illustrates how she was successfully assimilated into a Senecan tribe. Jemison was living with her parents on their farm in Pennsylvania until, in 1758, at age 14, they were raided by the Shawnees who

abducted Mary, three of her siblings, and their mother, along with a neighboring woman and her children.²² They were taken to Fort Pitt at the forks of the Ohio River for adoption.²³ Similar to the treatment of the Deerfield captives, she had to witness the murder of her family and neighbors.²⁴ She recalled this experience, saying that she saw the Native Americans who captured her as cruel, yet noted that she never saw them again after she was given to the Senecans; she even mentioned that she felt as if the Senecan women were protectors from the cruel Native Americans who killed her family.²⁵

Jemison's narrative provides a much more detailed picture of the subsequent process of integration. In her description, all the women of the tribe upon gathering around her "immediately set up a most dismal howling, crying bitterly, and wringing their hands in all their agonies of grief for a deceased relative."²⁶ She witnessed a mourning ceremony that ended with the speaker saying that the deceased spirit had sent "a helper whom with pleasure we greet."²⁷ This subtle reframing of Jemison as a "helper" marks a shift from Jemison as a victim who was violently abducted and separated from her family to a heaven-sent aid welcomed by the tribe. In an induction ceremony, Jemison was then given a new Native American name—Dickewamis, meaning "pretty or handsome girl"—and it was announced that she now took the place "of our brother, she stands in our tribe."²⁸ The ceremony then shifted to a warm and joyful celebration, with the Native Americans using "every means" for her "consolation and comfort." Henceforth, she was treated "as a real sister, the same as though I had been born of their mother."²⁹

It is uncertain, however, why only female captives were successfully integrated into the Iroquois. Anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace observed that village leaders placed the fate of captives into the hands of the clans who were grieving upon the return of the war party.³⁰ The head of that clan, the matriarch, would then decide whether to execute the captive in a ritual to provide a sense of catharsis via retributive justice, or to adopt the captive

into the clan to replace the person who has passed away.³¹ Obviously, Jemison falls in the latter group; significantly, she took on the name of the deceased person, Dickewamis, as she effectively took her predecessor's place in the clan. Wallace also emphasized that women and children are typically spared, where adult men or teenage boys were killed.³² The tendency to spare the women and to kill the men perhaps lies in socioeconomic pressures to sustain the matrilineage; if a man were to be integrated into the clan, he could not prolong the clan's lineage as his children are viewed to belong to his wife's clan. However, in the case of adopting a woman, per matrilineal and matrilocal customs, any property she may accrue and any offspring she may produce will stay within her family.

It is not difficult to imagine that the relative importance and freedom these women had the opportunity to achieve after being adopted into the Iroquois clan may have influenced their refusal to return to their previous communities. In addition, the grieving clan was not observed to wage the mourning war themselves; instead, young warriors from other longhouses who were relatives to the deceased by marriage conducted the raid.³³ These factors, when combined with her witnessing the torture of her friends and family before her adoption, makes it less likely that a captive would wish to return to her original society.

Opportunities Presented by Iroquois Life

Lewis Henry Morgan, in his studies of Native Americans in the 19th century when he was adopted into the Hawk Clan, wrote that "the children always followed the tribe of the mother."³⁴ Lafitau echoed this observation, stating that "the children were not considered to be part of the husband's lodge, but the wife's."³⁵ Matrilocal behavior is observed in multiple Iroquois societies. The social organization of Iroquois families contributed to the power Iroquois women held, and such power may have contributed to the reasons why the captive women stayed. The common Iroquois village was small and typically located on high grounds surrounded

by a tall wooden fence.³⁶ The architectural structure typical to an Iroquois village was the longhouse. As the name suggests, longhouses are long, narrow structures that can house up to 70 people.³⁷ Typically, multiple families belonging to the same clan lived in a longhouse, an extended family consisting of parents, children, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and more.³⁸ It is in the context of these longhouses that Iroquois women execute their primary work and exercise their power and influence, though not without some notable exceptions.

Iroquois men dominated life outside of the domestic and agricultural realms. They were the hunters, the warriors, the tradesmen, and the diplomats.³⁹ When men were not occupied with war, however, “the rest of the time they pass in idleness, gambling, sleeping, singing, dancing, smoking or going to feasts, and they are reluctant to undertake any other work that forms part of the women’s duty except under strong necessity.”⁴⁰ These observations were made by Gabriel Sagard, a French missionary who stayed with the Huron tribe for nine months in 1623 shortly after European contact. In the 1700s, similar observations were made by Lafitau, who spent time at Caughnawaga in Quebec, a town founded by the Mohawks. Like Sagard, he also noted that Iroquois men were seen doing “nothing except holding meetings, singing, eating, playing, sleeping and loafing.”⁴¹ The most the men did, according to Sagard, was preparing gear for hunting and building houses.⁴² Bruce G. Trigger, an editor of the *Handbook of North American Indians*, has hypothesized that “matrilocal residence was a response to prolonged male absences from their villages.”⁴³ The semi-agricultural, semi-hunter-gatherer lifestyles the Iroquois supported could be the reasons behind the formation of matrilocal residence and matrilineal succession, as it was necessary to maintain the functioning of the tribe in the long absences of the men. In addition, while this strict divisions of labor along gender lines appear to be generally consistent with that of European society during that time, it should be noted that Iroquois women exercised greater economic freedom and decision-making responsibility than their European counterparts.

By being in charge of the domestic sphere, including control of agricultural production, the Iroquois women had considerable power and influence as domestic property and land accrued to them, not to the men. Given these economic and social opportunities, captive women were often able to achieve a degree of power and influence uncommon among their European counterparts.

What follows this matrilineal succession was also a pattern of inheritance through the female side. Sagard mentions that men did not pass down possessions to their own children, but to the children in his mother's household.⁴⁴ He asserts the reason that "the fathers constitute the children of their own sisters their successors and heirs" is due to the belief that "they are sure that these are of their blood and parentage."⁴⁵ In sources, though, it is not mentioned what specific property is passed down. Since it is known that household items, such as family quilts or jewelry, and cooking utensils and blankets belonged to women, it is likely that they constitute part of the property passed down to their children.⁴⁶ It is also possible that the ownership of land enters into the question of inheritance. While the Iroquois concept of land ownership differed from more legal European definitions, land ownership is nevertheless mentioned in Iroquois history.⁴⁷ The Great Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy, for instance, states that "women shall be considered the progenitors of the nation. They shall own the land and soil."⁴⁸ Therefore, land, or a family's allocated share of land, may be passed down to their children when the mother passes away or can no longer work in the fields. Therefore, matrilineal succession is based on several important factors: the mother running the domestic business, owning the land, the women acting as heads of the longhouse, and the custom of property inheritance through the mother's side to insure that a clan's wealth was not dispersed.

In light of these facts, the story of Mary Jemison, again, serves not only to depict the importance and social purpose of Iroquois assimilation, but more importantly, to illustrate the advantages available to women in Iroquois society compared to

those offered to their European counterparts. Jemison later recounts that she regarded her Native American sisters as her family; she owned two hundred acres of land during her time with the Iroquois and, upon her death, was able to pass on her land and property to her children.⁴⁹ She also had the right to divorce or remarry as she wished, as her first marriage was with a “Delaware warrior named Sheninjee” and after his death, she remarried an Indian named Hiokatoo and lived with him for the remainder of her life. She described Sheninjee as a “noble man; large in stature; elegant in his appearance; generous in his conduct” and that he was “an agreeable husband, and a comfortable companion.”⁵⁰ She also mentioned that her second husband treated her with “all the kindness and attention that was [hers] due as his wife.”⁵¹ These are reflections of how a woman’s rights were “forever protected” in the Iroquois laws.⁵² It is likely that these freedoms and privileges featured prominently in her decision to “stay and spend the remainder of [her] days with [her] Indian friends, and live with [her] family.”⁵³

The Leadership Roles of Iroquois Women

Harriet Converse, an scholar studying Iroquois culture wrote in 1908 that:

Labor and burdens may have been the condition of the Indian woman. She may seem to have been a creature only and not a companion to the red man, yet by comparison with the restrictions, to characterize it by no stronger term, obtaining among civilized people, the Iroquois woman had a superior position and superior rights.⁵⁴

The Clan Mothers’ Council was a demonstration of such “superior position” in the social-political realm of Iroquois life. While no specific documentation proves that any captive women participated on this council, the position would almost certainly have been within their grasp. The Clan Mothers are made of women old enough to have children, but young enough to still engage in decision making; these are often respected women and heads of longhouses. This does not mean the Clan Mothers have to be the eldest women; instead, it is the women who possess “most leadership

and diplomacy.”⁵⁵ Their role is complementary and supervisory to the role of the male-led Tribal Council, which engages in community conversation and makes decisions about tribal affairs.⁵⁶ The power of the Clan Mothers’ Council is considerable as they are charged with the responsibility of appointing men on the Tribal Council, and they have the right to veto any decisions made by the Tribal Council.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Clan Mothers can also “dehorn” a chief if his leadership proves to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, Iroquois women not only wielded considerable power in Iroquois society in the domestic sphere, but in the realm of politics as well. As the primary agricultural producers and the resident cooks, women also had the power to withhold the provisioning of war parties or diplomatic missions if they disagreed with the purpose of the undertaking. These various prerogatives reflect an undeniable matriarchal dimension to Iroquois society, as these positions of authority gave Iroquois women significant power and influence.

Outside of the political realm of the Clan Mothers’ Council, Iroquois women also held important roles in typical village meetings. Since women were in charge of the internal sphere of Iroquois life, they contributed to village meetings as the spokesperson of their families, whereas men contributed more in diplomatic relations with other tribes and European colonial entities.

In addition, a Huron woman’s involvement in politics need not be as overt, as such an occurrence was later observed by Martha Randle, documented in her book *Iroquois Women, Then and Now*, published in 1951.⁵⁸ She mentions that women are believed to have spoken through male speakers at councils, a reflection of indirect involvement by the Iroquois women in politics. A different perspective on women’s role in politics, however, is presented by Sagard in his book *The Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons*. He did not observe Iroquois women to have participated in councils.⁵⁹ However, Randle comments that Europeans and colonial Americans are coming from a patriarchal perspective, and therefore “any dealings with Iroquois women are minimized and gradually eliminated.”⁶⁰ Although the Clan Mothers’ Council was one of

the few official platforms available to women, needless to say, Iroquois women were also able to exert their influence through more indirect, though no less effective, means. Therefore, there were a host of opportunities available to assimilated women to enjoy positions of power greater than they were likely to have experienced in their past lives.

Captive Women as a Potentially Disruptive Force

While Iroquois women clearly wielded a degree of power and influence rivaling that of Iroquois men, it has been argued that this was not necessarily the case for captive women. It has been argued, on the contrary, that forcing captive women into marriage was often used as a means of reducing the influence of a woman's power in the relationship by weakening the man's obligations to the wife's family, which might serve as a potentially disruptive force to the matriarchal underpinnings of Iroquois society. When Iroquois men marry, they moved into their wife's household, and became a part of their wife's family.⁶¹ The argument is that through marrying a captive woman who previously did not belong to their tribe, a man would not feel as obligated to move and integrate into the captive woman's family, but instead might be tempted to reverse this precedent by forcing his new wife to move into his clan.⁶² This would have the effect of allowing him to retain the position he holds in the family while maintaining his dominance in their relationship, as he would not need to take into consideration his wife's family's wishes. Furthermore, captive women would offer the potential advantage of meeting the cultural ideal of the Iroquois warrior, who, according to Lafitau, wanted wives who were "hard working, and of a docile personality."⁶³ Considering the psychological trauma and emotional strain undergone during their captivity, it is reasonable to assume that these foreign women were likely to be more subordinate. Therefore, there are a number of potential advantages—psychological, cultural, and political—for an Iroquois man to prefer a wife who has been abducted. While one can only assume that the matriarchal and matrilineal customs and traditions were largely respected, some

men may have been tempted by the opportunity that marrying a foreigner would provide by allowing them to leverage certain privileges in the context of this largely matrilineal system. It could be said the Iroquois men sought captive women not for what they brought, but what they did *not* bring.

Evidence, however, may dismiss this potentially disruptive force as non-existent. The narratives of captured women present them as neglecting their new situations at first only to gradually acquiesce and successfully assimilate, eventually finding fulfilling lives afforded by the wealth of opportunities Iroquois society offered. Both of the captured young women previously discussed in this paper refused to return to European colonial society a few years after their capture, and eventually married and created a family within their respective adoptive tribes.⁶⁴ In addition, Williams's story shows that there may be a misconception that the women that are taken captive automatically married the man who kidnapped them. Instead, in the process of inducting the captives, the opinion of the entire mourning clan was considered when deciding to which households the captives went. In this case, it was not the men, but the women, who held the power in deciding who the newly-inducted members of the clan would marry. It should be kept in mind, however, that since Williams was adopted as a child, she had the opportunity to more fully assimilate and integrate into Iroquois society. Unlike other adult captive women, because she had already been living with the Mohawks prior to her marriage to a Mohawk man, she likely enjoyed the privileges accorded to full-fledged members of the Mohawks. Jemison, like Williams, ended up marrying a Native American man, and freely proclaimed her love for him, presenting a portrait of a relatively supportive marriage; after her husband died, she married another Native American and had six children by him.⁶⁵ She, too, refused to return to colonial society after a few years of assimilation, even going to the extent of carefully watching a Dutch trader's movements "in order to avoid falling into his hands."⁶⁶


Conclusion

While detailed accounts like Williams' and Jemison's are rare, they should not be regarded as outlying cases of successful assimilation into Iroquois society. It is important to bear in mind that it is not merely these first-hand accounts of captive women, but rather a constellation of other eye-witness accounts and primary sources which contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon. It is not merely speculation to conclude that many other captive women were able to build strong connections with their new Iroquois families and even enjoyed a wealth of opportunities virtually unavailable to women in European society. After the Seven Years' War, the defeated Senecas, Delawares, and Shawnees of the Ohio Valley were forced to give up their captives; the Native Americans reluctantly obeyed the treaty, yet proceeded to visit their relatives daily, bringing them presents and following them as they were taken away by colonial officials.⁶⁷ Many of these captives were reluctant to be taken away as well, a demonstration of how they preferred their new lives with their adopted Iroquois families.

Prompted not by savage blood-lust and cruelty, but driven by cultural and economic forces, the Iroquois sought captive women through the process of mourning war to relieve grief for a deceased relative and to sustain their lineage, their culture and traditions by passing them down through a process of matrilineal succession. Despite being captives, these women were treated with kindness, and those who were able to assimilate into Iroquois society often found themselves in positions of more power and equality than they would have enjoyed in their previous lives. Iroquois women played roles central to the socio-economic sphere of the Iroquois, ranging from being heads of longhouses to the owners of land and serving as representatives on the Clan Mothers' Council and at tribal gatherings. These roles lay central to the power and authority Iroquois women held.

The observance of these higher levels of autonomy Iroquois women enjoyed and their comparatively equal status to men in Iroquois society can stand as proof against the depiction

of the Native Americans as savages as Europeans promulgated. The Iroquois frequently performed acts of war not merely out of any gratuitous savagery or aggression, but rather due to cultural traditions, one of which is the mourning-war, thought to relieve grief and to replenish the spiritual power of the Iroquois. It is, therefore, enlightening to observe and reflect upon the customs of the Iroquois, who maintained a tradition of matrilineal succession long before the Europeans began granting women political, economic, and reproductive rights in pursuit of a more equitably gendered society.



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- ³ Colin G. Calloway, Evan Haefeli, and Kevin Sweeney, "Revisiting the Redeemed Captive," in *After King Philip's War: Presence and Persistence in Indian New England* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1997), 3-46, 6.
- ⁴ Williams, *The Redeemed Captive*, 21.
- ⁵ Calloway, Haefeli and Sweeney, "Revisiting the Redeemed Captive," 6.
- ⁶ Emma Lewis Coleman, *New England Captives* (Boston, MA: New England Historic Genealogical Society, 2012), 59-61.
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- ¹⁰ Colin G. Calloway, "An Uncertain Destiny: Indian Captivities on the Upper Connecticut River," *Journal of American Studies*, 17 (Aug. 1983), 194.
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- ²² James E. Seaver, *A Narrative of the life of Mrs. Mary Jemison*, (New York, 1961), 37.
- ²³ Ibid.
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- ²⁶ Ibid., 44.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 47.
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- ³⁶ William Engelbrecht, "The Iroquois: Archaeological Patterning on the Tribal Level," *World Archaeology* 6, no. 1 (1974): 52-65.
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- ³⁸ Patricia Reed, "Role of Women in Iroquoian Society," 81.
- ³⁹ Gabriel Sagard, *The Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons*, 23.
- ⁴⁰ Sagard, *Country of the Hurons*, 96.
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“YOU CAN’T GO ANY FURTHER”: THE DECLINING
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN COMPUTING DURING
THE LATTER HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Renee Cai

In bold letters on the cover of the 1957 International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) recruiting brochure were written the words “My Fair Ladies.”¹ That same year, renowned female computer scientist Frances Allen began working in the languages and compilers research department at IBM, where she coded alongside large numbers of women, who, at the time, accounted for thirty to fifty percent of the computing workforce.² Like other similarly sized technology corporations, IBM actively recruited women to be programmers, systems analysts, researchers, and instructors.³ Four decades later, however, Allen walked into a thirty-five-year anniversary party for a previous male subordinate and found that, of the forty people attending the event, not one was a woman.⁴

During those four decades, the masculinization and misogynization of professional, academic, social, and cultural aspects of the computing field resulted in a substantial loss of women in

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that domain. Professional computing organizations showcased a distinctly masculine image of a professional programmer by limiting female membership and promoting male leadership, while male-centric video games and computer advertisements fostered a culture of female exclusion within the computing field. In addition, male colleagues and managers questioned the competence of women while patronizing and sexualizing them in misogynistic university and workplace settings, creating environments in which female computer scientists lacked academic opportunities and female mentorship, which effectively masculinized the field. Limited career opportunities and the development of a masculine “workaholic” hacker culture further discouraged women from pursuing careers in computing. These various challenges caused women to lose interest in computing and confidence in their ability to succeed, causing many to leave the field. Because of these phenomena, computing, which managers once considered menial work suitable for women, became male-gendered work after the 1950s, even as other professions became less sex-segregated.⁵ Thus, the latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a significant decline in the participation of women in computing as masculinized professional organizations, misogynistic workplaces and academic programs—and a resulting lack of academic opportunity, professional advancement, and mentorship—raised the barrier of entry for women and caused many female students and professionals to abandon the field.

Many gender and labor historians have suggested that the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin,” and the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which put federal enforcement powers behind Title VII in 1965 represented the “opening of the American workplace.”⁶ Historians Nancy MacLean, Katherine Turk, and William Chafe have convincingly argued that the period after the passage of the Civil Rights Act represented a “veritable revolution in thinking about race and gender and work.”⁷ As MacLean states, Title VII “became as important a resource for the

women's movement as it was for the civil rights movement" because it "emboldened women to craft" an agenda for gender equality.⁸

To borrow a phrase from gender historian Joan W. Scott, gender is a "useful category of historical analysis" through which to expand on histories of computing.⁹ Scholarship on gender in computing has generally been lacking, however. Most subfields of computing historiography focus on the labor of computing and its impact on society, as well as on important individuals and corporations.¹⁰ As historians Joy Lisi Rankin and Walter Isaacson have suggested, historians should marginalize the "Silicon Valley methodology" that focuses on famous male tech "geniuses" and entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs and Bill Gates and instead focus on the collaborative nature of technological progress and its impact on society—in this case, gender relations.¹¹ Gender dynamics regarding who performs computing labor and how society perceives computing have occupied a large segment of computing history and should not be overlooked.¹² This paper analyzes these dynamics through an examination of professional magazines and publications, mainstream and university periodicals, sociological studies of computer science academic departments and workplaces, and interviews with women who worked in the computing field during the late twentieth century.¹³

Women in Early Computing: Large Numbers, Lowly Status

Computer-based data processing began with Herman Holterith's invention of the punch card machine for the 1890 United States census.¹⁴ Because the operation of this machine, which corporations and government agencies used to process increasingly large amounts of data, required large numbers of people, many of these computing operations evolved into departments that hired lots of people. The fact that many of these hirees were women can be attributed to a number of factors, including the belief that women had "innate manual dexterity" that made them particularly suitable for the operation of these computing machines and the fact that women proved themselves to be more efficient than men at data-processing work.¹⁵ Thus, the early decades of

computing were characterized by large proportions of women in the workplace.

Throughout the late nineteenth and into the mid-twentieth century, keypunch work, a type of data processing that occupied the lowest rung on the computing salary ladder, was typical of feminized labor in that it was routinized, low-skilled, and low-paid.¹⁶ Women constituted the majority of keypunch workers, using a specialized keyboard to code data from paper into punched cards. As with other female-dominated jobs—for example, typing, stenography, switchboard operating, and other types of clerical work—managers considered keypunch work to be mindless, low-status labor suitable for women.¹⁷ Punched-card machine operators, a rank above keypunch workers, were usually men with a high school education who started out running simple, routine tasks and progressed to more complex tasks like control-board writing. The male-dominated operator career path led upward to supervisory positions and eventually to department head.¹⁸ However, keypunch workers, who were mostly female, had no such upward mobility. As one woman who worked in the computing field noted:

I knew several male operators who, without a 4-year degree of any kind, were promoted into the ranks of programmer...Keypunchers... were rarely (never, in my experience) selected for aptitude tests or invited to an interview that could have led to an elevated position. I never knew of a single woman keypuncher who was promoted into any other rank...I wish I were relating only an individual experience and not the norm, but there is evidence that this situation was prevalent.¹⁹

Thus, women's occupations in the computer field had no upward career trajectory, while men commonly did work that offered more opportunities for career advancement.

Nonetheless, female participation in the computing field remained high through the middle of the twentieth century. In 1918, the computing staff at the United States government's Experimental Ballistics Office was fifty percent female.²⁰ In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the majority of the computing staff at Iowa State College's Mathematical and Statistical Service laboratory was female.²¹ In the early 1940s, women accounted for twenty-three of the forty-nine members of the computing team at the New York

Hydrographic Project, one of the largest computing operations in the United States.²² During that same period, the University of Pennsylvania, likely motivated by the idea that few men would be available for office work during wartime and that managing a single-gender staff would be easier than managing a mixed-gender one, hired only “women college graduates” to operate its differential analyzer, a type of computing machine. In fact, a sign on the computing office’s door read “Women Only.”²³ In 1946, women comprised more than fifty percent of the programmers chosen to work on the United States military’s first computer.²⁴ In the 1950s, women accounted for thirty to fifty percent of the United States’ entire computing workforce.²⁵ Thus, women were well-represented in the computing field throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

The Masculinization of Professional Computing Organizations

During the 1960s, however, women began to be excluded from computing as the field professionalized. The professionalization of this field was a multifaceted process that was characterized by the forwarding of a patriarchal corporate work culture bolstered largely by newly formed professional organizations that discriminated, both implicitly and explicitly, against women. These organizations were, as computing scholar Frank Bott notes in his book *Professional Issues in Information Technology*, “widely regarded as the source of the most authoritative advice on their disciplines” and played the role of controlling entry to the occupations they represented, thus protecting their fields from people the organizations considered to be “unqualified.”²⁶ In the computing field, these authoritative organizations, dominated by men, generally deemed women to be unqualified to hold higher-level professional positions. Therefore, as the field professionalized, the companies within it consigned women to low-status administrative and data-entry work, while men continued to hold high-status management and leadership roles.²⁷ Thus, by embracing the masculinized culture fostered by male-dominated professional organizations, these companies affirmed and entrenched computing’s masculine identity.

The professional computing organizations that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s consisted almost entirely of men who strived to advance their careers and attain management roles by transforming computing into masculine, intellectual, interesting work, rather than the historically feminine, menial, low-status work of data processing. The Association of Computing Machinery (ACM), formed in 1947, and the National Machine Accountants Association (NMAA)—later renamed the Data Processing Management Association (DPMA) and hereafter referred to as the NMAA/DPMA—founded in 1949, were two of the most prominent professional computing organizations. The NMAA/DPMA had 10,000 members by 1957 and soon became the main association for senior staff in the computing industry. In 1969, the NMAA/DPMA had 27,000 members, while the ACM had several thousand fewer members but was growing quickly.²⁸ By reframing computing work as masculine and promoting the professional advancement of men within the computing field, both of these organizations promoted the masculinization of the discipline.

In order to legitimize what historian Clark Davis has called their “white-collar manhood,” male members of these professional organizations excluded many people who worked in low-status, female-dominated occupations like keypunching, thus distancing their work from that of the low-status female workers.²⁹ As historian Robert O. Self suggests, accepting female members to high-ranking, high-paying positions would have undermined the nuclear-family ideal, widely embraced by the citizenry and leadership of the United States in the years after World War II, that depended on a male breadwinner.³⁰ A photograph of the founders of the NMAA/DPMA shows an all-male team, with the exception of one woman, who is barely visible in the back. A 1953 membership roster from the NMAA/DPMA’s Kansas City chapter shows that only ten percent of its early members were female. Eleven years later, a NMAA/DPMA national survey found that, while seventy-three percent of its members identified as a “manager, supervisor, or director of data processing,” only two percent of its members were female. The NMAA/DPMA did not even consider membership for female keypunch operators. The first edition of the NMAA/

DPMA's publication, *The Hopper*, answered the question "Are tabulating machine operators eligible for membership?" by stating, "The association has restricted membership to applicants in the supervisory capacity"—a restriction that, given women's relegation to non-supervisory work, precluded them from membership. The NMAA/DPMA usually tasked its few female members with auxiliary responsibilities such as organizing the "Ladies Program" for its annual meetings, which included activities like luncheons, fashion shows, and interior decorating talks that were stereotypically feminine and unrelated to computing.³¹ Thus, by denying membership to those who held low-status, female-dominated jobs, professional computing organizations established a hierarchy that kept women in the lower echelons of the computing workplace.

Sexist Representation and Questioning of Competence

Not only did professional organizations and older corporations adopt exclusionary practices that left women out of the rapidly advancing field of computing, but newly formed university computer science departments and start-up workplaces between the 1970s and 1990s also made women less than welcome. This shunning of women was associated with a number of issues, including the sexist, male-targeted nature of the video game and personal computer markets, as well as the tendency of men to doubt the competence and qualifications of female computer scientists. This widespread questioning of the aptitude of these women led their male professors and supervisors to assign them uncreative and uninteresting work, causing many women to lose interest in computing. At the same time, the fact that men in computer science academic programs and workplaces frequently ignored and patronized their female counterparts caused many of those women to doubt their place within the field.

The dearth of women in university computer science departments, as well as in the world of computing in general, was partially rooted in children's play. According to the renowned computer scientist Ellen Spertus, who researched the reasons for the scarcity of women in computing, toy manufacturers market

mechanical vehicles, sports equipment, and computer games to boys and domestic playthings like dolls and dollhouses to girls.³² In addition, scholars like media psychologist Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz and social psychologist Karen E. Dill contend that the video game market calls upon “gender...stereotypes to market products to a dominant...male audience” and, in the process, upholds stereotypes about gender that uphold the “male hero” and depict women as secondary, “sexualized and scantily clad.”³³ For example, *Barbarian II: The Dungeon of Drax*, released in 1989, features a woman with large breasts wearing an extremely skimpy bikini.³⁴ In *Atlantia*, released in 1988, players can see the female character’s underwear under her short skirt, while *Mata Hari*, also released in 1988, contains a scene in which the heroine fully undresses.³⁵ The fact that these video games, which were, according to a study titled “Gaming as a Gateway to ICT [Information and Communication Technology] Careers,” often a “gateway” and a “starting point for the study of computer science and related technical fields,” were generally marketed to males and frequently propagated sexist tropes, circumscribed the extent to which women engaged in video gaming.³⁶ According to a 1982 study by sociologist Sidney J. Kaplan, only twenty percent of video gamers in arcades were female.³⁷ Similarly, according to a 1988 study by the Nintendo corporation, a major producer of video games, only twenty-seven percent of Nintendo Entertainment System players in the United States were female.³⁸ Thus, because of the male-focused, often misogynist nature of video and computer games, this great “gateway” to the computer science field was restricted to mostly males.

The stereotype that computing was appropriate for men but not for women was also reinforced by 1970s and 1980s advertisements for personal computers. A 1977 advertisement for the Apple II, one of Apple’s first personal computers, features a man using the computer while a woman, preparing food in the kitchen, looks on.³⁹ Similarly, a Radio Shack advertisement from the same period features a man using a personal computer at the kitchen table while a woman in the background watches as she prepares food.⁴⁰ A 1980 Apple advertisement features a young

boy and his father playing with a personal computer in a store while the mother watches from the background.⁴¹ A 1982 IBM advertisement likewise features a smiling young boy typing on a personal computer while his parents look on. The mother is the only person in the image who is not touching the computer.⁴² A 1983 advertisement for a Commodore 64 personal computer depicts a similar situation: a young boy at the keyboard, the father holding a software manual, and the mother, the only person in the image who is not engaged with the operation of the machine, observing from the side.⁴³ These examples are not anomalies; a number of studies have noted the male-centric, often sexist nature of computer advertising, which frequently depicted men as active users of the products while portraying women as more passive.⁴⁴ This type of gendered portrayal was certainly prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, when advertisements in which only males are shown interacting with the computer bolstered the idea that computing was appropriate for men but not for women.

The notion that women did not belong in the computing field fostered the persistent questioning by many male computer scientists of the competence and qualifications of their female colleagues. According to a female computer science graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the early 1980s, a male colleague once told her, "You'll never make it through MIT. You're too feminine."⁴⁵ According to another woman at MIT during the same period, a male colleague declared, "Women aren't concerned with technical details."⁴⁶ A study titled "Women and Computers: Effects of Stereotype Threat on Attribution of Failure" found that such underestimation of women's computing competence was widespread.⁴⁷ In addition, male students questioned their female colleagues' credentials by suggesting that they were accepted into graduate school only because of gender-based affirmative action or because a professor was in love with them.⁴⁸ A woman studying computer science at Carnegie Mellon University in the 1990s recalled, "The guys...say, 'Just because you're a girl, you got accepted.'"⁴⁹ According to another female student at Carnegie Mellon, a male student suggested that women were there just to "make our computer science department look better"

and that professors “don’t really expect [women] to be able to code.”⁵⁰ In fact, in a study of Carnegie Mellon students conducted by researchers Jane Margolis and Allan Fisher between 1995 and 1999, one quarter of the female computer science students interviewed had heard comments that implied that they were admitted only because they were women.⁵¹ Such comments negatively affected many women’s views of their place within the computing field. For instance, according to Margolis and Fisher, thirty-three percent of female students at Carnegie Mellon thought that they may have been admitted because of their gender, indicating that they believed that they were not otherwise qualified.⁵² Thus, the fact that many men in the computing field often questioned the competence and qualifications of their female colleagues led many women to question those qualities in themselves.

The male questioning of women’s competence in computer science schools and workplaces also came in the form of assigning female students and employees uncreative and uninteresting work that caused a decline in their interest in the subject. Graduate school research supervisors and professors, who were overwhelmingly male, tended to assign women “menial tasks” like proofreading or simple data processing. According to an article published in *The Boston Globe* in 1983, “Computer engineering is dominated by men and is seen as a male activity by students while ‘the clerical end of things’ is seen as a female activity.”⁵³ Having been assigned such menial tasks, many women came to view computer science as boring. For instance, a study that the American Association of University Women conducted between 1998 and 2000 found that girls tended to view computer science as “unchallenging” and “tedious”—perceptions that caused them to eschew the field.⁵⁴ Thus, by impeding women’s access to interesting computer-related work, the widespread view among males that women were incompetent at computer science decreased women’s interest in the subject.

Doubtful of women’s competence, men in computing often ignored or patronized their female colleagues, causing them to question their place within the field. In the words of a female computer scientist at MIT during the early 1980s, “I have been

ignored, constantly interrupted, and talked over in meetings as if I weren't there."⁵⁵ Another woman at MIT during the same period stated, "I have been excluded from discussions. I even had two people with whom I was trying to have a meeting pull their chairs together and start talking to each other as if they'd forgotten I was in the room."⁵⁶ One female computer science undergraduate recalled that, when she visited a graduate school to which she had been accepted, the male graduate student with whom she was discussing the school addressed his answers to her questions to the male prospective student who was also at the meeting.⁵⁷ Another female graduate student at MIT recalled being physically pushed away from a computer by a male colleague on several occasions, as if she were not there.⁵⁸ When they were not being ignored, these women were often being belittled. One female graduate student at MIT complained that male peers spoke to her like she had "little or no knowledge of computer science," as if she were "a high school student rather than a colleague."⁵⁹ Moreover, when a female student would ask a male colleague for help with a task, the male would often take over without explaining to the female how she could do it herself, thereby implying that the woman would not be able to understand the explanation or complete the undertaking even with assistance.⁶⁰ As a result of being frequently ignored and patronized, many female computer scientists felt that they would never be accepted by their male colleagues and that there was no place for them in the computing field.⁶¹

Social Alienation and Sexualization

For many women, the belief that there was no place for them in the computing field included the feeling that there was no place for them in "semi-social gatherings" with their male colleagues, as these get-togethers tended to emphasize traditionally masculine activities.⁶² Andy Hertzfeld, a software engineer at Apple, recalled that, in the early days of the company, employees would often engage in such activities, including playing with radio-controlled cars, "go[ing] outside to see the maiden voyage of the latest plane," and playing tag with Nerf balls "at least once

a day.”⁶³ Finding it difficult to participate in these male-inclined activities, many women in the computer science field felt out of place. As Spertus notes, they would also frequently decline to go out drinking with male colleagues because they felt uncomfortable when the men made “lewd remarks after a few drinks.”⁶⁴ As one woman studying computer science in the 1990s remarked: “Being female is scary in this program. First you feel alone, and you don’t know who to go to, and you don’t know who to talk to. You just feel weird because you see the immediate bonding between other people, just male bonding...And you just feel like you’re in a minority.”⁶⁵ Such statements demonstrate how the male-dominated nature of social gatherings within the computing field alienated many women within that domain.

Many women in the computing field also felt uncomfortable attending trade shows, where companies introduced and presented much of the industry’s cutting-edge technology. The few women at these shows were usually models whom companies hired to attract men to products and booths.⁶⁶ At a Computer Dealers’ Exhibition (COMDEX) in 1989, the technology company Fujitsu hosted an Arabian Nights-themed event for which it hired women to entertain attendees in particularly denigrating ways. According to an article describing the event, a Fujitsu executive was “carried around on a golden throne...as his ‘favorite’ women danced suggestively in front of him,” after which “[a] ‘harem’ of chained ‘slave girls’ was brought in front of the crowd and ‘auctioned off,’” with two of these women being “‘sold’ and carried away kicking over the shoulders of male attendants.”⁶⁷ The women who did attend trade shows as computer professionals were sometimes denied admittance by security guards who doubted their credentials. In addition, they were often mistaken for prostitutes and, as a result, were sometimes ejected from nearby hotels.⁶⁸ The resultant reluctance of many women to attend these events took a professional toll. As one female computer scientist who joined the field in the 1960s recalls, “Most of the original information concerning the PCs was from trade shows.”⁶⁹ Thus, the fact that many women felt uncomfortable attending computer trade shows put them at a distinct professional disadvantage within the computing field.

The disinclination of many women in the computing field to attend social and professional gatherings was heightened by the fact that men often sexualized their female counterparts in both the university and the workplace, thereby objectifying them and making them anxious and fearful about interacting with their male colleagues. Men frequently interpreted casual interactions with their female colleagues as possibly romantic situations, leaving women wondering whether the men had any interest in discussing technical or professional matters with them or if they viewed them merely as romantic and sexual objects. Women found that even normal gestures, such as “looking [a man] directly in the eyes,” “smiling while talking,” or “leaning back” in a chair could be perceived as “come-ons.”⁷⁰ This constant misinterpretation of their actions made women nervous about being alone with, or surrounded by, their male colleagues. As one female computer scientist at MIT in the early 1980s said: “I find that I have a sense of anxiety all the time here. Because I never know who’s going to decide that I’m ‘available,’ I’m not comfortable away from my desk, and I find it difficult to talk to male graduate students.”⁷¹ Another woman who attended MIT during the same period stated: “These situations have made me stop talking to male faculty members and fellow graduate students. Any approach made to me by male faculty members or graduate students I view with great suspicion.”⁷² As a result of such situations, women felt hesitant and uncomfortable joining technical discussions with their male peers, which made them feel like they were missing an important aspect of their education.⁷³ They also avoided encounters with professors that could be misconstrued as romantic because, as one female graduate student at MIT noted, they were afraid that “personal attention from a faculty member” could “threaten their professional image.”⁷⁴ As another female MIT student stated, “I don’t have the time and energy to be constantly having to ‘defend’ myself while I am trying to get work done on my thesis.”⁷⁵ Statements like this exemplify the way that unwanted sexual advances prevented women in the computing field from focusing on their work or their studies, thus putting them at a disadvantage both professionally and academically.

Some sexualized encounters were particularly explicit and aggressive. In fact, research has shown that sexual harassment of women is a pervasive problem in computer science academic programs.⁷⁶ Female students frequently received obscene mail from male students and encountered pictures of nude women on display in common spaces. Women who worked as teaching assistants at MIT recall male graduate students bursting into their lectures asking for telephone numbers and male undergraduate students asking them to sit on their laps. One woman at MIT recalled that, when she joined a team, she “received an anonymous message saying, ‘Looks like there is a hot item in the department.’”⁷⁷ Male computer scientists would often touch their female colleagues inappropriately, grabbing and tickling them and rubbing their shoulders and neck. One female MIT graduate recalled, “While talking with a male colleague in my office, he suddenly placed his hand on my breast and said he liked me.”⁷⁸ Such incidents characterize the explicit, forceful nature of some of the sexualized encounters to which men subjected women in the computing field.

Even in computer-related educational materials, obscenity and sexism was on prominent display. For example, the 1979 edition of *101 BASIC Computer Games*, which was one of the first computer books with over one million in sales and which *Time* magazine called “the single most influential book of” that particular era of computing, contains a computer program called UGLY, which produces an image of “an ugly woman,” who is illustrated as fat, and allows the user to change the measurements of the woman’s breasts, waist, and hips.⁷⁹ Thus, UGLY is yet another example of how many men in the male-dominated world of computing objectified women. Similarly, information technologist Theodor H. Nelson’s 1974 book *Computer Lib*, which the renowned technology journalist Steven Levy once referred to as the “the epic of the computer revolution, the bible of the hacker dream,” includes an image of a nude woman composed of keyboard symbols like dollar signs and forward slashes.⁸⁰ In her article “Misogyny and the Making of the Tech Fratriarchy,” Joy Lisi Rankin, a scholar of gender and technology, argues that such obscene “computer representations of women serve[d] to enforce the norm that women give their bodies and

reproductive labor to men, whereas men take the power, prestige, and wealth associated with computing.”⁸¹ The enforcement of this norm, Rankin contends, cultivated a “tech fratriarchy” of which misogyny and hostility against women was a key component.⁸² Sexist representations of women in computer-related educational materials fostered the development of this fratriarchy, reinforcing the male-dominated nature of the computing field.

Lack of Opportunity, Advancement, and Mentorship

Because of the misogyny and hostility that they faced within the computing field, female computer science students had fewer academic opportunities than their male counterparts. According to a study of the experience of female computer science graduate students and researchers at MIT in the early 1980s, many male faculty members refused or were reluctant to supervise female students, provide them with financial support, “or allow them to work on interesting and important problems.”⁸³ The same report noted that, at most universities, there was only one professor who worked on any particular type of research. Thus, if a female student’s professor did not treat her with support and respect, she would often be compelled to change her school, research group, or field of study. When a woman would leave a research group because of such issues, departmental faculty would often deem her incompetent rather than acknowledge that the faculty member did not adequately support her. Ultimately, in response to being discriminated against and uncomfortable interacting with male peers, many women withdrew from research groups or chose a topic that allowed them to work more independently, which meant that they did not receive the learning opportunities that came with working in a group.⁸⁴ Thus, in a number of ways, the sexism and antagonism that female computer science students faced caused them to have fewer academic opportunities than their male colleagues.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as in the 1950s and 1960s, male bosses promoted relatively few women to management positions.⁸⁵ Frances Allen, a female computer scientist who entered

the field in the 1950s and would eventually become one of the most prominent female figures in the field, recalls: “By tradition, much of management has been white males—at that time [in the 1970s], for sure. Women just hit glass ceilings everywhere...It was very clear that women were not going to succeed in [the 1970s]. That was the first time I really hit ‘you can’t go any further.’... [T]here was no possibility on the executive side, beyond the first line.”⁸⁶ Another female computer scientist who worked during the 1990s recalls: “There were absolutely very few women that I worked with, and for years and years I found myself in conference rooms where we were meeting to design something, and I would be the only woman in the room for a really, really long time. Even now, when I look at my peers, at my managers, I am the only woman.”⁸⁷ In the early days of Apple, one employee sarcastically noted that receiving a promotion “wasn’t a matter of talent or technical skill” or “of working harder” or being “more productive”; instead, it was about having a “fairly prominent” mustache.⁸⁸ Such recollections underscore the persistent gender disparity in management roles within the computing industry from the 1950s through the 1980s.

As a result of this social alienation and lack of support from male colleagues and faculty members, women studying computer science lacked good mentorship. In her 1991 article “Why Are There So Few Female Computer Scientists?,” Spertus contended that thesis supervisors usually devoted less time and energy to female students. In some cases, she noted, male faculty members were hesitant to work closely with female students because they were concerned that they would be perceived as engaging in romantic relationships.⁸⁹ Similarly, according to interviews that Margolis and Fisher conducted with female computer science students at Carnegie Mellon in the mid and late 1990s, many women “felt lost, unsupported, unconnected, and unable to bolster their own sense of belonging in the field.”⁹⁰ As one woman who studied computer science in the early 1990s recalls: “I only had one female professor. I still remember that I thought she was amazing and a trend-setter—and it was unusual...I looked at her, and I thought, ‘Maybe this was something I could do, too’...Seeing that representation was definitely something that made me

wonder whether I could do more, whether I should try it out.”⁹¹ However, in 1995, shortly after this woman graduated, only five percent of full-time computer science faculty and approximately ten percent of associate computer science faculty in American universities were women.⁹² In their 1997 book *Talking about Leaving: Why Undergraduates Leave the Sciences*, scholars Elaine Seymour and Nancy M. Hewitt argue that a strong relationship with a faculty member is particularly important to female students, as facing “the prospect of four years of isolation and male hostility on the one hand, and the abrupt withdrawal of familiar sources of praise, encouragement, and reassurance by faculty on the other,” is discouraging.⁹³ Thus, women’s lack of mentorship within the computing field, largely the result of the failure of their male colleagues and faculty members to offer sufficient support, had a profoundly negative effect on women studying computer science.

In the computing workplace, many women in the 1980s and 1990s lacked female role models and mentors who could help them navigate the specific challenges that they faced as women in this field. According to Frances Allen, this deficit was largely due to the fact that many women who entered computing during the “golden era” of that decade had left the industry or were retiring, and few women had entered the field during the 1960s and 1970s.⁹⁴ As one woman who began coding in the early 1980s recalls: “I was grappling with the balance of personal commitments and what I thought the job required to continue to advance, and I looked around, and tried to find a mentor, someone who could relate specifically to my personal challenges...and I couldn’t find one.”⁹⁵ This recollection exemplifies the difficulty that many women in the computing industry faced in finding female mentors and role models in the workplace.

The Masculinity of Hacker Culture

Another challenge that women in the computing field faced was the masculine “hacker” culture that emerged in university computer science departments and start-up workplaces from the late 1970s through the 1990s and that eventually upended the

traditional professionalism, epitomized by professional associations like the NMAA/DPMA, of the 1950s and 1960s. From its inception, this hacker culture was, as computing scholar Nathan Ensmenger states, “a distinctively masculine identity” that was associated with computer programmers—almost always men—who were obsessed with coding and would often miss meals and forgo sleep in order to focus on their “holy calling.”⁹⁶ As Ensmenger states in his article “Beards, Sandals, and Other Signs of Rugged Individualism’: Masculine Culture within the Computing Professions,” the main sites for the “cultural formation and dissemination” of this nascent hacker culture were the homosocial university computer centers where male computer science majors often bonded.⁹⁷ Because of its male-centric nature, women were generally excluded from hacker culture and thus from an increasingly substantial aspect of the computing field.

One characteristic of hacker culture that was particularly alienating to women was its time-intensive nature. According to Margolis and Fisher, many students described hackers as “living and breathing the world of computing” and having a “monitor tan” from spending so much time in front of a computer. These researchers note that, according to an electronic bulletin board at Carnegie Mellon, the acronym of the School of Computer Science (SCS) stood for “Sleep, Code, Sleep.”⁹⁸ In computer start-up companies, employees often spent long nights and holidays transfixed by their computers. Andy Hertzfeld, an early Apple employee, recalls, “I was used to coming back to the lab at Apple after dinner, to see if anything interesting was going on and working on various extra-curricular projects ... even though it was starting to get late.”⁹⁹ Hertzfeld also remembers engaging in intense all-nighters with his male colleagues and says that Burrell Smith, a male computer engineer who designed the motherboard for the Macintosh computer, “liked to do intensive design work over the Christmas break.”¹⁰⁰ These anecdotes demonstrate the time-intensive nature of hacker culture, which, for reasons described below, generally prevented women from participating in that culture.

Women, who often have familial duties and obligations that make them unable to work long, sporadic hours or to devote all of their time and energy to computing, were generally unable or unwilling to participate in this time-intensive hacker culture.¹⁰¹ As one female programmer who began her twenty-seven-year career in the 1960s recalls, “The hours were usually not the standard nine to five.”¹⁰² Another female programmer, a mother of six, says:

We haven’t made it easy for women. The work-life balance has been extremely tough for me throughout my career. I think other industries are just less intense. So when I see women who are beginning to have families or dealing with older parents, whatever it may be, I know they are going to struggle, because I know we demand a lot from them...I started out as a developer and literally coded day and night.¹⁰³

When this woman got married and had children, she had to switch away from computer programming and into a business analyst and project management role, which was less demanding timewise. She states:

You see a higher concentration of women in roles like business analysts as opposed to developers...They’re not the ones delivering the code... and they are not the ones that have to do the support overnight and over the weekend when things don’t work. When I switched tracks, that was also something that I considered, which it was hard for me to do weekend support or nighttime support...So I switched tracks midway and stopped coding.¹⁰⁴

Another female programmer who has been coding since the 1990s says that women “are moving away from technical and into more soft-skill roles, probably due to family reasons...If you are not hard-core into technology then your job is less demanding, which means you have better flexibility spending time with your family.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, the fact that women often have more familial obligations than men do generally prevented women from participating in hacker culture, which became such an integral part of the computing field.

In their interviews with female computer science students at Carnegie Mellon in the mid and late 1990s, Margolis and Fisher found that most female computer science students felt that they did not fit into hacker culture. More than two-thirds of the 51 women

interviewed felt that they were not a part of the hacker stereotype, and a fifth of them “question[ed] whether they belong[ed] in computer science” because they were not as intensely invested in the field as their male peers were.¹⁰⁶ In the words of a female junior: “When I have free time, I don’t spend it reading machine learning books or robotics books like these other guys here. It’s like, ‘Oh my gosh, this isn’t for me.’...I’m just not like [hackers] at all; I don’t dream in code like they do...I have that kind of feeling like, ‘What? Do I belong in this major if they love programming that much?’... Am I in the right department?”¹⁰⁷ One interviewee contended that she was not willing to “sacrifice the rest of my life for computing,” even though “there are quite a few guys that do.”¹⁰⁸ Indeed, a 2000 report on women in computer science found that many women “are turned off by technical careers that they view as full of geeky guys...who toil at keyboards for hours.”¹⁰⁹ As one of the young girls who was interviewed for this report contended: “Girls have other priorities.”¹¹⁰ Ultimately, those other priorities kept many women out of the computing field. As an associate professor of computer science at Worcester Polytechnic Institute stated in a 1998 article titled “Fewer Women Select Computer Science Field,” “It is well known that the entry level into computer science is hacking around...but women don’t hack.”¹¹¹ Thus, interviews with women in the late twentieth century showed that, because they generally did not identify with the immersive nature of hacker culture, they often felt alienated not only from that specific culture but also from the field of computing as a whole.

Declining Confidence, Interest, and Participation

As a result of these numerous challenges, many women in computing lost both confidence in their ability to succeed and interest in the field. As a female student studying computer science in the 1990s stated: “I enjoy computer science, but it’s not my life...Part of it is a confidence thing...when you feel like you are not as good at things, you lose a little bit of interest.”¹¹² With their work constantly undervalued, many women began to believe that they were incompetent and thus ended up accomplishing less

than if they had been given the same encouragement as their male peers.¹¹³ In a 1997 study titled “A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance,” social psychologist Claude Steele found that when women faced low expectations and negative gender-based stereotypes in STEM fields, not only did they become less interested in the field, but their academic performance also declined. In his study, Steele gave high-achieving men and women a difficult math test. He found that when women were told that the test results represented a gender difference, the women’s test scores dropped, whereas women who were not told there was a gender difference performed better on the test.¹¹⁴ The sexist stereotypes that permeated the computing field negatively affected the performance of many women in the same way.

As a result of these negative gender-based stereotypes, many female computer scientists left the field. One female computer scientist who worked at MIT during the early 1980s stated: “Stereotypes make it harder for me to work here because they reinforce the idea that I can’t be a good engineer. This attitude is pervasive. It affects other people’s behavior towards me as well as my own self-image.”¹¹⁵ According to a report on the experience of female computer science graduate students and researchers at MIT in the early 1980s, many women who were very capable and could have made significant contributions to the field became so frustrated with this pervasive sexism and the “unacceptable burden” that it placed on them that they changed their field of study or left university altogether, resulting in fewer women remaining in the computing field.¹¹⁶ For instance, in 1995, there were only seven female computer science students in the entire first-year class at Carnegie Mellon.¹¹⁷ Six of these seven students had made the dean’s list. The next year, however, four of these students left computer science.¹¹⁸ In fact, a study conducted at Carnegie Mellon in the late 1990s found that thirty percent of female computer science students dropped out of the program, as opposed to twelve percent of male students.¹¹⁹ The high rate at which women left computing academic programs and workplaces, which was largely due to the pervasive sexism they faced, led to the dearth of women in the computing field.

This decline in female participation in computer science academic programs was evident on a national level during the last fifteen years of the twentieth century. After peaking at thirty-seven percent in 1984, the percentage of bachelor's, master's, and doctorate degrees in computer science earned by women began to decrease significantly in the late 1980s and continued to decline during the 1990s to twenty percent in 2006.¹²⁰ A nationwide survey of college freshmen administered between 1971 and 2015 shows that the percentage of female students entering college who planned to major in computer science peaked in 1982 at slightly more than four percent, declining to one percent by 1987 and remaining around that level until 2001, when it decreased even further.¹²¹ This sudden and sustained decrease in female participation did not occur in any other field. Indeed, between 1966 and 2000, the percentage of bachelor's degrees earned by women in engineering, psychology, physical sciences, social sciences, and biological and agricultural sciences, as well as in the science and engineering field as a whole, increased or remained steady almost every year, as did the proportion of law school and medical school degrees awarded to women.¹²² Furthermore, in each year throughout this period, the percentage of male students entering college interested in computer science, which peaked at six and a half percent in 1999 and 2000, was higher than the proportion of female entering students interested in the field.¹²³ Thus, not only did the percentage of degrees earned by women in computer science experience a sharp, protracted decline, but it did so when the proportion of degrees earned by women in other fields, as well as male interest in computer science, was increasing, indicating that the forces that were driving the decline in female academic participation were unique to the computing field.


A similar pattern of declining female participation emerged in the computing workforce. In 1987, the proportion of women in this workforce reached thirty-eight percent, the highest share since the early 1970s, after which it declined to twenty-eight percent by 2006.¹²⁴ Such sustained declines in women's workforce participation did not occur in other fields. Between 1960 and 2000, the percentage of jobs held by women in engineering and

the chemical and material science field increased each decade. In addition, between 1970 and 2000, the percentage of jobs held by women in mathematics and in the life and physical science field increased each decade.¹²⁵ Between 1960 and 2000, the proportion of female workers in the United States labor force as a whole generally maintained an upward trajectory, experiencing only a few minor dips.¹²⁶ Thus, as with the proportion of degrees earned by women in computer science, the proportion of computing jobs held by women decreased at the same time that women were making gains in other professional fields and in the overall labor force, indicating that the phenomena that were propelling the decline in women's workforce participation were unique to the computing industry.

Conclusion: Women and the Histories of Computing

There is not one history of computing, as historian Michael S. Mahoney asserts in his 2005 article "The Histories of Computing(s)."¹²⁷ When one considers gender throughout the contours of computing history, the story of the field becomes even more mixed. At the intersection of gender history, computing history, and labor history lies a crucial contradiction: even as the American workplace began to open to women in the 1960s, the world of computing began to close to women for extralegal cultural reasons.¹²⁸ Prior to the 1960s, when computing was deemed a menial task, women had a significant presence in the profession. From the 1960s through the 1990s, however, the field masculinized as professional organizations, computer science departments, and computing workplaces—from established companies like IBM to upstarts like Apple—either explicitly created barriers that excluded women or implicitly excluded women through behavior that brought women's qualifications and competence into question while sexualizing and patronizing them. Additionally, women faced limited career opportunities, had difficulty finding mentors and role models, and were excluded from the masculine hacker culture that came to define the computing environment in universities and workplaces.

The result of the masculinization and misogynization of computing was an environment in which women felt unsupported, unappreciated, unconnected, and unsure of themselves and of their place within the field. Faced with pervasive sexism and often stymied in their efforts to make substantial contributions, many women lost both their confidence and their interest in computing. As one woman described her experience studying computer science at Carnegie Mellon in the 1990s: “You have this bridge you have to walk over, and you just don’t look down...There were cases when I started looking down, and it was really scary. I’d think, ‘WHY am I putting myself through this?’”¹²⁹ While this particular woman persevered and continued in the computing field, many of her female peers gave up trying to cross the bridge and left the domain altogether, leading to a substantial decline in the participation of women in computing during the latter half of the twentieth century.



Endnotes

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⁵ Jerry A. Jacobs, “Long-Term Trends in Occupational Segregation by Sex,” *American Journal of Sociology* 95, no. 1 (July 1989): 160, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2780409>; Barbara Reskin, “Sex Segregation in the Workplace,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 241, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2083388>.

⁶ “An act to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States of America to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes,” Public Law 88-352, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 78 (1964), <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/civil-rights-act>; Nancy Maclean, *Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2.

⁷ William H. Chafe, *The Unfinished Journey: American Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 315-21; MacLean, *Freedom Is Not Enough*, 2; Katherine Turk, *Equality on Trial: Gender and Rights in the Modern American Workplace* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 8-10.

⁸ Many scholars of the post-1960s, however, emphasize “declension” narratives regarding civil rights for women and people of color as schools and workplaces have “resegregated” through, for example, homeownership politics. Nevertheless, historians who embrace this “long civil rights movement” argument, as coined by historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, suggest that the legal tools established during the 1960s to combat racism and sexism have led to some real and lasting “affirmative action” and desegregation. Nevertheless, as these historians acknowledge, there have been many losses resulting from neoliberalism and conservative austerity since the 1970s on other fronts that have negatively affected women and people of color. The rise of right-wing politics and increased globalization have led to the destruction of public funds to programs like welfare, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Community Action Agencies, and job training, as well as an assault on American unionism, which has led to its decline. Turk, as well, acknowledges that, rather than allowing women to achieve the same economic status as many men, the “opening of the American workplace” often led to a “gendered division of labor into the age of sex equality by repackaging it as a class divide, lowering the floor for everyone else as they pressed pink-collar jobs into the expanding service sector.” As historian Gabe Winant has shown, the collapse of America’s “industrial core of the economy” in manufacturing and extractive industries like car production, steel, and coal has led to a service economy in which everyone earns less. As Winant suggests, the “labor market surplus brought about the collapse of manufacturing, worsened competition for work, drove down wages, and emboldened employers” to resist worker’s demands and undermine worker bargaining power. In other words, as women gained access to equal economic positions with men, the decline of American unionism meant that all people made less as the workplace became more equal in terms of gender; both working-class white men and men of color joined women in the “same dead-end service jobs” that women had sought to transform. Chafe, *The Unfinished Journey*, 315-21; Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” *The Journal of American History* 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1254-60; MacLean, *Freedom Is Not Enough*, 133; Annelise Orleck, *The War on Poverty: A New*

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⁹ Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053-75.

¹⁰ One subfield of computing scholarship focuses on the manual labor of accounting, running statistics and tabulating, and the way computing has revolutionized modern society. This historiography converges with those of business and political history as corporations, industries, and governments have had to process increasing amounts of data. Michael S. Mahoney, a historian of science and technology, argues that these two narratives converge in the mid-nineteenth century with the introduction of the electronic digital computer and then diverge into different innovations to thread back together by the invention of the internet. This machine-centered history emphasizes the "impact theory" of the interactions between technology and society. These scholars argue that this technological revolution impacted every corner of society and caused the emergence and eventual division of two classes: the trained and the untrained. Historian Paul E. Ceruzzi traces the development of computing starting from the post-World War II Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) to the popular proliferation of the worldwide web during the turn of the twenty-first century and threads a narrative centered on the technical development of computer hardware and software and the pivotal roles of organizations like IBM and the United States government in making significant investments in computer technology. Chris Bernhardt, *Turing's Vision: The Birth of Computer Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 11-12; Paul E. Ceruzzi, *A History of Modern Computing* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 7-8, 15, 298; Martin Davis, *The Universal Computer: The Road from Leibniz to Turing* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), xii; Andy Hertzfeld, *Revolution in the Valley: The Insanely Great Story of How the Mac Was Made* (Sebastopol: O'Reilly

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¹¹ Walter Isaacson, *The Innovators: How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 1-2; Joy Lisi Rankin, *A People's History of Computing in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 2-6.

¹² While the gendered history of computing has been understudied, some historians have begun to discuss the relationship between gender and computing. Historian Jennifer S. Light, who argues that historians have overlooked women's contributions to computing history, focuses on retelling the history of computing, particularly before and during the ENIAC era, through the contributions of the female technicians "rendered invisible." Light forwards the idea that a central paradox in this history is that, although the popular press during World War II perpetuated the narrative that women were entering STEM occupations and jobs that were traditionally masculine, women were also "hidden" during this time in computing history. In the 2010 book *Gender Codes: Why Women Are Leaving Computing*, historian Thomas J. Misa argues for a more comprehensive narrative of why women are leaving computing, noting that the computer field is unique in the large quantity of women who entered it during the mid-twentieth century and how suddenly the number of women in the field fell from 1984 onward. He argues that this decrease in female engagement was largely a result of a masculine work environment that became unwelcoming to women. Jennifer S. Light, "When Computers Were Women," *Technology and Culture* 40, no. 3 (July 1999): 455-83, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25147356>; Thomas J. Misa, "Gender Codes: Defining the Problem," in *Gender Codes: Why Women Are Leaving Computing*, ed. Thomas J. Misa (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 3-6.

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the computing world. Sandra began in the early 1960s, Judy started in the 1970s, and Kalpana and Sandy studied computer science in the 1990s at the bachelor's and graduate levels. They had experience computing for the government, in high school, in university, and in the corporate world. One, now retired, was dedicated to computing her entire life, with her computing career spanning nearly thirty years. Two others are still in computing but transitioned from intensive coding to software applications in the finance world. Another earned a degree in computer science but left for the finance world soon after graduating. The author found these interviewees through academic and personal connections. The author asked the interviewees about how they started coding, why they were interested in coding, and their experiences in university and the computing workforce.

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¹⁷ Cohen, "What Programming's Past Reveals"; Schlombs, "A Gendered Job Carousel," 81; James C. Taylor, *Fragmented Office Jobs and the Computer* (Los Angeles: Center for Quality of Working Life, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1978), 8, <https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/28722/bk0003v0g4z>.

¹⁸ Thomas Haigh, "Masculinity and the Machine Man: Gender in the History of Data Processing," in *Gender Codes: Why Women Are Leaving Computing*, ed. Thomas J. Misa (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 52.

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²⁰ David Alan Grier, *When Computers Were Human* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 140.

²¹ Grier, *When Computers Were Human*, 166-167.

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²⁹ Clark Davis, *Company Men: White-Collar Life and Corporate Cultures in Los Angeles, 1892-1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 145-46.

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
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